# 1NC

## OFF

### 1NC

#### The aff is strengthens free markets and saves capitalism by upholding competition

Parakkal & Bartz-Marvez 13, \*\*Assistant Professor of International Relations, Philadelphia University \*\*Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Miami (\*Raju Parakkal \*\*Sherry Bartz-Marvez, 2013, “Capitalism, democratic capitalism, and the pursuit of antitrust laws,” The Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 58, No. 4, Winter 2013, DOI: 10.1177/0003603X1305800409)

Antitrust laws have historically been associated with countries that possess a free-market capitalist economy, which is understood as an economic system in which competition and the market forces of demand and supply determine economic outcomes. This historical association between capitalism and antitrust laws is evident from the fact that the countries that first adopted national antitrust laws, such as Canada, the United States, and the countries of Western Europe, are countries that have long embraced a market economy. On the contrary, the statist economies of the erstwhile Soviet bloc and many developing countries, for the most part, did not institute antitrust laws of the type associated with free market economies. Notwithstanding these country examples, which indicate a positive association between a capitalist economic system and antitrust laws, there exist arguments that both support and oppose antitrust laws for a capitalist economy. Arguments in support of antitrust laws for a capitalist economy begin with the fundamental understanding that the most important ingredient of a capitalist system is market competition. The presence of a competitive market is vital to achieving the efficiency levels that a capitalist economy seeks. Therefore, competitive forces need to be protected to discipline the market players, especially the dominant ones. By preventing and punishing anticompetitive practices by market players, an antitrust law protects and promotes market competition. 1 In the United States, which is commonly understood to be the leading bastion of free-market capitalism and one of the first countries to enact an antitrust law, the role of antitrust legislation in preserving the capitalist character of its economic system is underscored by the near-constitutional status accorded to its antitrust statues by the U.S. Supreme Court. 2 The Court described these statutes as “the Magna Carta of free enterprise” and “as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.”3 Such a sentiment is appropriate, given that the American antitrust law, the Sherman Act, was passed in 1890 to protect economic competition from rapidly-growing “trusts.”4 While the social and political zeitgeist has changed considerably since the passing of the Sherman Act, the fact remains that antitrust is perceived as key to “protecting consumers against anticompetitive conduct that raises prices, reduces output, and hinders innovation and economic growth.”5 Moreover, it is understood that “competition is a public good, and society cannot expect the victims of anticompetitive conduct to protect themselves.”6 The implication therefore is that government power, through the enforcement of antitrust statutes, is critical to reining in corporate power in order to protect economic competition and capitalism.

#### Anti-trust against big tech is a ruse to restore capitalist competition and impose American ideology on the Global South.

Kwet 20, Visiting Fellow of the Information Society Project at Yale Law School (Michael, October 26th, “A Digital Tech New Deal to break up Big Tech,” *Al Jazeera*, <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/10/26/a-digital-tech-new-deal-to-break-up-big-tech>, Accessed 06-07-2021)

In July, the CEOs of Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon appeared before Congress in an “historic” antitrust hearing. The event was met with great fanfare from the press. In early October, the United States House Judiciary Committee published a 450-page report criticising the anti-competitive business practices of the four giants and recommending new measures to “restore competition” to the market.

Mainstream “tech critics” across the political spectrum of the so-called “techlash” are celebrating this antitrust agenda led by the US Congress and the intellectuals informing the hearings. They see nothing wrong with the American legal system reshaping corporations that dominate markets outside US borders. After all, they accept the notion that the US “owns” the world and see capitalism as the only system imaginable. For them, the reformist goal to “restore” a “capitalism for the people” is seen as the proper way to fix Big Tech. The Americans are joined by European power elites, who are seeking to curb the dominance of Big Tech as part of an effort to increase market share for European companies. Yet the solution to American Big Tech corporations dominating markets across the world cannot come from the American or European pro-capital legal systems. Rather, it has to be a collective effort by the international community, focused on bottom-first redistribution for the Global South, as part of a global transformation towards a sustainable green economy.

The new progressives and neo-Brandeisian antitrust

To understand Big Tech antitrust in the US, we need to understand its origins. The movement was spearheaded by a group of US legal scholars, sometimes called the neo-Brandeisians, named after Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis (1856-1941). As a young lawyer and legal scholar, Brandeis focused on social justice issues and financial power. As corporations restricted competition through “trusts”, he became concerned with how monopoly power could undermine democracy and harm society. His work inspired “antitrust” legislation banning unfair business practices in the US. Decades later, in the 1970s, a conservative group of legal scholars sought to restrict the scope of antitrust in the US. These neoliberals of the Chicago School, led by legal scholar Robert Bork, argued that antitrust should be narrowly concerned with economic efficiency, largely measured by lower prices for consumers. Inspired by the likes of Bork, US courts began ruling that “consumer welfare”, rather than broad concerns about democracy and power, should be the focus of antitrust. Over the past few years, neo-Brandeisian scholars dug into legal history and argued, correctly, that the neoliberal antitrust framework does not work for Big Tech. Its business model cannot always be measured by the price that consumers pay for a firm’s product (eg Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube are “free”), and broader concerns around democracy and equality should inform antitrust. In order to fix Big Tech, they insist, we need to think broadly about antitrust and antimonopoly, much like Louis Brandeis did a century ago. While this all sounds great, a closer look at what neo-Brandesians offer reveals two significant problems with it: one, they want the US to legislate for a problem that concerns the whole world; two, they still insist on a capitalist solution which is incompatible with notions of global social justice and environmental protection.

Big Tech is global

Neo-Brandeisian scholars intend to restructure Big Tech within a framework of US law, spearheaded by US thinkers. However, the firms they want to regulate have a global reach that harms people outside of the US as well. In fact, the central business model of Big Tech is digital colonialism. Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft (GAFAM) are worth more than $5 trillion in total and much of it is profit coming from abroad For example, less than half of Facebook’s revenues come from the US and Canada, while nine of its top 10 user bases are from Global South countries, totalling 957 million users. The US, by comparison, has 190 million users. Most revenue for Apple and Google comes from outside the US as well, and almost half of Microsoft’s revenue comes from abroad. A large majority of Amazon’s total revenue comes from its US operations, but it is expanding globally, and its Amazon Web Services dominate the global cloud market. If we zoom in on individual countries, the scale of the problem becomes even clearer. A small country may provide a tiny fraction of GAFAM’s revenue, but the giants still capture a large share of various markets in that country. For example, in South Africa, Google controls 70 percent of local online advertising, and social media – led by Facebook – another 12 percent. South Africa’s largest media groups take just 8 percent of the pie Some 84 percent of smartphones in South Africa use Google Android operating systems, while 15 percent – Apple; 72 percent of desktop computers have Microsoft Windows, while 17 percent – Apple. Other products and services, such as e-hailing, streaming entertainment, search, cloud and office suites are also dominated by American firms. This dynamic repeats throughout the world. US tech reformers have little to say about the global nature of US tech transnationals, or about why laws regulated by the US government should reshape the core structure of global behemoths. Most of them also no longer discuss how the partnership between the National Security Agency and Big Tech promotes American military imperial interests outside of the US.

The best neo-Brandeisian scholars can argue is that their proposals would weaken the stranglehold of the Silicon Valley beyond US borders. But this is not enough to resolve the problem and does nothing to address the looming environmental catastrophe we are facing.

‘Kinder capitalism’ does not work

US tech reformers assume that market competition – supplemented by new privacy laws, public utility regulation, and some publicly subsidised, non-profit alternatives – is the solution to the power of monopoly. However, they do not address the problem of how private property in a capitalist marketplace creates inequality in the first place. Would “competitive markets” really benefit the Global South? Competition means beating other people out, and poorer people and nations are naturally disadvantaged in such a competition. After “restoring competition” to the tech economy, those who will dominate as “new market entrants” on the “open” internet will still be companies from richer countries: the US, European powers, China, etc, not low-income countries like Zimbabwe, Bolivia or Cambodia. And within low-income countries, the well-resourced classes will capture any new market opportunities that an antitrust push in the US may open. Indeed, reformers assume we can restore “competitive capitalism” while we are staring at the abyss of permanent environmental destruction. Proponents of capitalism maintain that we can grow our way to poverty alleviation and innovate to stop climate change and environmental degradation. But estimates show that under the growth model of the past few decades, the global economy would require a 175-fold increase in global consumption and production just to bring billions of poor people up to a meagre $5 per day. And in the process, we would most definitely destroy the environment. Degrowth researchers have demonstrated that capitalism is fatally flawed. A capitalist economy focuses on profit and growth, which increases greenhouse gas emissions overheating the planet and leads to over-extraction of material resources, which results in ecological collapses. The richest nations are dependent on material extraction from the poorest. High-income countries have the worst material footprint, with a consumption level of about 26 tonnes per person per year, when the sustainable level is about eight tonnes per person globally. Low-income countries consume about two tonnes per person per year. The Big Tech industry contributes to environmental destruction in several ways. E-waste now accounts for five percent of all global waste, and it is growing, in large part because gadgets are built with short lifespans. Instead of designing products that can last a long time, Big Tech has lobbied to kill “right to repair” laws, which would allow consumers to get their devices repaired or buy spare parts from third parties. What is more, Big Tech directly contributes to inequality by extracting wealth from the poor and concentrating in the hands of a few US-based executives, shareholders and highly paid professionals. At the same time, it exploits workers and often denies them safe and dignified working conditions. Digital capitalists also encourage consumerism through ads and monetise surveillance, which is destroying privacy, with grave consequences for civil rights and liberties. Private ownership of the means of computation – software code, infrastructure and the internet – is required to extract money for content, force ads on audiences and spy on users. If the people own and control the digital environment, they would opt to share knowledge freely, reject ads and protect their privacy.

Solutions: Tech for Extinction Rebellion

It goes without saying that any solution for the digital economy must be part and parcel of a sustainable green economy. This, in turn, requires rapid wealth and income redistribution and degrowth. It is a monumental task.

Fortunately, there are some reasonable ways forward.

First, we can phase out copyright paywalls and patents. Such a move would enjoy the support of activists in the Global South and Global North, and would make the world’s scientific and cultural knowledge available to all people, irrespective of their ability to pay. Of course, equitable information sharing and generation also requires resources to bridge the digital divide and make use of scientific knowledge.

Second, software can be placed under strong free and open-source licences, online services can be decentralised, interoperable and owned by communities, while internet infrastructure can be fully socialised as communal property. The global Free Software Movement and activist scholars have already built a preliminary foundation and framework for moving in this direction.

Third, an eco-socialist Digital Tech New Deal has to be implemented to reorient the tech economy away from profit and towards satisfying the needs of the people. This requires socialising financial, intellectual and physical property. As first steps, we could impose heavy taxes on the rich to fund a global digital commons, produce plans to phase out private ownership of information and the means of computation, support workers and mandate economic redistribution to the global poor, and build a privacy-by-design tech ecosystem. All of this must be done within the confines of a sustainable economy.

These solutions need to be part of the global movement for wealth redistribution, reparations, and democratisation. In South Africa, we are building a People’s Tech for People’s Power movement to drive this agenda forward, through popular education and the formation of solidarity networks to launch actions against Big Tech and digital capitalism.

There already is a good historical precedent for global action against Big Tech. During South Africa’s apartheid era, people around the world initiated boycotts, divestment and sanctions (BDS) against corporations like IBM and Hewlett-Packard, which aided and abetted the apartheid state and businesses.

US corporations, in response, pushed a reformist agenda called the Sullivan Principles said to improve racial equality for workers. But anti-apartheid activists rejected the move as corporate propaganda designed to manufacture consent while US corporations continued to profit from apartheid misery. Today, the US resembles the South African apartheid state, but on a global scale. Its high-tech military projects power across the world, its diplomats impose strong intellectual property protections at the World Trade Organization, its imperialist anti-immigrant policies control the movement of people and capital, and its tech corporations dominate nearly every industry vertical outside of mainland China, all while creating a global police state. We do not need 21st century Sullivan Principles to save digital capitalism. We need digital socialism, reparations and democratisation of tech for a global green economy. This is a matter of survival for the whole human race.

#### Tech industry innovation empowers digital policing and conceals racialized labor extraction.

Miller 20, dissertation for a PhD in cultural studies @ the University of California Davis. (Andrea, “Environmental Order: Making and Securing Ecosystems from Nuclear to Cyber”, Office of Graduate Studies, University of California Davis, pg. 95-97)---language edited, brackets

Importantly, this connectivity is animated by overlapping but irreducible notions of racialized pathogenic threat as well as the areas of profit and development generated through practices of pacification. As Tyler Wall, Parastou Saberi, and George Jackson describe, pacification “involves the production of the multi-dimensional and multi-scale conditions for capital accumulation.”13 In the city, the profiteering of pacification occurs under the guise of real estate development and revitalization—the “cleaning up the block” of community policing.14 In the cyber center, this profiteering takes place through shared attunements, capital investments, product development, training, and policing in cybersecurity across higher education, military and police, and industry under the guise of play and innovation. Neither ecosystem is mutually exclusive: the success and expansion of the Georgia Cyber Center catalyzes urban redevelopment projects, and the enactment of urban redevelopment projects in turn consolidates the position of the Georgia Cyber Center in the city and regional economy. The language of the ecosystem not only operationalizes these intertwined projects but also renders natural and desirable economic imperatives that turn on practices of pacification, where “pacification seeks to break down the apparent division between coercion and consent, uniting them in a single concept.”15 Here, pacification is capacious enough to account for all manner of security practices unassumingly mobilized through practices of play, beautification, and, as I propose below, the multicultural values of inclusion and diversity that order the very architecture of the Georgia Cyber Center itself. During a lull in the capture-the-flag event, I wandered out to the lobby of the building where a popular Augusta coffee shop had opened a small café. I recognized the barista from the café’s other location, a Black graduate student whom I’d come to know during my time in the city. After exchanging pleasantries, our conversation turned to Kenney’s large collage occupying the wall nearest the café. He told me it had only just arrived in the last day or so and that it hadn’t been there during his last shift. The barista and I pored over the collage; we could not decide what to make of it. We were intrigued but also confused. At the outset, it appeared to offer a possible critique of US military power and empire, but how had it wound up here as the centerpiece of the main building’s lobby? As we continued to mull over the various aspects of the collage, we honed in on the multicultural huddle of people at the ziggurat’s base as the barista described the political and racial contradictions that he faced working in the cyber center. The barista described that elements of the collage felt eerily like an amalgam for his experience of the cyber center, which he described as a “dystopian” space. He recounted conversations with one of the Georgia Technology Authority officials who worked from the building, noting that he regularly questioned her about the lack of racial diversity he saw amongst the people moving through the space. While the official indicated that the center valued diversity and inclusion, the barista noted that there was a stark contradiction between the cyber center’s claims to multiculturalism and the actual spectrum of people he saw working in and studying cybersecurity there. With the exception of some military personnel and service, janitorial, and maintenance staff, the cyber center was, by his account, a predominantly white male space. Almost on cue during this conversation, we observed a group of army soldiers in fatigues leaving a secured video conference. Some white, some non-white, they passed through the hallway to our side, and we watched as they exited the building where three nonwhite workers were busy cleaning the glass door and windows, rather uncannily elucidating my acquaintance’s point. Indeed, the contradictions highlighted by the barista point to some of the structuring contradictions of the tech industry multiculturalism used as the basis for the construction and operation of the Georgia Cyber Center. Multiculturalism in the tech industry, as in twenty-first-century market capitalism more broadly, is an uneven and contradictory formation that manages social difference through practices of conditional inclusion and exclusion.16 Tech industry multiculturalism not only promises practices of diverse and inclusive hiring but also connotes an attention to multicultural approaches to labor optimization and productivity, such as its turn to Buddhist practices of mindfulness.17 Within tech industry multiculturalism, however, espoused commitments to inclusion and diversity actually work to conceal the racialized aspects of social reproduction and undervalued labor that make their operations possible.18 This labor includes service workers like my acquaintance, janitorial and maintenance staff, and laborers engaged in mining, assembling, and transporting the materials necessary for digital technologies. And in the cybersecurity center or the proliferation data fusion centers that provide shared spaces for local, state, and federal police digital operations around the United States,19 this also includes those persons from whom data is extracted.20 Extracted data accrues value both financially and as a threat to be pursued. In this sense, the value of data is perhaps perversely though accurately described by the military term “target of opportunity.”

#### 1AC Hovenkamp says the aff changes Intellectual property ⁠— that’s the language of the colonizer.

Vats 21, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law with a secondary appointment in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh. (Anjali, “Temporality in time of TAM, or towards racial chronopolitics of intellectual property law”, *IDEA*: The Law Review of the Franklin Pierce Center for Intellectual Property, 61(3), 686-687)

"Intellectual property's economic structure is 'always already' raced," 4 2 because capitalism's orientation to knowledge is always already raced. Betsy Rosenblatt, for instance, demonstrates about copyright law that "[i]t rewards appropriation of materials perceived as primitive, raw, or 'folk' by purveyors of dominant culture, while punishing appropriation of materials that it associates with higher culture or views as already completed."4 3 As such, copyright law operates as "the language of the colonizer." 44 Kara Swanson similarly shows about patent law that its "ideology of slavery reached into the technical bureaucracy of the patent office, an arena of law and of the administrative state frequently considered outside politics." 45 As such, patent law implicates "an ultimate claim of whiteness as intellectual property." 46 Knowledge, in both instances, is ordered in a manner that centers whiteness and its attendant estimations of the value of creation and knowledge. Trademark law too produces and entrenches visual economies of whiteness. Rosemary Coombe writes that trademarks "denied or downplayed the cultural and ethnic differences of some 'Americans"' through "the medium of the consuming body and embodiment...of others whose claims to an American subjectivity were complicated by contemporary relations of subjugation."47 Put differently, America's visual culture, as constituted through trademark law, constituted whiteness as valuable by objectifying people of color. One way that the "scopic regime"48 of trademark law operated was through the articulation of people of color as primitive, i.e. from a time past. As Coombe puts it, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries "we see preoccupation with the frontiers of civilization and the containment of the primitive."49 In the sections that follow, I explore how Harjo and Blackhorse not only reinforce temporally based race discrimination by portraying Native Americans as primitive but also illustrate how the manipulation of time through legal procedure can advantage certain litigants over others, with considerable racial and colonial consequences."50

#### Reject sanctions as an ineffective and brutal tool of imperial power

Addis 3 (Adeno Addis is William Ray Forrester Professor of Public and Constitutional Law at Tulane University Law School. He received his B.A. and LL.B. (Honours) from Macquarie University (Australia), and an LL.M. and a J.S.D from Yale. He has published extensively in the areas of American constitutional law, communications law, human rights, and jurisprudence. Human Rights Quarterly 25.3 (2003) 573-623)

In fact, as argued earlier, in a general sense, a major reason for the ineffectiveness of economic sanctions is a result of this conceptual confusion. In relation to the behavior modification objective, it was argued earlier that economic sanctions falsely assume that the people of the target state could pressure the regime to alter the offending policies and behavior. Many studies indicate that multilateral (or, for that matter, even unilateral) economic sanctions do not often force regimes to alter their conduct or policy. To add another voice to that general conclusion, below are comments from the Sub-Commission of the UN Commission on Human Rights: The "theory" behind economic sanctions is that economic pressure on civilians will translate into pressure on the Government for change. This "theory" is bankrupt both legally and practically, as more and more evidence testifies to the inefficacy of comprehensive economic sanctions as a coercive tool. The traditional calculation of balancing civilian suffering against the desired political effects is giving way to the realization that the efficacy of a sanctions regime is in inverse proportion to its impact on civilians. 94 This is not to say, of course, that sanctions are not economically effective—they are. They have devastating impacts on the target nation and its citizens, as the UN sanctions against Iraq and US trade embargoes against Cuba 95 [End Page 606] testify. The point here, rather, is that "the relation[ship] between economic effectiveness and political effectiveness is not at all clear; indeed, it may be an inverse relation." 96 An unaccountable regime will always externalize the cost from itself and its supporters to the ordinary citizens. And the power of the ordinary citizen to punish the regime for the consequences of the sanction is rather negligible, if not non-existent. A newspaper report on the effects of the decade old UN imposed sanctions against Iraq concluded that in Baghdad those sanctions have created two classes of people, a small group of citizens who are "close to the ruling circles" and who are still doing very well, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the overwhelming majority of Iraqi citizens "whose income has been so devalued that few . . . can afford a helping of chicken at al-Sa'ah [the equivalent of Kentucky Fried Chicken]." 97 Treating civilians in such circumstances effectively as "outlaws" is the cruelest form of indifference. Economic effectiveness does not correlate with political effectiveness. 98 Even in relation to the identity-constituting objective, many of the sanction regimes seem to be spectacularly unsuccessful. The image they project is not an international community that believes in the centrality of human rights as its very identity, but the opposite. Once again, consider Iraq. When the lives of many civilians, including many children, are put at risk or even lost as a result of sanctions, part of whose purpose is said, at least publicly, to be the protection of human rights, 99 the image (the identity) [End Page 607] of the international community becomes one that is quite willing to sacrifice the rights and lives of a considerable number of individuals from certain parts of the world to achieve certain political goals. For many individuals from developing countries and from non-western traditions, this suspicion gets strengthened when they hear statements such as the one from former US Secretary of State and Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeline Albright. Albright was asked by Lesley Stahl of "60 Minutes" whether the death of a half-million people—which reports had suggested might have taken place—was an acceptable price for sanctions and Albrght responded: "we think the price is worth it." 100 The image of the international community is, therefore, one that devalues not only non-western traditions and horizons of significance, 101 but the very lives of non-western peoples as well. 102 A public attempt to dissociate oneself from evil ends up creating an even greater evil.

#### That legitimizes violent neoliberal governance AND masks structural violence

Nieto 11, Professor at University of Icesi (Diego Nieto, 2011, “Neoliberalism, Biopolitics, and the Governance of Transnational Crime,” Colombia Internacional, 76, pp. 137-165)

CONCLUSION: SECURITY BEYOND NEOLIBERALISM

In the context of biopolitics, crime has a significant place to make sense of what is at stake in global governance. Crime discloses at least two very important dimensions: first, how the idea of a transnational governmentality is thought of through defining threats to the global society; and second, that power over subjects is exercised through various mechanisms derived from these “racist” discourses of criminal threats. Many of us have experienced these mechanisms of control exposed in the last part of the article, where the “fear” of terror and crime**—**typical biopolitical discourses—triggers forms of regulations and surveillance that go well beyond the fight against organized crime and terrorism itself. These mechanisms discipline subjects and control populations, devise policies targeting and classifying “dangerous” places and people, and in the end divide the world between the “respectable” and the outlaw and reckless populations. This last point is critical, and the place of neoliberalism in this discourse cannot be underestimated. Neoliberalism has a very specific definition of the ethos of the respectable individual, and therefore, of the valuable ways of enjoying freedom. For all neoliberalism’s defense of individual freedom, it is significant to see how, whereas entrepreneurs and millionaires are welcomed to enjoy the “benefits" of globalization (and accordingly policing mechanisms are designed), the vast majority of the population suffers all these controls and the severe consequences of diffuse wars such as those on drugs and terror. This is the great paradox of biopolitical power in neoliberal politics: to enhance individual freedom, neoliberalism must deploy many forms of power over subjects. As Foucault says about the interplay in liberalism between freedom and apparatuses of security: “The problems of what I shall call the economy of power peculiar to liberalism are internally sustained, as it were, by this interplay of freedom and security... the horsemen of the Apocalypse disappear and in their place everyday dangers appear, emerge, and spread everywhere... there is no liberalism without a culture of danger” (Foucault 2008, 65, 67). The neoliberal rationality of crime control epitomizes this paradox, illustrating how the homo economicus has become the grid and interface between the individual and the technologies of power designed for governing the population. In this way, thanks to this fundamental connection between the problems of the market and the problems of security and crime, a re-territorialization of forms of power takes place. The global assemblage for governing crime constitutes the extension of a political imagination of freedom to the production of subjects and populations through security apparatuses. My contention is that if we consider there is something questionable, normatively and in the practical consequences brought about by the mechanisms of policing and securitization developed over the last few decades (let alone the wars on drugs and terror), we cannot separate our criticism from a profound examination of the neoliberal rationality underlying them. This also demands we must re-imagine the interplay between freedom and security beyond neoliberalism.

#### Capitalism causes extinction ⁠— climate change, nuclear war, democratic collapse, extreme inequality, disease, prison-industrial complex, and perpetual exploitation of the Global South; it’s try-or-die for a transition

Foster 19, Sociology Professor at the University of Oregon (John Bellamy Foster, 2-1-2019, “Capitalism Has Failed—What Next?,” The Monthly Review, Vol. 70, Issue 9, <https://monthlyreview.org/2019/02/01/capitalism-has-failed-what-next/>)

Less than two decades into the twenty-first century, it is evident that capitalism has failed as a social system. The world is mired in economic stagnation, financialization, and the most extreme inequality in human history, accompanied by mass unemployment and underemployment, precariousness, poverty, hunger, wasted output and lives, and what at this point can only be called a planetary ecological “death spiral.”1 The digital revolution, the greatest technological advance of our time, has rapidly mutated from a promise of free communication and liberated production into new means of surveillance, control, and displacement of the working population. The institutions of liberal democracy are at the point of collapse, while fascism, the rear guard of the capitalist system, is again on the march, along with patriarchy, racism, imperialism, and war. To say that capitalism is a failed system is not, of course, to suggest that its breakdown and disintegration is imminent.2 It does, however, mean that it has passed from being a historically necessary and creative system at its inception to being a historically unnecessary and destructive one in the present century. Today, more than ever, the world is faced with the epochal choice between “the revolutionary reconstitution of society at large and the common ruin of the contending classes.”3 Indications of this failure of capitalism are everywhere. Stagnation of investment punctuated by bubbles of financial expansion, which then inevitably burst, now characterizes the so-called free market.4 Soaring inequality in income and wealth has its counterpart in the declining material circumstances of a majority of the population. Real wages for most workers in the United States have barely budged in forty years despite steadily rising productivity.5 Work intensity has increased, while work and safety protections on the job have been systematically jettisoned. Unemployment data has become more and more meaningless due to a new institutionalized underemployment in the form of contract labor in the gig economy.6 Unions have been reduced to mere shadows of their former glory as capitalism has asserted totalitarian control over workplaces. With the demise of Soviet-type societies, social democracy in Europe has perished in the new atmosphere of “liberated capitalism.”7 The capture of the surplus value produced by overexploited populations in the poorest regions of the world, via the global labor arbitrage instituted by multinational corporations, is leading to an unprecedented amassing of financial wealth at the center of the world economy and relative poverty in the periphery.8 Around $21 trillion of offshore funds are currently lodged in tax havens on islands mostly in the Caribbean, constituting “the fortified refuge of Big Finance.”9 Technologically driven monopolies resulting from the global-communications revolution, together with the rise to dominance of Wall Street-based financial capital geared to speculative asset creation, have further contributed to the riches of today’s “1 percent.” Forty-two billionaires now enjoy as much wealth as half the world’s population, while the three richest men in the United States—Jeff Bezos, Bill Gates, and Warren Buffett—have more wealth than half the U.S. population.10 In every region of the world, inequality has increased sharply in recent decades.11 The gap in per capita income and wealth between the richest and poorest nations, which has been the dominant trend for centuries, is rapidly widening once again.12 More than 60 percent of the world’s employed population, some two billion people, now work in the impoverished informal sector, forming a massive global proletariat. The global reserve army of labor is some 70 percent larger than the active labor army of formally employed workers.13 Adequate health care, housing, education, and clean water and air are increasingly out of reach for large sections of the population, even in wealthy countries in North America and Europe, while transportation is becoming more difficult in the United States and many other countries due to irrationally high levels of dependency on the automobile and disinvestment in public transportation. Urban structures are more and more characterized by gentrification and segregation, with cities becoming the playthings of the well-to-do while marginalized populations are shunted aside. About half a million people, most of them children, are homeless on any given night in the United States.14 New York City is experiencing a major rat infestation, attributed to warming temperatures, mirroring trends around the world.15 In the United States and other high-income countries, life expectancy is in decline, with a remarkable resurgence of Victorian illnesses related to poverty and exploitation. In Britain, gout, scarlet fever, whooping cough, and even scurvy are now resurgent, along with tuberculosis. With inadequate enforcement of work health and safety regulations, black lung disease has returned with a vengeance in U.S. coal country.16 Overuse of antibiotics, particularly by capitalist agribusiness, is leading to an antibiotic-resistance crisis, with the dangerous growth of superbugs generating increasing numbers of deaths, which by mid–century could surpass annual cancer deaths, prompting the World Health Organization to declare a “global health emergency.”17 These dire conditions, arising from the workings of the system, are consistent with what Frederick Engels, in the Condition of the Working Class in England, called “social murder.”18 At the instigation of giant corporations, philanthrocapitalist foundations, and neoliberal governments, public education has been restructured around corporate-designed testing based on the implementation of robotic common-core standards. This is generating massive databases on the student population, much of which are now being surreptitiously marketed and sold.19 The corporatization and privatization of education is feeding the progressive subordination of children’s needs to the cash nexus of the commodity market. We are thus seeing a dramatic return of Thomas Gradgrind’s and Mr. M’Choakumchild’s crass utilitarian philosophy dramatized in Charles Dickens’s Hard Times: “Facts are alone wanted in life” and “You are never to fancy.”20 Having been reduced to intellectual dungeons, many of the poorest, most racially segregated schools in the United States are mere pipelines for prisons or the military.21 More than two million people in the United States are behind bars, a higher rate of incarceration than any other country in the world, constituting a new Jim Crow. The total population in prison is nearly equal to the number of people in Houston, Texas, the fourth largest U.S. city. African Americans and Latinos make up 56 percent of those incarcerated, while constituting only about 32 percent of the U.S. population. Nearly 50 percent of American adults, and a much higher percentage among African Americans and Native Americans, have an immediate family member who has spent or is currently spending time behind bars. Both black men and Native American men in the United States are nearly three times, Hispanic men nearly two times, more likely to die of police shootings than white men.22 Racial divides are now widening across the entire planet. Violence against women and the expropriation of their unpaid labor, as well as the higher level of exploitation of their paid labor, are integral to the way in which power is organized in capitalist society—and how it seeks to divide rather than unify the population. More than a third of women worldwide have experienced physical/sexual violence. Women’s bodies, in particular, are objectified, reified, and commodified as part of the normal workings of monopoly-capitalist marketing.23 The mass media-propaganda system, part of the larger corporate matrix, is now merging into a social media-based propaganda system that is more porous and seemingly anarchic, but more universal and more than ever favoring money and power. Utilizing modern marketing and surveillance techniques, which now dominate all digital interactions, vested interests are able to tailor their messages, largely unchecked, to individuals and their social networks, creating concerns about “fake news” on all sides.24 Numerous business entities promising technological manipulation of voters in countries across the world have now surfaced, auctioning off their services to the highest bidders.25 The elimination of net neutrality in the United States means further concentration, centralization, and control over the entire Internet by monopolistic service providers. Elections are increasingly prey to unregulated “dark money” emanating from the coffers of corporations and the billionaire class. Although presenting itself as the world’s leading democracy, the United States, as Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy stated in Monopoly Capital in 1966, “is democratic in form and plutocratic in content.”26 In the Trump administration, following a long-established tradition, 72 percent of those appointed to the cabinet have come from the higher corporate echelons, while others have been drawn from the military.27 War, engineered by the United States and other major powers at the apex of the system, has become perpetual in strategic oil regions such as the Middle East, and threatens to escalate into a global thermonuclear exchange. During the Obama administration, the United States was engaged in wars/bombings in seven different countries—Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan.28 Torture and assassinations have been reinstituted by Washington as acceptable instruments of war against those now innumerable individuals, group networks, and whole societies that are branded as terrorist. A new Cold War and nuclear arms race is in the making between the United States and Russia, while Washington is seeking to place road blocks to the continued rise of China. The Trump administration has created a new space force as a separate branch of the military in an attempt to ensure U.S. dominance in the militarization of space. Sounding the alarm on the increasing dangers of a nuclear war and of climate destabilization, the distinguished Bulletin of Atomic Scientists moved its doomsday clock in 2018 to two minutes to midnight, the closest since 1953, when it marked the advent of thermonuclear weapons.29 Increasingly severe economic sanctions are being imposed by the United States on countries like Venezuela and Nicaragua, despite their democratic elections—or because of them. Trade and currency wars are being actively promoted by core states, while racist barriers against immigration continue to be erected in Europe and the United States as some 60 million refugees and internally displaced peoples flee devastated environments. Migrant populations worldwide have risen to 250 million, with those residing in high-income countries constituting more than 14 percent of the populations of those countries, up from less than 10 percent in 2000. Meanwhile, ruling circles and wealthy countries seek to wall off islands of power and privilege from the mass of humanity, who are to be left to their fate.30 More than three-quarters of a billion people, over 10 percent of the world population, are chronically malnourished.31 Food stress in the United States keeps climbing, leading to the rapid growth of cheap dollar stores selling poor quality and toxic food. Around forty million Americans, representing one out of eight households, including nearly thirteen million children, are food insecure.32 Subsistence farmers are being pushed off their lands by agribusiness, private capital, and sovereign wealth funds in a global depeasantization process that constitutes the greatest movement of people in history.33 Urban overcrowding and poverty across much of the globe is so severe that one can now reasonably refer to a “planet of slums.”34 Meanwhile, the world housing market is estimated to be worth up to $163 trillion (as compared to the value of gold mined over all recorded history, estimated at $7.5 trillion).35 The Anthropocene epoch, first ushered in by the Great Acceleration of the world economy immediately after the Second World War, has generated enormous rifts in planetary boundaries, extending from climate change to ocean acidification, to the sixth extinction, to disruption of the global nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, to the loss of freshwater, to the disappearance of forests, to widespread toxic-chemical and radioactive pollution.36 It is now estimated that 60 percent of the world’s wildlife vertebrate population (including mammals, reptiles, amphibians, birds, and fish) have been wiped out since 1970, while the worldwide abundance of invertebrates has declined by 45 percent in recent decades.37 What climatologist James Hansen calls the “species exterminations” resulting from accelerating climate change and rapidly shifting climate zones are only compounding this general process of biodiversity loss. Biologists expect that half of all species will be facing extinction by the end of the century.38 If present climate-change trends continue, the “global carbon budget” associated with a 2°C increase in average global temperature will be broken in sixteen years (while a 1.5°C increase in global average temperature—staying beneath which is the key to long-term stabilization of the climate—will be reached in a decade). Earth System scientists warn that the world is now perilously close to a Hothouse Earth, in which catastrophic climate change will be locked in and irreversible.39 The ecological, social, and economic costs to humanity of continuing to increase carbon emissions by 2.0 percent a year as in recent decades (rising in 2018 by 2.7 percent—3.4 percent in the United States), and failing to meet the minimal 3.0 percent annual reductions in emissions currently needed to avoid a catastrophic destabilization of the earth’s energy balance, are simply incalculable.40 Nevertheless, major energy corporations continue to lie about climate change, promoting and bankrolling climate denialism—while admitting the truth in their internal documents. These corporations are working to accelerate the extraction and production of fossil fuels, including the dirtiest, most greenhouse gas-generating varieties, reaping enormous profits in the process. The melting of the Arctic ice from global warming is seen by capital as a new El Dorado, opening up massive additional oil and gas reserves to be exploited without regard to the consequences for the earth’s climate. In response to scientific reports on climate change, Exxon Mobil declared that it intends to extract and sell all of the fossil-fuel reserves at its disposal.41 Energy corporations continue to intervene in climate negotiations to ensure that any agreements to limit carbon emissions are defanged. Capitalist countries across the board are putting the accumulation of wealth for a few above combatting climate destabilization, threatening the very future of humanity.

#### Racial capitalism outweighs ⁠— the current system necessitates super-exploitation of the Global South, colonial dispossession, militaristic imperialism, and racial hierarchies to sustain itself; the system must be rejected on ethical grounds

Burden-Stelly 20, Visiting Scholar in the Race and Capitalism Project at the University of Chicago, Assistant Professor of Africana Studies and Political Science at Carleton College (Charisse Burden-Stelly, 7-1-2020, “Modern U.S. Racial Capitalism,” The Monthly Review, Vol. 72, Number 3, [https://monthlyreview.org/2020/07/01/modern-u-s-racial-capitalism/)](https://monthlyreview.org/2020/07/01/modern-u-s-racial-capitalism/)%20)

Drawing on the intellectual production of twentieth-century Black anticapitalists, I theorize modern U.S. racial capitalism as a racially hierarchical political economy constituting war and militarism, imperialist accumulation, expropriation by domination, and labor superexploitation.14 The racial here specifically refers to Blackness, defined as African descendants’ relationship to the capitalist mode of production—their structural location—and the condition, status, and material realities emanating therefrom.15 It is out of this structural location that the irresolvable contradiction of value minus worth arises. Stated differently, Blackness is a capacious category of surplus value extraction essential to an array of political-economic functions, including accumulation, disaccumulation, debt, planned obsolescence, and absorption of the burdens of economic crises.16 At the same time, Blackness is the quintessential condition of disposability, expendability, and devalorization.

Footnote 14: Another feature of modern U.S. racial capitalism is property by dispossession. In Theft Is Property! Dispossession and Critical Theory, Robert Nichols draws on the experience of Indigenous peoples in the United States, Canada, and New Zealand to theorize how the “system of landed property” was fundamentally predicated on violent dispossession. While the Anglo-derived legal-political regimes differed in these localities, the “intertwined and co-constitutive” material effects converged in the legalized theft of indigenous territory amounting in “approximately 6 percent of the total land on the surface of Earth.” Such dispossession, Nichols notes, is recursive: “In a standard formulation one would assume that ‘property’ is logically, chronologically, and normatively prior to ‘theft.’ However, in this (colonial) context, theft is the mechanism and means by which property is generated: hence its recursivity. Recursive dispossession is effectively a form of property-generating theft.” As such, theft and dispossession, through property regimes, are an ongoing feature of the Indigenous reality of modern U.S. racial capitalism. Robert Nichols, Theft Is Property! Dispossession and Critical Theory (Durham: Duke University Press, 2020), 50–51.

Footnote 15: Borrowing from Karl Marx’s dictum that the labor process is the hidden abode of the capitalist production of value, and Nancy Fraser’s conceptualization of reproduction as the even more hidden abode, or background condition, for the possibility of capitalist production, I understand Blackness as the obfuscated abode. The immense value of Blackness is obscured and rendered unintelligible by its positioning as worthlessness, as something that does not amount to anything—but that does not equal nothing. As a structural location at the intersection of indispensability and disposability, Blackness exceeds the category of race, is not reducible to class, and does not fit the specifications of caste.

My operationalization of capitalism follows Oliver Cromwell Cox’s explication in Capitalism and American Leadership.17 Modern U.S. racial capitalism arose in the context of the First World War, when, as Cox explains, the United States took advantage of the conflict to capture the markets of South America, Asia, and Africa for its “over-expanded capacity.”18 Cox further expounds upon this auspicious moment of ascendant modern U.S. racial capitalism thus: By 1914, the United States had brought its superb natural resources within reach of intensive exploitation. Under the stimulus of its foreign-trade outlets, the financial assistance of the older capitalist nations, and a flexible system of protective tariffs, the nation developed a magnificent work of transportation and communication so that its mines, factories, and farms became integrated into an effectively producing organism having easy access to its seaports.… [Likewise,] further internal expansion depended upon far greater emphasis on an ever widening foreign commerce.… Major entrepreneurs of the United States proceeded to step up their campaign for expansion abroad. The war accentuated this movement. It accelerated the growth of [modern] American [racial] capitalism and impressed upon its leaders as nothing had before the need for external markets.19 Relatedly, Peter James Hudson argues that the First World War fundamentally changed the terms of order of international finance, allowing New York to compete with London, Paris, and Berlin for the first time in the realm of global banking. This was not least because the Great War “drastically reordered global credit flows,” with the United States transforming from a debtor into a creditor nation.20 In addition to Latin American and Caribbean nations and businesses turning to the United States for financing and credit, domestic saving and investment patterns were altered to the benefit of imperial financial institutions like the City Bank.21 Although the United States is, to use Cox’s terminology, more a “lusty child of an already highly developed capitalism” than an exceptional capitalist power, the nation perfected its techniques of accumulation through its vast natural wealth, large domestic market, imbalance of Northern and Southern economies, and, importantly, through its lack of concern for the political and economic welfare of the overwhelming masses of its population, least of all the descendants of the enslaved.22 Modern U.S. racial capitalism is thus sustained by military expenditure, the maintenance of an extremely low standard of living in “dependent” countries, and the domestic superexploitation of Black toilers and laborers. Cox notes that Black labor has been the “chief human factor” in wealth production; as such, “the dominant economic class has always been at the motivating center of the spreads of racial antagonism. This is to be expected since the economic content of the antagonism, especially at its proliferating source in the South, has been precisely that of labor-capital relations.”23 In a general sense, racial capitalism in the United States constitutes “a peculiar variant of capitalist production” in which Blackness expresses a structural location at the bottom of the labor hierarchy characterized by depressed wages, working conditions, job opportunities, and widespread exclusion from labor unions.24 Furthermore, modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the imbrication of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism. Anti-Blackness describes the reduction of Blackness to a category of abjection and subjection through narrations of absolute biological or cultural difference; ruling-class monopolization of political power; negative and derogatory mass media propaganda; the ascent of discriminatory legislation that maintains and reinscribes inequality, not least various modes of segregation; and social relations in which distrust and antipathy toward those racialized as Black is normalized and in which “interracial mass behavior involving violence assumes a continuously potential danger.”25 Anti-Blackness thus conceals the inherent contradiction of Blackness—value minus worth—obscuring and distorting its structural location by, as Ralph and Singhal remark, contorting it into only a “debilitated condition.”26 Antiradicalism can be understood as the physical and discursive repression and condemnation of anticapitalist and/or left-leaning ideas, politics, practices, and modes of organizing that are construed as subversive, seditious, and otherwise threatening to capitalist society. These include, but are not limited to, internationalism, anti-imperialism, anticolonialism, peace activism, and antisexism. Anti-Blackness and antiradicalism function as the legitimating architecture of modern U.S. racial capitalism, which includes rationalizing discourses, cultural narratives, technologies of repression, legal structures, and social practices that inform and are informed by racial capitalism’s political economy.27 Throughout the twentieth century, anti-Blackness propelled the “Black Scare,” defined as the specter of racial, social, and economic domination of superior whites by inferior Black populations. Antiradicalism, in turn, was enunciated through the “Red Scare,” understood as the threat of communist takeover, infiltration, and disruption of the American way of life.28 For example, in the 1919 Justice Department Report, Radicalism and Sedition Among the Negroes, As Reflected in Their Publications, it was asserted that the radical antigovernment stance of a certain class of Negroes was manifested in their “ill-governed reaction toward race rioting,” “threat of retaliatory measures in connection with lynching,” open demand for social equality, identification with the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), and “outspoken advocacy of the Bolshevik or Soviet doctrine.”29 Here, anti-Blackness, articulated through the fear of the “assertion of race consciousness,” was attached to the IWW and Bolshevism—in other words, to anticapitalism—to make it appear even more subversive and dangerous. Likewise, antiradicalism, expressed through the denigration of the IWW and Soviet Doctrine, was made to seem all the more threatening and antithetical to the social order in its linkage with Black insistence on equality and self-defense against racial terrorism. In this way, “defiance and insolently race-centered condemnation of the white race” and “the Negro seeing red” came to be understood as seditious in the context of modern U.S. racial capitalism. The link between my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism and Robinson’s catholic theory of racial capitalism, beyond his “suggest[ion] that it was there,” is vivified through the prison abolitionist and scholar Ruth Wilson Gilmore, who writes: “Capitalism…[is] never not racial.… Racial capitalism: a mode of production developed in agriculture, improved by enclosure in the Old World, and captive land and labor in the Americas, perfected in slavery’s time-motion, field factory choreography, its imperative forged on the anvils of imperial war-making monarchs.”30 Racial capitalism, she continues, “requires all kinds of scheming, including hard work by elites and their compradors in the overlapping and interlocking space-economies of the planet’s surface. They build and dismantle and reconfigure states, moving capacity into and out of the public realm. And they think very hard about money on the move.”31 Perhaps more than Gilmore, though, my approach aligns with that of Neville Alexander as described by Hudson.32 Like Alexander, who focused on South Africa, I offer a particularistic understanding of racial capitalism, mine being rooted in the political economy of Blackness and the legitimating architectures of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism in the United States. Gilmore qua Robinson offers a more universalist and transhistorical conception. Like Alexander, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is primarily rooted in (Black) Marxist-Leninists and fellow travelers. This is an important epistemological distinction: whereas Robinson finds Marxism-Leninism to be, at best, inattentive to race, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the work of Black freedom fighters who, as Marxist-Leninists, were able to offer potent and enduring analyses and critiques of the conjunctural entanglements of racialism, white supremacy, and anti-Blackness, on the one hand, and capitalist exploitation and class antagonism on the other hand.33 Although Robinson draws on scholars like Fernand Braudel, Henri Pirenne, David Brion Davis, and Eli Heckscher to understand European history, socialist theory, and the European working class, the work of Black Marxists like James Ford, Walter Rodney, Amílcar Cabral, and Paul Robeson offer me those same intellectual, historical, and theoretical resources. Finally, I agree with Alexander that the resolution to racial capitalism is antiracist socialism, not a cultural-metaphysical Black radical tradition. In what remains of this essay, I will draw on the work of Black Marxist-Leninists and anticapitalists to explicate the defining features of modern U.S. racial capitalism—war and militarism, imperialist accumulation, expropriation by domination, labor superexploitation, and property by dispossession. In this, I demonstrate that their critiques and analyses offer a blueprint for theorizing modern U.S. racial capitalism. War and militarism facilitate the endless drive for profit. Military conflicts between imperial powers result in the reapportioning of boundaries, possessions, and spheres of influence that often exacerbate racial and spatial economic subjection. War and militarism also perpetuate the endless construction of “threats,” primarily in racialized and socialist states, against which to defend progress, prosperity, freedom, and security. The manufacturing of conflict legitimates the mobilization of extraordinary violence to expropriate untold resources that produce relations of underdevelopment, dependency, extraversion, and disarticulation in the Global South. Moreover, the ruling elite and labor aristocracy in imperialist countries, not least the United States, wage perpetual war to defend their way of life and standard of living against the racialized majority who, because they would benefit most from the redistribution of the world’s wealth and resources, represent a perpetual threat.

#### Reject the aff and critically interrogate neoliberal discourse ⁠— resisting capitalist pedagogy in educational spaces is a prerequisite towards anti-capitalist political projects; COVID-19 provides a unique transition opportunity

Giroux 20, McMaster University Professor for Scholarship in the Public Interest and The Paulo Freire Distinguished Scholar in Critical Pedagogy (Henry Giroux, 6-9-2020, “Racist Violence Can’t Be Separated from the Violence of Neoliberal Capitalism,” Truthout, <https://truthout.org/articles/racist-violence-cant-be-separated-from-the-violence-of-neoliberal-capitalism/>)

As educators, it is crucial for us to examine how we talk, teach, and write about inequality as an object of critique in an age of precarity, uncertainty and the current pandemic crisis. This is especially true at a time when a growing number of authoritarian regimes around the globe substitute replace thoughtful dialogue and critical engagement with the suppression of dissent and a culture of forgetting r. How do we situate our analysis of education as part of a broader discourse and mode of analysis that interrogates the promises, ideals, and claims of a substantive democracy? How do we fight against iniquitous relations of power and wealth that empty power of its emancipatory possibilities, and as Hannah Arendt has argued, “makes most people superfluous as human beings”? How might we understand how neoliberal ideology, with its appropriation of market-based values, regressive notions of freedom and agency, uses language to infiltrate daily life? How does a pandemic pedagogy in the service of neoliberalism produce identities defined by market values, and normalize a notion of responsibility and individuality that convinces people that whatever problem they face they have no one to blame but themselves? Repeated endlessly on right-wing media platforms, the underlying conditions that disproportionately produce chronic illness among poor people of color disappear among a public distracted, if not persuaded, by a pandemic pedagogy that celebrates unchecked self-interest, disdains social responsibility, and turns away from the reality of a society with deep-seated institutional rot and unravelling of social connections and the social contract. Pandemic pedagogy thrives on inequality and becomes a militarized and heartless normalizing tool to convince the broader public that the lives of the elderly, sick, and vulnerable should be valued according to how much they contribute to the economy. And if they are willing to die in order not to be a drain on the economy, all well and good. Nothing escapes the cruel logic of neoliberalism with its arrogance and hubris on full display as it bathes in the glow of right-wing populism, ultra-nationalism, and neofascism. Its accoutrements of dictatorship are everywhere and can be seen in the swagger of militia that storm state capitals, in police who punch and pepper spray protesters and push elderly men to the ground, and in military forces on the streets without badges reinforcing a climate of fear, repression, and unaccountability. There is more at work here than a lack of humanity on the part of the Trump administration. As the Irish journalist Fintan O’Toole observes, there is also the deepening grip of a culture of cruelty and dehumanization. He writes: “As a society the American people are being habituated into accepting cruelty on a wide scale. Americans are being taught by Trump and his administration not to see other people as human beings whose lives are as important as their own. Once that line has been crossed – and it is not just Trump and the people around him, but many of Trump’s supporters as well – then we know where that all leads, what the ultimate destination is. There is no mystery about it. We know what happens when a government and its leaders dehumanize large numbers of people.”

Depoliticization and the Authoritarian Turn

Neoliberalism is not only an economic system, it is also an ideological apparatus that relentlessly attempts to structure consciousness, values, desires, and modes of identification in ways that align individuals with its governing structures. Central to this pedagogical project is the attempt to prevent individuals from translating private issues and troubles into broader systemic considerations. By doing this, it becomes difficult for individuals to grasp the historical, social, economic, and political forces at work in shaping a social order as a human activity deeply immersed in specific relations of power. Neoliberalism’s attempt to erase or rewrite historical and social forces makes it difficult for individuals to imagine alternative notions of society, with themselves as collective actors, or view their problems as more than the limitations of faulty character, moral failure, or a problem of personal responsibility. Reducing individuals to isolated, discrete, hermetically-sealed human beings whose lives are shaped only by notions of self-reliance and self-sufficiency is a pedagogical strategy that utterly depoliticizes people, leading them to believe that however a society is shaped, it is part of a natural order. President Trump echoed this “no alternative” narrative when asked about celebrities and rich people having special access to being tested for the coronavirus while few others had access. He replied, “Perhaps that’s been the story of life.” This individualization of the social with its mounting privatization, gated communities, and social atomization undermines collective action, any viable notion of solidarity, and weakens the notion of global connectivity. The philosopher Byung-Chul Han has rightly argued that contemporary neoliberal society is shaped by a dysfunctional notion of solitude and hermitically-sealed notions of agency, all of which undermine the values and social connections vital to a democracy. He writes: “Those subject to the neoliberal economy do not constitute a we that is capable of collective action. The mounting egoization and atomization of society is making the space for collective action shrink… The general collapse of the collective and the communal has engulfed it. Solidarity is vanishing. Privatization now reaches into the depths of the soul itself. The erosion of the communal is making all collective efforts more and more unlikely.” This panoptical nature of hyper-individualism is more aligned with shared fears than shared responsibilities. Under such circumstances, trust and the notion that all life is related become difficult to grasp as the myopic language of private self-interest inures individuals to wider social problems such as extreme inequality. There is no understanding in this discourse of the damage fanatical entrepreneurialism does to our embodied collectivity. Nor is there any value attributed to the important responsibilities, social values, and notion of the common good that exceeds who we are as individuals, or how we have been shaped by diverse social forces in particular ways. It should be clear that questions of economic and social justice cannot be addressed by a neoliberal pedagogy that enshrines self-interest and privatization while converting every social problem into individualized market solutions or regressive matters of personal responsibility. Under neoliberalism’s disimagination machine, individual responsibility is coupled with an ethos of greed, avarice, and personal gain. One consequence is the tearing up of social solidarities, public values, and an almost pathological disdain for democracy. This radical form of privatization is also a powerful force for the rise of fascist politics because it depoliticizes individuals, immerses them in the logic of social Darwinism, and makes them susceptible to the dehumanization of those considered a threat or disposable. Just as the spread of the pandemic virus in the United States was not an innocent act of nature, neither is the rise and pervasive grip of inequality. What is clear is that neoliberal support for unbridled individualism has weakened democratic pressures and eroded democracy and equality as governing principles. Moreover, as a mode of public pedagogy, it has undercut social provisions, the social contract, and support for public goods such as education, public health, essential infrastructure, public transportation, and the most basic elements of the welfare state. As a form of pedagogical practice, neoliberalism has morphed into a form of pandemic pedagogy that sacrifices social needs and human life in the name of an economic rationality that values reviving economic growth over human rights. As a lived system of meaning and values, self-reliance and rugged individualism are the only categories available for shaping how individuals view themselves, and their relationship to others and to the planet. The individualization of everyone and the reduction of social problems to private troubles is paralleled by sanctioning a world marked by borders, walls, racism, hate, and a rejection of government intervention in the interest of the common good. Most importantly, neoliberal individualization personalizes power, creating a depoliticized subject whose only obligation as a citizen is defined by consuming and living in a world free from ethical and social responsibilities. In many ways, it does not just empty politics of any substance, it destroys its emancipatory prospects. The neoliberal strategists use education not only to mask their abuses and the effects of their criminogenic policies, they also – in a time of crisis, when dissatisfaction of the masses might lead to chaos, revolts, and dangerous levels of resistance – move dangerously close to creating the conditions for a fascist politics. The noted theologian Frei Betto is right in stating that under such conditions, “…they cover up the causes of social ills and cover up their effects with ideologies that, by obscuring causes, fuel mood in the face of the effects. That’s why neoliberalism is now showing its authoritarian face – building walls that divide countries and ethnic groups, executive power over legislature and judiciary, disinformation about digital networks, the cult of the homeland, the brazen offensive against human rights.” Neoliberalism and its regressive notion of individualism and individual responsibility has undermined the belief that human beings both make the world and can change it. The pandemic has ushered in a crisis that undermines that belief and opens the door for rethinking what kind of society and notion of politics will be faithful to the creation of a socialist democracy that speaks to the core values of justice, equality and solidarity. Under such circumstances, private resistance must give way to collective resistance, and personal and political rights must include economic rights. If inequality is to be defeated, the social state must replace the corporate state and social rights must be guaranteed for all. There can be no adequate struggle for economic justice and social equality unless economic inequality on a global level is addressed along with a movement for climate justice, the elimination of systemic racism and a halt to the spiraling militarism that has resulted in endless wars. This can only take place if the anti-democratic ideology of neoliberalism, with its collapse of the public into the private and its institutional structures of domination, are fully addressed and discredited. Étienne Balibar is right in stating that the triumph of neoliberalism has resulted in the “death zones of humanity.” Following Balibar, what must be made clear is that neoliberal capitalism is itself a pandemic and a dangerous harbinger of an updated fascist politics.

Overcoming Pandemic Pedagogy

The kind of societies that will emerge after the pandemic is up for grabs. In some cases, the crisis will give way to authoritarian regimes such as Chile, Hungary and Turkey, all of which have used the urgency of COVID-19 as an excuse to impose more state control and surveillance, squelch dissent, eliminate civil liberties and concentrate power in the hands of an authoritarian political class. As is well documented, history in a time of crisis also has the potential to change dominant ideologies, rethink the meaning of governance, and enlarge the sphere of justice and equality through a vision that fights for a more generous and inclusive politics. It is crucial to rethink the project of politics in order to imagine forms of resistance that are collective, inclusive and global, capable of producing new democratic arrangements for social life, more radical values and a “global economy which will no longer be at the mercy of market mechanisms.” This is a politics that must move beyond siloed identities and fractured political factions in order to build transnational solidarities in the service of an alternative radically democratic society. Making the pedagogical more political means challenging those forms of pandemic pedagogy that turn politics into theater, a favorite tactic of Trump. In this case, the performance works to suspend disbelief, hold power accountable and unravel one’s sense of critical agency. Pandemic pedagogy does more than undermine critical thinking and informed judgments, it dissolves the line between the truth and lies, fantasy and reality, and in doing so, destroys the foundation for understanding, engaging and promoting that social and economic justice. The endgame under the rubric of a pandemic pedagogy is not simply the destruction of the truth, but the elimination of democracy itself. Central to developing an alternative democratic vision is development of a language that refuses to look away and be commodified. Such a language should be able to break through the continuity and consensus of common sense and appeals to the natural order of things. At stake here is the need to reclaim both critical and redemptive elements of a radical democracy in order to address the full spectrum of violence that structures institutions and everyday life in the United States. This is a language connected to the acquisition of civic literacy, and it demands a different regime of desires and identifications to enable us to move from “shock and stunned silence toward a coherent visceral speech, one as strong as the force that is charging at us.” Of course, there is more at stake here than a struggle over meaning; there is also the struggle over power, over the need to create a formative culture that will produce informed critical agents who will fight for and contribute to a broad social movement that will translate meaning into a fierce struggle for economic, political and social justice. Agency in this sense must be connected to a notion of possibility and education in the service of radical change. Reimagining the future only becomes meaningful when it is rooted in a fierce struggle against the horrors and totalitarian practices of a pandemic pedagogy that falsely claims that it exists outside of history. Václav Havel, the late Czech political dissident-turned-politician, once argued that politics follows culture, by which he meant that changing consciousness is the first step toward building mass movements of resistance. What is crucial here in the age of multiple crises is a thorough grasp of the notion that critical and engaged forms of agency are a product of emancipatory education. Moreover, at the heart of any viable notion of politics is the recognition that politics begins with attempts to change the way people think, act and feel with respect to both how they view themselves and their relations to others. There is more to agency than the neoliberal emphasis on the “empire of the self,” with its unchecked belief in the virtues of a form of self-interest that despises the bonds of sociality, solidarity and community. The U.S. is in the midst of a political and pedagogical crisis. This is a crisis defined not only by a brutalizing racism and massive inequality, but also a constitutional crisis produced by a growing authoritarianism that has been in the making for some time. The recent attacks by the police on journalists, peaceful protesters and even elderly people marching for racial justice echoes the violence of the Brownshirts in the 1930s. Let’s stop the futile debate about whether or not the U.S. is in the midst of a fascist state and shift the register to the more serious question of how to resist it and restore a semblance of real democracy. Under such circumstances, education should be viewed as central to politics, and it plays a crucial role in producing informed judgments, actions, morality and social responsibility at the forefront not only of agency, but politics itself. In this scenario, truth and politics mutually inform each other to erupt in a pedagogical awakening at the moment when the rules are broken. Taking risks becomes a necessity, self-reflection narrates its capacity for critically engaged agency and thinking the impossible is not an option, but a necessity. Without an informed and educated citizenry, democracy can lead to tyranny, even fascism. Trump represents the malignant presence of a fascism that never dies and is ready to remerge at different times in different context in sometimes not-so-recognizable forms. The COVID-19 crisis and the pandemic of inequality and racism have revealed elements of a fascist politics that are more than abstractions. The struggle against a fascist politics is now visible in the rebellions taking place across the United States. While there are no political guarantees for a victory, there is a new sense that the future can be changed in the image of a just and sustainable society. There is a new energy for reform taking place in the aftermath of the killing of George Floyd. Massive protests for racial, economic and social justice are emerging all over the globe. As I have argued in The Terror of the Unforeseen, at stake here is the need for these protests to transition from a pedagogical moment and collective outburst of moral anger to a progressive international movement that is well organized and unified. Such a movement must build solidarity among different groups, imagine new forms of social life, make the impossible possible, and produce a revolutionary project in defense of equality, social justice and popular sovereignty. The racial, class, ecological and public health crisis facing the globe can only be understood as part of a comprehensive crisis of the totality. Immediate solutions such as defunding the police and improving community services are important, but they do not deal with the larger issue of eliminating a neoliberal system structured in massive racial and economic inequalities. David Harvey is right in arguing that the “immediate task is nothing more nor less than the self-conscious construction of a new political framework for approaching the question of inequality, through a deep and profound critique of our economic and social system.” This is a crisis in which different threads of oppression must be understood as part of the general crisis of capitalism. The various protests now evolving internationally at the popular level offer the promise of new global anti-fascist and anti-capitalist movements. In the current moment, democracy may be under a severe threat and appear frighteningly vulnerable, but with young people and others rising up across the globe — inspired, energized and marching in the streets — the future of a radical democracy is waiting to breathe again.

### 1NC

T: PRIVATE SECTOR

#### “Private sector” means all non-governmental persons or entities, including non-profits

Senate Report 95, (Senate Report, 1995, 104-1, “UNFUNDED MANDATE REFORM ACT OF 1995,” <https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/104th-congress/senate-report/1>)

"Private sector" is defined to cover all persons or entities in the United States except for State, local or tribal governments. It includes individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, and educational and nonprofit institutions.

#### TVA: any universally applied standard, like CWS (Consumer Welfare Standard)

Phillips 18, commissioner on the Federal Trade Commission (Noah J. Phillips, 11-1-2018, “Before the Federal Trade Commission, “Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century,” <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/1415284/ftc_hearings_session_5_transcript_11-1-18_0.pdf>)

Our second topic today is the consumer welfare standard. And I think most folks even out in the public know, this is the standard that we use across the board, mergers and conduct in courts and at agencies, to judge anticompetitive conduct. It is not only a standard that we in the U.S. apply, it is a standard that is used by competition agencies around the world. It is an economically-grounded standard, and it requires that there be harm to consumers for conduct to be condemned. Mere harm to competitors is considered insufficient. So let me repeat that again. There has to be harm to consumers, not just competitors. The reason that is so, the reason harm to competitors is considered insufficient is because sometimes a less-efficient firm losing sales or market share to a cheaper, more innovative or efficient rival, can be and often is consistent with vibrant competition and with outcomes that benefit consumers. Courts and agencies have embraced this standard for decades. Today, there are two very important discussions going on about the consumer welfare standard, and they are happening simultaneously. And I think it is important that we understand that there are two conversations going on. One is a continuing discussion about how we apply the standard, regarding whether enforcement is at the appropriate level, whether it is properly targeted. This is an introspective question on some level, in which scholars, economists, practitioners, and enforcers all ask ourselves, are we bringing the right kinds of cases? Are we using the right kinds of evidence? Should we be doing more or less in certain places? The antitrust bar, the business community, and others benefit from this ongoing and active analysis. The second discussion happening now, and the one on which today’s consumer welfare standard panels will focus, is whether the standard is itself the right metric we ought to use in antitrust enforcement and in antitrust law; some argue that enforcement under the consumer welfare standard has failed because of the law, and accordingly, that we should reform the law.

## Platforms

### 1NC---Frontline

#### Solvency takes decades, and big firms rebound.

Fukuyama et al. 21, \*Francis, Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. \*\*Barak Richman, Katharine T. Bartlett Professor of Law and Professor of Business Administration at Duke University School of Law. \*\*\*Ashish Goel, Professor of Management Science and Engineering at Stanford University. They are members of the Working Group on Platform Scale for Stanford University’s Program on Democracy and the Internet. (January/February 2021, "How to Save Democracy From Technology", *Foreign Affairs*, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-11-24/fukuyama-how-save-democracy-technology)

Another approach to checking Internet platforms’ power is to promote greater competition. If there were a multiplicity of platforms, none would have the dominance enjoyed by Facebook and Google today. The problem, however, is that neither the United States nor the EU could likely break up Facebook or Google the way that Standard Oil and AT&T were broken up. Today’s technology companies would fiercely resist such an attempt, and even if they eventually lost, the process of breaking them up would take years, if not decades, to complete. Perhaps more important, it is not clear that breaking up Facebook, for example, would solve the underlying problem. There is a very good chance that a baby Facebook created by such a breakup would quickly grow to replace the parent. Even AT&T regained its dominance after being broken up in the 1980s. Social media’s rapid scalability would make that happen even faster.

#### Adding new standards forces arbitrary and conflicting decisions---that triggers regulatory capture and zeroes compliance

Melamed 20, Professor of the Practice of Law, Stanford Law School. (A. Douglas, “ANTITRUST LAW AND ITS CRITICS”, 83 ANTITRUST L.J., pg. 15-16, <https://lisboncouncil.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/MELAMED-Antitrust-Law-and-Its-Critics.pdf>)

Perhaps more important, the institutions of antitrust law are not well suited to address multiple and often conflicting objectives. Antitrust law is enforced on a case-by-case basis. Were antitrust law to serve multiple objectives, it would need criteria to guide decisions in the many instances when those objectives would conflict. There is, however, no algorithm for weighting inequality or political power, on the one hand, against economic welfare, on the other.86 There is not even a common metric for measuring them. Absent such a metric or algorithm, antitrust decisions would necessarily be arbitrary and perceived as arbitrary.

That would have three serious costs. First, if antitrust decisions are perceived as arbitrary, the widespread legitimacy of antitrust law would erode. The antitrust laws were first passed in 1890, and the most important statutory provisions are more than one hundred years old. It is not an accident that populist critics have expressed their concerns largely in antitrust terms. The perpetuation of that legitimacy cannot be taken for granted.

Second, if antitrust decisions are perceived as being arbitrary, they will be more easily subject to regulatory capture because there will not be seemingly principled bases to cabin antitrust decision making. The beneficiaries of a regime susceptible to capture are likely to be the powerful, not the powerless. Ironically, therefore, adding equality and dispersion of economic and political power to the objectives of the antitrust laws could prove detrimental to those very objectives.

The third and perhaps most important cost is rooted in the general application and decentralized enforcement of antitrust law. 87 Antitrust law applies to almost all businesses, and it can be enforced by at least 52 government entities and any entity that has been harmed by an antitrust violation. Antitrust law thus has a widespread effect on business conduct throughout the economy. Its principal value is found, not in the big litigated cases, but in the multitude of anticompetitive actions that do not occur because they are deterred by the antitrust laws, and in the multitude of efficiency-enhancing actions that are not deterred by an overbroad or ambiguous antitrust law.

If antitrust law is perceived as being arbitrary, it will provide a far less certain guide to business conduct. The effect might be disregard of antitrust law in circumstances in which it seems unpredictable. More likely, the effect will be excessive caution by businesses uncertain about the consequences of aggressive or novel forms of competition. The effectiveness of antitrust law in promoting competition and economic welfare will be seriously impaired.

### 1NC---Heg K

#### The vestiges of order are the intellectual underpinnings of a cosmopolitan dystopia that involutes into permanent violence

Dr. Philip Cunliffe 20, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent, PhD in War Studies from King's College London, MSc in Economics and International Politics with Distinction from the University of Wales, Aberyswyth, BA in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics from the University of Oxford, Cosmopolitan Dystopia: International Intervention and the Failure of the West, p. 3-12

Travelling to Iraq and Syria for ‘humanitarian purposes’ may have provided the alibi or initiation for many a Western would-be jihadi, but however pure or impure their motives, however authentic or inauthentic their compassion, it is unsurprising that the logic of humanitarian rescue was entwined with that of violent regime change.4 After all, while the world bewailed the human rights abuses and atrocities committed by the Syrian government, it was jihadis who were the ones actually fighting the government on the ground, and it was only jihadis who actively, persistently and unambiguously sought to overthrow the Syrian regime. As one reflective would-be jihadi put it, viewing military conquest as a charitable act and feeling entitled to intervene in other countries’ civil wars and to rebuild their societies were popular Western ideals more than they were Islamic scripture.5 In short, humanitarian compassion for distant strangers entwined with transcending nation-states by force if necessary and scorning nationalism through transnational organisation and supranational authority were familiar themes in world politics. What we were seeing in Iraq and Syria was only a murky mirror, one in which familiar ideals and hopes were being played out in dark and terrible form: permanent war inspired by global ideals in a borderless world.

As J. M. Keynes once noted, ‘Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back’. As the spectre of totalitarianism had faded at the end of the Cold War, many international political theorists had turned their scribblings to intellectually subduing that most intensely concentrated, brash and unrestrained form of political power – that institution that recognises peers but has no superiors, the sovereign state. While these scribblings were numerous and varied, many of them shared a similar cast, in that they sought to supersede state sovereignty in various ways. Whether through appealing to global law or vesting their hopes in supranational new regimes and institutions, a common and recurrent concern was to assimilate peoples into new supranational social, legal and political structures – those varied elements that together constituted the ‘postnational constellation’, as the title of philosopher Jürgen Habermas’s book on the matter put it.6 Vertically, people had to be integrated into new supranational institutions and laws that ramified from regional up to global bodies, and horizontally they had to be blended together, less segmented by national political loyalties.

While many of these changes were often assumed to be a result of the movement of capital and new types of media, globalisation was never merely a matter of spontaneous trade flows or extemporaneous new technologies, but also involved explicitly political projects of integration and reordering to better fit the emergent infrastructure of a new social order. Part of this also involved military force, in which powerful Western states were expected to act as the direct military enforcers and executors of global law, defending individuals’ human rights from the depredations of their own negligent and criminal national leaders, arresting war criminals to haul them off before international courts, promoting democracy up to and including the use of force if necessary, and acting to neutralise global security threats – security threats that paradoxically seemed to become more apocalyptically menacing the more globalised Western power became. This was the view of NATO as the ‘left hand of God’, as per the title of an exultant essay by the philosopher Slavoj Žižek in which he defended the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, the North Atlantic alliance cast as the imperfect instrument of a higher justice.7

If wars had previously been defined in liberal terms of antitotalitarianism and anti-communism, they had also been justified in unabashedly national terms too – defending national rights and honour, self-defence and sometimes even plain unadorned national self-interest. In the post-Cold War era, the use of force was still defined in liberal terms but also terms that were at once more cosmopolitan (justified on behalf of others) and humanitarian (protection and alleviating suffering rather than defending liberty). Thus, while in 1999 Habermas acknowledged the ‘inevitability of a transitory paternalism’8 in NATO’s invocation of higher right over the rights of sovereign states, he nonetheless welcomed NATO’s war against Yugoslavia as embodying ‘a leap from the classical international law of states to a cosmopolitan law of a global civil society’.9 Cosmopolitan political theorist Patrick Hayden saw post-Cold War developments in international security such as the doctrine of the responsibility to protect and the international human security regime as concrete steps towards ‘replacing the realist national interest-based security paradigm with a cosmopolitan, person-based paradigm’.10

A crucial constituent element of this cosmopolitan vision of politics was human rights. As Perry Anderson observed, for an entire generation of political theorists who had hitherto restricted themselves to theorising politics inside the state during the Cold War, after the Cold War ‘human rights became the global trampoline for vaulting over the barriers of national sovereignty, in the name of a better future’.11 Human rights were to be used to abrade nation-states in order to insert them into new global configurations so that they would fit better alongside new actors such as non-governmental organisations, international courts and supranational bodies. Human rights provided the legal undergirding for cosmopolitan politics, the human face of globalisation. Powerful, evocative and densely layered and distributed across international treaties, conventions, national courts and supranational agencies, human rights have captured the hopes of many millions of people around the world – hopes for justice, social improvement, legal redress and political change. By the same token, human rights have also been widely criticised, not only for the hypocrisy of their defenders but also for an imperious universalism that bleaches out cultural particularism. To be sure, the language of human rights has certainly provided Western states with a supple new discourse of moral superiority to wield over up-start ex-colonies in place of white supremacy. The discourse of human rights also gave an appropriately supranational expression to old European imperial states that had grown habituated to pooling their sovereignty as their individual power waned. There is, though, one element of human rights that has hitherto been overlooked and yet is crucial to understanding both their cosmopolitan character and their dystopic results. That element is the post- or counter-utopian character of human rights. Political philosopher John Rawls, for instance, expressly framed his cosmopolitan vision in The Law of Peoples as a ‘realistic utopia’ – that is to say, a vision that was expressly modest, pragmatic and selfrestrained rather than being crusading or militant.12 Juxtapose this with Samuel Moyn’s work, which has shown most clearly how human rights could necessarily politically succeed only as a response to thwarted utopianism.13 It was the failure of New Left hopes for radical transformation in Western democracies – accompanied by the frequently dismal results of Third World and anti-colonial revolutions – that formed the disenchantment that was to provide the basis for human rights as a project. At once modest and fervent, human rights offered a model of politics and activism that was restrained, diffident, circumspect and minimalistic. In place of the radical hopes for drastic improvement to be achieved through the high drama of national politics, the seizure of state power and even revolution, change was to be limited to marginal, incremental but persistent improvement through the alleviation of suffering. Conceived as such, human rights were explicitly anti-political. With human rights targeted à tous azimuts, activists confronted both East and West in the Cold War, championing the rights of dissidents across totalitarian Eastern Europe as well as the rebels imprisoned by fascistic military dictatorships in the Americas, Southern Europe and apartheid South Africa.14

Rooted in civil society movements rather than campaigning political parties, human rights activists were uninterested in seizing or wielding state power. Indeed, the human rights movement carried with it the hostility to and suspicion of centralised political authority that would become the core of post-Cold War cosmopolitanism. The advocates of human rights vested their hopes in civil society organisations rather than nationalist movements or political parties. Yet by the same token, nor was the human rights movement anarchist. There was never any intention of abolishing the state as such, for such a vision would, after all, be a political one, involving precisely the kind of ambition and sweep that human rights were defined against. The project never envisaged the dissolution of the state but rather a new kind of state, one in which the mailed fist of state power was softened by the velvet glove of international law, and was to be coordinated with a range of new appendages and prostheses – transnational regimes, new regional bodies, supranational courts, non-governmental organisations, social movements, ethically aware corporations, transnational regulatory agencies and so on.

In political terms, human rights embodied nothing so much as the liberalism of fear – a distinctive strain of post-war liberalism that was cultivated by thinkers such as Isaiah Berlin, Judith Shklar and Raymond Aron.15 While these thinkers were as suspicious of and as hostile to the utopian totalitarianism that they saw on the other side of the Iron Curtain as any other liberal, they were also wary of grandiose attempts to counter totalitarianism that might risk mimetically replicating its crushing uniformity.16 Their political vision and hopes for liberalism were thus restricted, with the most that could be hoped for being the cautious, prudent relief of extreme human suffering in a world that was irredeemably conflicted, plural and fallen, beyond redemption. Human rights were the legal and institutional embodiment of this exemplary hope that suffering and injustice could be meliorated while at the same time avoiding the terrible, ineluctable fate of utopians, whose radical passion for sweeping political change inevitably leads to dystopian totalitarianism.

Yet if human rights activists and civil society movements flaunted their lack of interest in political power, political power was certainly interested in them. Human rights rapidly became the dominant ideology of Western states in their foreign affairs, haltingly at first under the Carter and Reagan administrations over the 1970s and 1980s, and then peaking under the Clinton administrations, while remaining firmly entrenched throughout the Bush and Obama era.17 Widely seen as having provided Czechoslovak, Polish and East German dissidents and activists with the ideological solvent to dissolve the totalitarian permafrost of Eastern Europe, the apolitical, thin but astringent universalism of human rights provided the ideological tonic to exalt Western victory in the Cold War and boost its new military efforts. Human rights became the ideology of post-ideological, multicultural liberal democracies, the moral framework for booming business as capitalism advanced eastwards into Eastern Europe and Asia.

Yet, despite having eschewed the utopian fanaticism of violent rebellion and the seizure of state power, human rights became entwined with war, across Africa, the Balkans and Asia. In the form of humanitarian intervention, democratisation and the responsibility to protect, defending human rights became a necessary component of every Western military intervention as surely as anti-communism had once been during the Cold War.18 As General Colin Powell, defence secretary in the first administration of US President George W. Bush, put it, non-governmental humanitarian organisations were a ‘force multiplier’ for the US military.19 In 1999, as NATO bombed Yugoslavia, Habermas disparaged states’ sovereign right to non-interference, arguing that this ‘presumption of innocence’ built into classical international law was palpably ‘absurd’ in light of the ‘catastrophic history’ of the twentieth century.20 Yet the erosion of the right to non-interference also made all domestic politics directly global. Questions of foreign affairs became instead questions of rights, democracy and government rather than, say, nationally specific institutions and conflicts, a regional balance of power or geopolitical rivalry. Without the presumptive right of noninterference institutionalised in the claims of sovereignty, every domestic crisis becomes a potential vortex that will suck in external powers:

#### marked

at the time of writing, this pattern is repeating with the stand-off in Venezuela between the government and opposition, which is drawing in Brazil and Colombia as well as the US.

After thirty years of perpetual warfare by Western states under the banner of human rights, human rights can no longer claim to be innocent either. Evidently even anti-utopian, cosmopolitan ideals can just as easily succumb to the intoxication of military power and crusading zeal to improve the world. One humanitarian emergency has followed another in which humanitarian intervention is urged even if not enacted, in an unbroken chain reaching back to the no-fly zone established in 1992 over northern Iraq after the end of the first Gulf War and going through the Balkans, East Timor, Somalia, West Africa, Rwanda, Darfur, Iraq, Syria, Kurdistan (not to mention all those instances in which intervention was urged but never materialised – Zimbabwe, Darfur, South Sudan, Myanmar).

More than this, not only have human rights been weaponised, they have also become dystopic. Western interventions have left a chain of shattered states across the Greater Middle East that are locked in perpetual civil strife; Islamic State would never have emerged were it not for the Anglo-American intervention in Iraq of 2003. However much the defenders of human rights may still protest that intervention in Iraq was not an authentic expression of humanitarian ideals,21 the fact remains that the invasion would never have happened had not the humanitarian suspicion of centralised state power and jurisdictional limits not been normalised by the globalisation of human rights ideology, and had the precedent not been established that humanitarian protection could be invoked to trump the rights of state sovereignty. Cosmopolitan dystopia was thus not restricted to insurgent enclaves in the Middle East: human rights helped to normalise our era of permanent war and with it a new wave of humanitarian occupation.22 This saw the recreation of trusteeship and a new generation of protectorates sprawling around the world, with a new imperial standard of civilisation, justified on the grounds of the need for prolonged humanitarian protection and oversight. All these together constituted the dystopic involution of liberal internationalism, of which cosmopolitan jihadism and global terror networks were merely the inadvertent progeny.

The centrality of human rights to the political problems of our age is being made increasingly visible in the growing volume of critique directed at the theory and practice of human rights.23 The entirety of this debate is beyond the scope of this book, and in any case I wish to add only one element to the growing collective critique. This element is to say that it is precisely the counterutopian character of human rights that makes them dystopian. Negatively defined against the world-historic evils of the twentieth century, human rights cast the alleviation of suffering as the most that can be hoped for. In international affairs at least, this necessarily leads, I argue, to a politics of exceptionalism. This is a politics that is defined by its reaction to exceptional crises, a politics defined against the extreme – halting genocide, massacre, tyranny, starvation, slavery, ethnic cleansing and so on.24 By having renounced the hope for systemic transformation or radical improvement of the human condition, under the banner of human rights political action necessarily becomes increasingly defined by the extreme, with the result that the extreme comes increasingly to define the norm. As the norm and the exception collapse into each other, the need for perpetual redress of recurrent evil that can, by its very nature, never be abolished, only repressed, results in … cosmopolitan dystopia. That is, a world order in which permanent war is normalised by perpetual policing in order to reduce human suffering. The crusading zeal and imperialist aggressiveness of cosmopolitan liberalism are not the results of still being contaminated by lingering traces of revolutionary utopianism, but by an anti-political monism that refuses to countenance a pluralistic international order.

Despite never having set their sights higher than curbing the most extreme human suffering, cosmopolitan liberals have nonetheless produced dystopias in their wake, complete with slave markets, tyrannies, ethnic pogroms, mass murder, massive refugee camps, beleaguered ‘safe havens’ and ‘safe zones’, protectorates and permanent war; in more recent times, their efforts have even revived geopolitical rivalries between nuclear-armed states. That their efforts were fated to be dystopic is the core argument of the book, and it is put forward in chapter 3. As well arguing for the dystopic character of cosmopolitan humanitarianism, I also seek to provide a more detailed overview of what cosmopolitan dystopia looks like – to show what an international order built around a dystopic politics of humanitarian emergency looks like. This is done across chapters 1 and 4. Chapter 2 looks at existing critiques of humanitarian intervention and where their limits lie – limits that necessitate a turn towards theorising exceptionalism as the key to understanding humanitarian intervention, the responsibility to protect and cosmopolitan dystopia. Before we review the structure of the argument in more detail, let us briefly define the terms and set the parameters that will operate in the discussion.

### 1NC---Fintech K

#### \*Fintech reinforces gross exploitation and white supremacy

Friedline 21 Friedline, Terri. Banking on a Revolution: Why Financial Technology Won't Save a Broken System. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2021. ND.

Beyond unequal landscapes and cost burdens, marginalization also may be amplified based on the ways that fintech embeds society’s destructive systems. Fintech and its supporters often operate under the assumption that digital and financial technologies can be developed devoid of white supremacy and financialized racial neoliberal capitalism. For example, as the Co-Director of MIT’s Initiative on the Digital Economy, Andrew McAfee, said in 2018, “If you want the bias out, get the algorithms in.” 66 This sentiment is shared by IBM Fellows Aleksandra Mojsilovic and John Smith, who believe that algorithms can be trained to reduce or eliminate any racial biases built in by their designers. 67 Even Stephen Schwarzman, Chief Executive-Officer (CEO) of Blackstone (yes, the same monopoly-esque investment corporation that is a central figure in Chapter 4), has chimed in on this possibility. Penning an opinion–editorial for The Washington Post in 2019 in a somewhat satirical caricature given his perch atop global capitalism, Schwarzman espoused the importance of an “ethics driven approach” to fintech. 68 Schwarzman described a multidisciplinary approach as sufficient for preventing broadly conceptualized “biases” and ensuring that fintech’s “powerful capabilities are a net positive for people and workers.” In other words, fintech’s disadvantages can be overlooked so long as advantages accrue on average. This viewpoint actually means that any disadvantages can be overlooked because “on average” (or “net positive, ” in Schwarzman’s terms) is code for white. 69 Fintech is acceptable—even ethical—so long as advantages accrue to whites (preferably wealthy elites) while averages disguise vast underlying racial disparities. For example, reporting the median net worth of $78,000 for all households in 2016 would conceal the fact that the median value of white households’ net worth is 41 times greater than that of Black households. 70 In fact, coders, computer scientists, engineers, and other designers—many of whom are white 71—stitch fintech and other technological advancements onto the fabric of society’s systems, 72 developing it as a tool for hoarding capitalism’s wealth. Insidiously, fintech is also developing as tool for surveilling and preying on Black and Brown communities by requiring individuals to sacrifice their privacy in order to participate. 73 This requirement disproportionately subjects people of color to ubiquitous, targeted surveillance that they are already experiencing in other contexts such as law enforcement, 74 education, 75 public welfare, 76 and housing. 77 White fintech users who experience technologies’ benefits without racist exploitation or wealth extraction may actually be contributing to mass surveillance that disproportionately impacts Black and Brown people. Like a white property owner ignoring how their predatory contract agreement contributed to the pattern of mass wealth extraction from Black and Brown communities, white fintech designers and users may similarly discount how their willingness—even eagerness—to sacrifice their privacy in exchange for fintech’s benefits may come with the costs of mass surveillance in the context of the financial system. And, if there was ever a case for history repeating itself, Black and Brown communities will disproportionally accrue the disadvantages if fintech marches full steam ahead without the voices of marginalized communities at the helm. 78 Fintech’s ability to accelerate the concentration of wealth can be overlooked when overemphasizing fintech for individuals. However, the problems with fintech for individuals are a microcosm of what is being acted out on a larger scale. For instance, Pagaya Investments, a U.S.–Israeli fintech start-up that describes its technology as the next generation of asset management investing, 79 announced in 2019 its complete reliance on machine learning and big data analytics to manage its $100 million portfolio. 80 Without human intervention, Pagaya’s fintech automatically manages the company’s asset-backed securities (ABS)—including all trading, buying, and selling transactions—and quickly spots potentially lucrative investment opportunities. Pagaya eventually plans to apply its fintech to collateralized loan obligations (CLO) and mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Minimal oversight from Pagaya’s data scientists is led by a former managing director of BlackRock, another monopoly-esque investment corporation. Buzzwords such as “disrupt, ” “reshape, ” and “innovate” are commonly applied to descriptions of Pagaya’s fintech, similar to the ways these buzzwords are enthusiastically applied to solving inequalities in individuals’ financial access. Pagaya Investments’ CEO, Gal Krubiner, promotes the advantages of a fintech approach that “can access very unique datasets” for making “really important insights and understanding on the valuation of assets” by identifying “what is really the risk behind each individual borrower or loan.” 81 At a 2017 fintech conference held in Tel Aviv, Krubiner described how fintech could modernize the field of corporate asset management, saying, “Many institutional investors are interested in investing in online lending markets. There’s a need for new, technology-based investment tools.” 82 Pagaya’s investors include venture capitalists, hedge funds, and financial institutions such as Oak HC/FT, GF Investments, and Citi Group. 83 In an announcement that Pagaya had raised $75 million in debt finance from the financial institution Citi Group, Citi Group’s Vice President of Consumer Finance, Ari Rosenberg, stated, “This transaction is a great example of the continuing evolution of consumer credit as an asset class and growth opportunity.” 84 Any evolution introduced by Pagaya’s fintech stands to benefit monopoly-esque investment corporations and their shareholders. “Consumer credit as an asset class and growth opportunity” is the language of a financialized racial neoliberal capitalism that equates growth with progress and deploys fintech to scavenge for new, profitable income streams. Individual consumers—the people whose collateralized credit card and mortgage debts are commodified and securitized to form these asset classes—do not see the profits that fintech generates from these new income streams. People are exploited by these processes, where algorithms scrape as much information on an individual as possible to be employed in risk models for generating profits that the individual will never receive. 85 Quickly and quietly, fintech efficiently ensconces the profits into the accounts of already-wealthy corporations and their disproportionately white shareholders. Not only can fintech concentrate wealth, the computer algorithms on which fintech is built replicate and reinforce white supremacy. 86 Evidence from online advertisements provides several examples. A study of Google advertisements reveals that searching for a person with a Black-identifying name is more likely to produce advertisements that falsely suggest the person has a criminal record. 87 Algorithms that determine whether a person is exposed to certain housing advertisements discriminate against people of color and those from lower-income backgrounds. 88 The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a lawsuit against Facebook claiming that their algorithms targeting online job ads to demographic groups excluded women. 89 Netflix has come under scrutiny for its algorithms’ tailoring of promotional advertisements based on customers’ viewing histories, effectively misrepresenting movies’ mostly white casts by showing scenes with movies’ few Black actors to Black customers. 90 Just as these algorithms work to discriminate on social media platforms and streaming services, fintech algorithms calibrate the financial system to whiteness. “Our whole defining mission is to redefine this discussion of both race, gender, and the intersectionality of that as it outlays and plays with closing the digital divide and providing access to girls of color . . . having the divine skills and innate ability to create change in both their own lives and their communities.” —Kimberly Bryant, 2017 91 As it stands—and especially when controlled by white data scientists and the wealthy corporations of financialized racial neoliberal capitalism—fintech offers new and sophisticated means of exploitation and surveillance. In the era of big data and predictive algorithms, benefits do not extend to Black and Brown communities or to lower-income whites. 92 Even Google Fiber’s purportedly well-intentioned city-wide efforts reinforce rather than remedy inequalities. While reflecting on the scientific contributions of her famed father, Stephen Hawking, Lucy Hawking mused, “How good is the track record of the human race in using advances in technology for the good of ordinary people?” 93 We can’t just hope that fintech will offer a slightly better track record. Hope steeped in willful, ahistorical ignorance is insulting and dangerous. We all need and deserve dignified access to digital and financial services without having our information exploited, wealth extracted, and movements surveilled—marginalized communities especially deserve this. Let us make it so.

### 1NC---Turn

#### The Iranian govt is using its money to buy vaccines and will make progress to solve now

Bozorgmehr 21, Reporter for Financial Times. (Najmeh, Spt 20, 21, Iran’s Raisi focuses on vaccines not nuclear talks, <https://www.ft.com/content/a331c157-3c91-4bec-9972-35716bc4788e>

A vaccination centre, a hospital, a pharmacy and finally a morgue. The first public visits by Iran’s new hardline president Ebrahim Raisi have made clear his top priority — accelerating imports of Covid-19 vaccines into a country hard hit by the pandemic. Since the 60-year-old cleric was inaugurated last month, replacing centrist president Hassan Rouhani, there has been a huge rise in imports of vaccines. A regime that in January this year banned western jabs now welcomes them, and Raisi has led the push. “When the president, like a commander, shows up in the frontline, then all officials realise that no excuses would be acceptable for any delay in importing vaccines,” said Mohammad Hassan Ghosian Moghaddam, a spokesman for the Iranian Red Crescent Society, which is the main conduit for vaccine imports. It buys principally from the Red Cross Society of China. “If we told the previous government we could import 1m doses, the answer was ‘let’s look into it over the next week’. Now, the answer is ‘Why 1m? Why not 10m?’” Raisi’s election victory was marred by public wrath over engineered polls and the barring of many moderate candidates. With Iran’s centres of power now all in the control of hardline conservatives, Raisi and his cohort want to prove their ability to run the Islamic republic more efficiently than his predecessor. President Ebrahim Raisi visits a Covid vaccination centre in Tehran © Iranian Presidency Office via AP Constant tensions between hardliners and reformists had made it difficult for Rouhani to make decisions, let alone import vaccines in large quantities. Hardliners had argued that accepting Western vaccines would make Iranians little more than laboratory rats and supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei himself banned the import of all Western jabs. Rouhani instead focused on reviving the 2015 nuclear deal with world powers, under which Iran curbed its nuclear output in return for the lifting of international sanctions. The deal fell apart after the then-US president Donald Trump abandoned it in 2018. In contrast, Raisi has so far refused to give any prominence to the nuclear talks in Vienna, which have been suspended since Iranian elections in June, focusing instead on vaccines. Last month, amid outrage on social media over the lack of jabs, the supreme leader urged authorities to “double efforts” and use “any possible way” to vaccinate people. “The government will surely resume talks but it is also waiting to see the results of vaccination and their impact on the economic situation,” said one reformist analyst. “He [ Raisi] has rightly prioritised vaccination as we cannot sit at the negotiating table while people feel so miserable.” First vice-president Mohammad Mokhber now convenes a committee on vaccination imports several times a week. “Before, the health ministry was alone, but now decisions are made in the vaccination committee and all obstacles are removed immediately in the same sessions,” said Mohammad Reza Shanehsaz, head of Iran’s Food and Drug Administration. “Imports of vaccines have become number one priority for the government of Mr Raisi.” The new measures mean Iran has managed to buy more than 30m doses over the past month alone, according to Shanehsaz. This compares with 19m in the preceding seven months. With 16.3 per cent of people already fully vaccinated, up from 3.3 per cent before Raisi took over, the government aims to have most of the 85m population jabbed by February.

#### Iran has to buy vaccines under the table because of the Sanctions

Motavelli 20, Reporter for Bloomberg News, (Golnar, 12/10/20, Iran Closes In on Covid-19 Vaccines as Payment Problems Ease, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-10/iran-closes-in-on-covid-19-vaccines-as-payment-problems-ease>

Iran said it expects to secure its first shipment of Covid-19 vaccines “soon” after making progress in overcoming hurdles that have been hindering purchases. Health Minister Saeed Namaki said that while U.S. sanctions continue to hamper Iran’s ability to transfer money overseas for the vaccines, “fortunately those knots are being loosened,” according to the Iranian Students’ News Agency on Wednesday. He didn’t say when deals could be completed or which of the various vaccines being tested around the world Iran was seeking to buy. This week, the governor of Iran’s central bank said sanctions were preventing Iran from procuring vaccines using the COVAX payment facility that’s jointly managed by Geneva-based Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, and the World Health Organization. A spokesperson for Gavi said there was no “legal barrier” to Iran procuring vaccines through COVAX as the U.S. Treasury’s Office on Foreign Assets Control had issued a license covering coronavirus vaccine procurement. Namaki didn’t mention COVAX or specify how Iran was paying for the doses. Iran Says U.S. Sanctions Preventing Purchases of Covid Vaccines Iran is struggling to manage the Middle East’s worst coronavirus outbreak and has repeatedly blamed U.S. sanctions for severely hampering its relief efforts. More than 1 million people have been infected and more than 50,000 have died from the disease so far, according to official figures. President Hassan Rouhani told the cabinet he had instructed Health Ministry officials to buy coronavirus vaccines from a particular country without naming it, according to state TV. “Our people have to know that any action that we want to take, whether its medicine imports, equipment imports or vaccine imports, we have to curse Trump 100 times at the same time,” Rouhani said. U.S. President Donald Trump reimposed crippling sanctions on Iran in 2018 after walking away from the landmark nuclear deal. “Today it takes weeks or sometimes months -- and the entire country is held up -- just so that we can send some money somewhere so that we can buy medicines,” he said.

#### Iran is solving the virus now but the risk of future outbreaks crfeating a 6th wave remains

Financial Tribune 10/16/21, (Iran Prepared to Deal With New Wave of Coronavirus, <https://financialtribune.com/articles/national/110729/iran-prepared-to-deal-with-new-wave-of-coronavirus>)

Health Minister Bahram Einollahi said on Saturday that Iran has taken the necessary steps to contain a possible sixth wave of Covid-19 as the country plans to move forward with school and university reopenings. “With the significant extent of vaccine coverage and public observance of safety rules, the next wave will be less intense than the one before,” the minister was quoted as saying by ISNA. According to Einollahi, Iran has brought in a total of 110 million vaccine doses since the launch of the vaccination campaign and some 71 million shots have been administered so far. He nevertheless noted that all hospitals across the country are on full alert in case of a resurgence. The Health Ministry on Saturday gave out over 828,000 vaccine doses, taking the number of fully vaccinated people to 23 million and those who have received a first shot to 48 million. Despite vaccinations and the containment of the fifth wave, Iran has persistently reported near 10,000 infections and 200 deaths on a daily basis. Head of the Health Ministry Center for Infectious Disease Control, Mohammad Mahdi Gouya, also pointed out that inoculation alone will not be enough to stem the disease. “We’re getting closer to cold seasons, children will go to schools and students to universities, the virus could reemerge in these circumstances,” the official warned. Gouya added that proper ventilation systems and following safety measures could play a huge role in containment, in addition to fast vaccine rollout.

#### Failure to control in Iran equals global recirculation and pandemic and future mutations

Kirkpatrick et al 8/13/21, Reporters NYT, (David with Farnaz Fassihi and Mujib Mashal, ‘Recipe for a Massive Viral Outbreak’: Iran Emerges as a Worldwide Threat, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/24/world/middleeast/coronavirus-iran.html)

Religious pilgrims, migrant workers, businessmen, soldiers and clerics all flow constantly across Iran’s frontiers, often crossing into countries with few border controls, weak and ineffective governments and fragile health systems. Now, as it struggles to contain the spread of the coronavirus, Iran is also emerging as the second focal point after China for the spread of the disease. Cases in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates — even one in Canada — have all been traced to Iran, sending tremors of fear rippling out from Kabul to Beirut. The Middle East is in many ways the perfect place to spawn a pandemic, experts say, with the constant circulation of both Muslim pilgrims and itinerant workers who might carry the virus. Iran’s economy has been strangled by sanctions, its people have lost trust in their government and its leaders are isolated from much of the world, providing little clarity about the extent of the epidemic. Civil wars or years of unrest have shattered the health systems of several neighboring countries, like Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen. And most of the region is governed largely by authoritarians with poor track records at providing public transparency, accountability and health services. “It is a recipe for a massive viral outbreak,” said Peter Piot, director of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and the former founding executive director of the Joint United Nations Program on H.I.V./AIDS. Millions of Muslim pilgrims travel each year from around the region to visit Shiite holy sites in Iran and Iraq. In January alone, 30,000 people returned to Afghanistan from Iran, and hundreds of others continue to make the pilgrimage to Qom, the site of the outbreak, every week, Afghan officials say.

#### A new wave will kill millions and mutations cause extinction

Duzgun 5/5/20 Eren Duzgun teaches Historical Sociology and International Relations at Leiden University, Netherlands. Capitalism, Coronavirus and the Road to Extinction, <https://socialistproject.ca/2020/04/capitalism-coronavirus-and-road-to-extinction/>

The Godzilla-like image of the virus Covid-19 has been haunting the world. Not only has the virus unraveled nightmarish possibilities leading to the extinction of millions of people, but it has also served as a quintessential case revealing the structural contradictions of and existential threats posed by capitalism on a global scale. Several researchers agree that Covid-19 is quite an unprecedented virus. Unlike seasonal influenza, Covid-19 is ten times deadlier, and we have yet to develop a medical remedy or herd immunity to slow it down; the best estimates for the development of a vaccine are at least three to six months away. The virus’s mortality rate seems much lower than earlier pandemics (such as Ebola [1994], Avian flu [1997], SARS [2002], MERS [2012]); yet the manner in which Covid-19 spreads, i.e., its mode of infectivity, seems radically different. Unlike earlier pandemics, the virus has proved infectious even before carriers display any symptoms, which renders it often undetectable during the 14-day incubation period. Facts on the Ground Given that we are unable to detect or cure it, we are completely helpless against the virus’s global march. Emergency measures such as compulsory quarantines, social-distancing and improved hygiene standards may temporarily slow down the virus’s pace, yet once these measures begin to be relaxed – as they surely will be – it is very likely that the virus will be at our door again. This grim picture gets even more complicated by the fact that the virus is likely to go through several mutations. The virus may increase its adaptability to new climatic and generational circumstances, hence targeting not only the elderly, but a broader age group even when summer arrives in the northern hemisphere. Covid-19 is not the first ‘modern’ pathogen with global consequences. The Spanish Flu (1918), for example, was sweeping in terms of its geographical span as well as devastating in terms of its death toll. As Mike Davis notes, the Spanish flu broke out at a time when billions were still in the process of being (forcibly) incorporated into the capitalist world market. The expansion of markets eliminated the very basis of safety-first agriculture, undermining local reciprocities and solidarities that traditionally provided welfare to the poor during crises. Indeed, what prepared the ground for its outbreak and exacerbated the impact of this early 20th century pathogen was the deterioration of nutritional standards under market imperatives as well as the exigencies and scarcities caused by the Great War. Covid-19, by contrast, has begun its journey and taken its biggest toll thus far in the most advanced and affluent parts of the world. This is to say, the contagion is no longer limited to the persistently undernourished, underdeveloped, and war-torn parts of the world; its impact is no longer restricted to a distant wet market or a third world country alone. Instead, it has emerged and expanded in the very heart of the capitalist world order at a time when capitalism has not only been already firmly established across the globe but has been testing the eco-biological limits of the entire planet. Should things remain the same, Covid-19 and its future cousins are likely to claim the lives of not just ‘some’ people as they did in the past, but of humanity as a whole. In this sense, perhaps for the first time in modern history, the biological blitzkrieg activated by the coronavirus has thrown into sharp relief the immediately existential and undeniably global contradictions and consequences generated by capitalism.

### 1NR---AT: Israel Strike

#### It’s all a bluff---There is zero chance of Israel preempting Iran---the threats are merely a bargaining chip with the U.S. on settlements

Safeel 10/17/21, a postdoc fellow at Germany’s Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology. (Sajjad, 10/17/21, Israel Isn’t Strong Enough to Attack Iran, Foreign Policyhttps://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/17/israel-isnt-strong-enough-to-attack-iran/)

Not for the first time in recent memory, Israel wants the world to know it is ready and willing to militarily strike Iran—alone if it has to. In recent weeks, Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz has twice spoken of Israel’s readiness to strike Iran militarily to prevent it from advancing is nuclear program. “I do not rule out the possibility that Israel will have to take action in the future in order to prevent a nuclear Iran,” he said at a briefing of foreign ambassadors and envoys. And as though to add to the alarmist mood, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of General Staff Aviv Kochavi claimed that the “progress in the Iranian nuclear program has led the IDF to speed up its operational plans” for an attack on the country and that a recently-approved “defense budget … is meant to address this.” A dedicated team, he boasted, had been assembled to boost preparation for a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities should such a strike be ordered by Israel’s political leadership. For his part, Israeli Prime Minister Neftali Bennett has said his country is ready to “act alone” against Iran if it ever feels the need to do so. He made the remarks after an attack on an Israeli-managed tanker off the coast of Oman, for which Tel Aviv and its allies blamed Iran. To be sure, Israel has in the past carried out relatively limited operations against Iran—such as raids on Iranian allies in Syria and nuclear sabotage—and may continue to do so in the future. But to what extent should we believe Tel Aviv is truly ready and willing to launch a strike on Iran because of advances in the Iranian nuclear program, knowing full well that this is likely to push the two countries and their allies into war? The political and military constraints on Israeli decision-makers suggests such a military showdown is highly unlikely. To speak of an imminent and undisguised IDF strike deep inside Iranian territory is to overlook a long-established norm that has for decades governed U.S.-Israel relations: Israel cannot simply ignore the wishes and concerns of its chief patron, especially when core U.S. foreign policy priorities are at stake. This norm was expressed in clear terms by no less a figure than Israel’s former premier and Defense Minister Ehud Barak in his autobiography My Country, My Life. Here, Barak spelled out the paradigm that has shaped—and will likely continue to shape—the contours of Israeli action against Iran. “There were only two ways,” he explained, that Israel could stop the Iranians from getting a nuclear weapon (read: “nuclear program,” for Barak willfully ignores U.S. intelligence assessments that Iran had halted pursuits for nuclear weapons in 2003). One way was “for the Americans to act.” The only other option was “for [the United States] not to hinder Israel from doing so.” But according to Barak, “hinder” is precisely what consecutive U.S. administrations have done—and are still likely to do. Even during the military interventionism of the George W. Bush presidency, Israel did not have a blank check to do as it pleased. As Barak notes in his memoirs, when Bush learned in 2008 of Israeli efforts to purchase heavy munitions from the United States, he confronted Barak and then-premier Ehud Olmert. “I want to tell both of you now, as president,” Bush warned, “We are totally against any action by you to mount an attack on the [Iranian] nuclear plants.” “I repeat,” Bush further clarified, “in order to avoid any misunderstanding. We expect you not to do it. And we’re not going to do it, either, as long as I am president. I wanted it to be clear.” It deserves mention that according to Barak, Bush issued this warning despite knowing that Israel did not even possess the military capacity to assault Iran at the time. According to Barak, this staunch opposition to a strike on Iran had a “dramatic” effect on him and Olmert since the Bush administration had supported Israel’s 2007 bombing of Syria’s nascent nuclear program just a year before. In both cases, Washington’s approval, or lack thereof, was demonstrably consequential. Barak’s memoirs show that the same dynamic continued to govern U.S.-Israel relations during Obama’s presidency. He recalls how then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta “made no secret of the fact he didn’t want us to launch a military strike” at a time when the Obama administration was focused on putting international political and economic pressure on Iran. Panetta “urged me to ‘think twice, three times,’ before going down that road,” Barak wrote, and saw it as a given that Tel Aviv would keep Washington abreast of its decisions. “If you do decide to attack the Iranian facilities, when will we know?” he allegedly asked Barak. According to Barak’s account, Israel was dissuaded from going forward with a supposed strike on Iran’s nuclear installations in summer 2012 “because of the damage it would do to our ties with the United States.” Washington’s demands continued to limit Tel Aviv after the finalization of the nuclear deal in 2015. Even then, Barak recalls, the Israelis could not simply act against Iran without a green light from the Obama administration: “We needed to reach agreement with the Americans about what kind of military strike we, or they, might have to take if the Iranians again moved to get nuclear weapons.” As evinced by Barak’s autobiography, U.S. presidents are not taciturn about making their views and wishes known to Israeli officials, especially when primary U.S. foreign policy objectives are involved. Nor can Tel Aviv afford to ignore Washington’s express demands and concerns on such matters. And today, any flagrant Israeli violation of Iranian sovereignty will instantly clash with two mutually reinforcing goals that have come to define the Biden administration’s foreign policy: curbing Iran’s nuclear program through non-military means (efforts currently focused on reviving the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal) and winding down U.S. military presence in the Middle East. These political realities make it unlikely Israel will pursue an overt strike on Iran. Just as important, however, are the military constraints that Israel faces. To be sure, even without its ready-to-launch nuclear warheads, Israel is more than capable of delivering swift and devastating blows to Iran’s armed forces, both in the skies and seas. Its fleet of American fighter jets and bombers alone can irreparably trounce Iran’s air defenses as well as its dilapidated air force. Even Iran’s increasingly powerful, accurate, and far-reaching missile and drone systems don’t radically alter the balance of power in the skies. In short, in terms of military hardware, the IDF’s superiority over Iran’s armed forces is indisputable, not to mention otherworldly. But this prodigious superiority will be rendered far less consequential in the event of an all-out war that lures the IDF ground forces into the battlefield. Why? Ever since the IDF’s embarrassing defeat during the 2006 war with Hezbollah, Israel’s top military brass have become acutely aware that the country’s land forces are ill-prepared for a full-scale war with a fighting force even moderately capable of packing a punch. As shown by Israel’s own scathing inquiry into the 2006 war, as well as reports by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the U.S. Army, the 33-day war with Hezbollah demonstrated that the IDF ground forces had been woefully ill-prepared to fight a real war with a formidable foe. Since then, there have been some signs of remedial measures undertaken by the IDF to address its shortcomings. Still, there is little reason to believe its ground forces have undergone a drastic improvement since the 2006 war. Unsurprisingly, when Gadi Eizenkot began his tenure as Chief of General Staff of the IDF a few months after Protective Edge (the 2014 Gaza War), he reportedly “found the ground forces in rather bad shape” and “an army that had gotten fat in … all the wrong places in the decade after the Second Lebanon War.” The picture looked more or less the same in late 2018 when the outgoing ombudsman of the Israeli Defense Ministry Maj. Gen. (res.) Yitzhak Brick warned lawmakers in a “contentious” meeting that the country’s ground forces were unprepared for a future war. Mindful of the gaping chink in the IDF’s armor, Israel’s highest military and political echelons are unlikely to order an overt military operation inside Iranian territory, knowing full well that such an assault will most likely lock Israel and Iran in an irreversible spiral of escalation that promises to pit ill-prepared IDF ground troops against Iranian forces and their regional allies such as Hezbollah. But if Washington’s red light and Tel Aviv’s own military calculus render a flagrant violation of Iranian sovereignty by the IDF unlikely, then what is to account for the public, at times even garish, saber-rattling emanating from Israeli statesmen? Such threats are partly tailored for domestic consumption. In a highly militarized social context that has in recent decades steadily drifted toward the far-right, talk of bombing Iran may be an effort to not appear weak before one’s political rivals. It may also be read, however, as a bargaining posture to strengthen Israel’s position vis-à-vis the Biden administration on issues far closer to home than the Iranian nuclear program. By continuously breathing life into the specter of striking Iran—a source of great unease in Western capitals due its catastrophic ramifications—Israeli leaders can offer to forgo their non-existent plans to enter an all-out war with Iran in return for other gains: Biden dropping his opposition to illegal settlement expansion in the occupied territories (a secondary issue for the United States) as well as more military and financial aid.

## Acquisition

### 1NC---Turn

#### Reduced reliance on nuclear weapons causes conventional build up – causes investments in PGS and CTM

Kelleher and Reppy 2011

Catherine Mc Ardle Kelleher Senior Fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University and College Park Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland and Judith Reppy Professor Emerita and Graduate School Professor at the Cornell Department of Science and Technology Studies “Getting to Zero : The Path to Nuclear Disarmament” published 2011-03-02, online access ProQuest Ebook Central 9/16/18

Any American president—Barack Obama included—wishing to wean the United States from its long-standing reliance on nuclear weapons would find it difficult not to pursue a robust conventionally oriented denial strategy. Yet, the challenge facing the United States is to make more transparent precisely where current advanced conventional and missile defense programs stand today, and what restrictions or operational constraints the United States might be willing to accept, if any, on their development or operation to accelerate the path toward nuclear abolition.

If the U.S. decision to arm a small number of Trident D-s missiles with conventional warheads is any indication, virtually no thought went into how such plans would be viewed in Moscow or Beijing, or indeed, even in the U.S. Congress. The impervious nature of conventional strategic strike programs is less a matter of intention and more related to the fact that programs are mired in vagueness with differing interpretations of missile requirements and capabilities existing within various bureaucratic stake holders. Programs are diffused across the entire Department of Defense, including the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency and the military services. And rather than being driven by any well-conceived concept of operation dictating how these various programs will transform military operations—the bellwether of truly revolutionary change—these efforts are propelled for the most part by raw technological momentum.17 The opaque nature of U.S. global missile defense ambitions in the Bush administration largely emanated from the imperative to deploy systems as quickly as possible to meet political, if not threat-driven, needs. Global strike capabilities, on the other hand, have the advantage today and in the future of appearing to transform deterrence-oriented nuclear ballistic missiles that no one ever wishes to be used into denial-oriented counterforce systems possessing an array of future mission possibilities—a factor that surely animates the interest of all three military services. But Global Strike’s exclusive affiliation with advanced conventional strike is today more promise than reality. However much the U.S. Air Force may have envisioned the Prompt Global Strike mission as a decidedly conventional one, its initial implementation proved otherwise, not least because of the dearth of truly global conventional capabilities.18 In fact, Global Strike’s June 2004 implementation as an approved operational plan mirrored the Bush administration’s 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) conflation of nuclear and conventional capabilities.

#### Crisis instability causes preemption and escalation

Acton 15

James M. Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program and a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Testimony for the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces December 08, 2015 “Prompt Global Strike: American and Foreign Developments”

Although plans for the so-called Conventional Trident Modification have been dropped, warhead ambiguity still dominates the discussion about the escalation risks of CPGS weapons. Indeed, the Department of Defense focused the CPGS program on boost-glide weapons largely because it saw them as a way of mitigating warhead ambiguity. It argues that conventional boost-glide weapons can be distinguished by their non-ballistic trajectories from nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. This argument is, however, not entirely persuasive. While the launch of a boost-glide weapon would be detectable by early-warning satellites, it would generally fly at too low an altitude to be monitored by early-warning radars thereafter. As a result, a state observing—or, rather, trying to observe—a boost-glide weapon would not see an object flying in a non-ballistic trajectory; it would see the launch of a weapon that would quickly disappear from view. The extent to which warhead ambiguity would be mitigated by an unobservable characteristic is, to say the least, an open question.

The risk of warhead ambiguity should not be ignored, especially if the United States acquired CPGS weapons to conduct strikes on China or, much less likely, on Russia. However, the focus on warhead ambiguity has been unhelpful by obscuring other risks.

For example, highly maneuverable CPGS weapons with unpredictable trajectories could create a different form of ambiguity—destination ambiguity, which is uncertainty on the part of an observing state about whether it was the target of a CPGS attack. CPGS attacks against North Korea, for example, could potentially lead Russia or China to conclude that they were under attack, risking inadvertent escalation. (The risk would be even greater if the observing state also misidentified the CPGS weapon as nuclear armed.)

Ambiguity could arise about the nature of the intended target as well. For example, China’s nuclear-armed missiles and conventional anti-ship ballistic missiles are reported to share a single command-and-control system. Because some components of this system are buried, hypersonic weapons may provide the only non-nuclear means to attack them. There is a real risk, however, that Beijing could interpret such strikes as an attempt to deny China control of its nuclear arsenal even if their actual goal was to protect American aircraft carriers from Chinese conventional weapons. Such target ambiguity, arising from attacks on “entangled” assets, could be highly escalatory.

Crisis instability is also a real risk; an adversary’s fears that CPGS weapons could destroy its strategic weapons could lead the adversary to employ those weapons preemptively. “Strategic” does not just mean nuclear. In a conflict with the United States, for instance, Beijing would want to protect its anti-access/area-denial capabilities. It could do so by destroying or disabling the GPS satellites on which CPGS weapons would, in all probability, rely for navigation. Fearing this, the United States would have an incentive to destroy Chinese anti-satellite capabilities with CPGS weapons early in a conflict. This threat would, in turn, give China an incentive to attack the GPS constellation preemptively to disable CPGS weapons. The result could be rapid escalation that both sides might rather avoid.

### 1NC---!D---Cyber

#### No cyber impact.

Lewis 20, PhD, a senior vice president and director of the Technology Policy Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. (James Andrew, 8-17-2020, "Dismissing Cyber Catastrophe", *CSIS*, https://www.csis.org/analysis/dismissing-cyber-catastrophe)

A catastrophic cyberattack was first predicted in the mid-1990s. Since then, predictions of a catastrophe have appeared regularly and have entered the popular consciousness. As a trope, a cyber catastrophe captures our imagination, but as analysis, it remains entirely imaginary and is of dubious value as a basis for policymaking. There has never been a catastrophic cyberattack.

To qualify as a catastrophe, an event must produce damaging mass effect, including casualties and destruction. The fires that swept across California last summer were a catastrophe. Covid-19 has been a catastrophe, especially in countries with inadequate responses. With ~~man-made~~ actions, however, a catastrophe is harder to produce than it may seem, and for cyberattacks a catastrophe requires organizational and technical skills most actors still do not possess. It requires planning, reconnaissance to find vulnerabilities, and then acquiring or building attack tools—things that require resources and experience. To achieve mass effect, either a few central targets (like an electrical grid) need to be hit or multiple targets would have to be hit simultaneously (as is the case with urban water systems), something that is itself an operational challenge.

It is easier to imagine a catastrophe than to produce it. The 2003 East Coast blackout is the archetype for an attack on the U.S. electrical grid. No one died in this blackout, and services were restored in a few days. As electric production is digitized, vulnerability increases, but many electrical companies have made cybersecurity a priority. Similarly, at water treatment plants, the chemicals used to purify water are controlled in ways that make mass releases difficult. In any case, it would take a massive amount of chemicals to poison large rivers or lakes, more than most companies keep on hand, and any release would quickly be diluted.

More importantly, there are powerful strategic constraints on those who have the ability to launch catastrophe attacks. We have more than two decades of experience with the use of cyber techniques and operations for coercive and criminal purposes and have a clear understanding of motives, capabilities, and intentions. We can be guided by the methods of the Strategic Bombing Survey, which used interviews and observation (rather than hypotheses) to determine effect. These methods apply equally to cyberattacks. The conclusions we can draw from this are:

Nonstate actors and most states lack the capability to launch attacks that cause physical damage at any level, much less a catastrophe. There have been regular predictions every year for over a decade that nonstate actors will acquire these high-end cyber capabilities in two or three years in what has become a cycle of repetition. The monetary return is negligible, which dissuades the skilled cybercriminals (mostly Russian speaking) who might have the necessary skills. One mystery is why these groups have not been used as mercenaries, and this may reflect either a degree of control by the Russian state (if it has forbidden mercenary acts) or a degree of caution by criminals.

There is enough uncertainty among potential attackers about the United States’ ability to attribute that they are unwilling to risk massive retaliation in response to a catastrophic attack. (They are perfectly willing to take the risk of attribution for espionage and coercive cyber actions.)

No one has ever died from a cyberattack, and only a handful of these attacks have produced physical damage. A cyberattack is not a nuclear weapon, and it is intellectually lazy to equate them to nuclear weapons. Using a tactical nuclear weapon against an urban center would produce several hundred thousand casualties, while a strategic nuclear exchange would cause tens of millions of casualties and immense physical destruction. These are catastrophes that some hack cannot duplicate. The shadow of nuclear war distorts discussion of cyber warfare.

State use of cyber operations is consistent with their broad national strategies and interests. Their primary emphasis is on espionage and political coercion. The United States has opponents and is in conflict with them, but they have no interest in launching a catastrophic cyberattack since it would certainly produce an equally catastrophic retaliation. Their goal is to stay below the “use-of-force” threshold and undertake damaging cyber actions against the United States, not start a war.

This has implications for the discussion of inadvertent escalation, something that has also never occurred. The concern over escalation deserves a longer discussion, as there are both technological and strategic constraints that shape and limit risk in cyber operations, and the absence of inadvertent escalation suggests a high degree of control for cyber capabilities by advanced states. Attackers, particularly among the United States’ major opponents for whom cyber is just one of the tools for confrontation, seek to avoid actions that could trigger escalation.

The United States has two opponents (China and Russia) who are capable of damaging cyberattacks. Russia has demonstrated its attack skills on the Ukrainian power grid, but neither Russia nor China would be well served by a similar attack on the United States. Iran is improving and may reach the point where it could use cyberattacks to cause major damage, but it would only do so when it has decided to engage in a major armed conflict with the United States. Iran might attack targets outside the United States and its allies with less risk and continues to experiment with cyberattacks against Israeli critical infrastructure. North Korea has not yet developed this kind of capability.

One major failing of catastrophe scenarios is that they discount the robustness and resilience of modern economies. These economies present multiple targets and configurations; they are harder to damage through cyberattack than they look, given the growing (albeit incomplete) attention to cybersecurity; and experience shows that people compensate for damage and quickly repair or rebuild. This was one of the counterintuitive lessons of the Strategic Bombing Survey. Pre-war planning assumed that civilian morale and production would crumple under aerial bombardment. In fact, the opposite occurred. Resistance hardened and production was restored.1

This is a short overview of why catastrophe is unlikely. Several longer CSIS reports go into the reasons in some detail. Past performance may not necessarily predict the future, but after 25 years without a single catastrophic cyberattack, we should invoke the concept cautiously, if at all. Why then, it is raised so often?

### 1NC---!D---C2 Hacking

#### Nuclear hacking is impossible---safeguards, deterrence, and redundancy.

Caylor 16, LCDR, MA student at Air Command and Staff College. (Matt, 2-1-2016, "The Cyber Threat to Nuclear Deterrence", *War on the Rocks*, https://warontherocks.com/2016/02/the-cyber-threat-to-nuclear-deterrence/)

The perception that cyber threats will ultimately undermine the relevance or effectiveness of nuclear deterrence is flawed in at least three keys areas. First among these is the perception that nuclear weapons or their command and control systems are similar to a heavily defended corporate network. The critical error in this analogy is that there is an expectation of IP-based availability that simply does not exist in the case of American nuclear weapons — they are not online. Even with physical access, the proprietary nature of their control system design and redundancy of the National Command and Control System (NCCS) makes the possibility of successfully implementing an exploit against either a weapon or communications system incredibly remote. Also, whereas the cyber domain is characterized by significant levels of risk due to a combination of bias toward automated safeguards and the liability of single human failures, nuclear weapon safety and surety are predicated on balanced elements of stringent human interaction and control. From two-person integrity in physical inspections and loading, to the rigorous mechanisms and authority required for weapons release, human beings serve as a multi-factor safeguard while retaining the ultimate role to protect the integrity of nuclear deterrence against cyber threats.

To a large degree, the potential vulnerabilities caused by wireless communications and physical intrusions into areas holding nuclear material are already mitigated via secure communications that are not linked to the outside and multiple layers of physical security systems. While there has been a great deal of publicity surrounding the Y-12 break-in of 2012, the truth is that the three people involved never got near any nuclear material or technology.

Without state-level resourcing in the billions of dollars, the technical sophistication required to pursue a Stuxnet-like attack against nuclear weapons is most likely beyond the capability of even the most gifted group of hackers. For all intents, this excludes terrorist organizations and cyber criminals from the field of threats and restricts it to those nations that already possess nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon states, however, have the full-spectrum cyber threat capability referenced in the Defense Science Board report and would most likely be influenced by an understanding of the elements of classic nuclear deterrence strategy. In the case of first strike, no cyber weapon could be expected to perform at a rate higher than any conventional anti-nuclear capability (i.e., not 100 percent effective). Therefore, an adversary’s nuclear threat would be perceived to endure, thereby negating and dissuading the effort to use and employ a cyber weapon against an adversary’s nuclear force. Additionally, just as missile defense systems have been historically controversial due to perceived destabilizing effects, it is reasonable to conclude that these nuclear-weapon states would view the attempt to deploy a cyber capability against their nuclear stockpiles from a similar perspective.

Finally, the very existence of nuclear weapons is often enough to alter the risk analysis of an adversary. With virtually no chance of remote or unauthorized detonation (which would be the desired results of a sabotage event), the most probable cyber threat to any nuclear stockpile is that of espionage. Attempted cyber intrusions at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) and its efforts to bolster cybersecurity initiatives provide clear evidence that this is already underway. However, theft of design information or even more robust intelligence on the location of stored nuclear weapons cannot eliminate the potential destruction that even a handful of nuclear weapons can bring

#### marked

to an adversary. Knowledge alone, particularly the imperfect knowledge that cyber espionage is likely to offer, is incapable of drastically altering an adversary’s risk calculus. In fact, quite the opposite is true. An adversary with greater understanding of the nuclear capabilities of a rival is forced to consider courses of action to prevent escalation, potentially increasing the credibility of a state’s nuclear deterrence.

Despite the growing sophistication in cyber capabilities and the willingness to use them for espionage or in concert with kinetic attack, the strategic value of nuclear weapons has not been diminished. The insulated architecture combined with a robust and redundant command-and-control system makes the existence of any viable cyber threat of exploitation extremely low. With the list of capable adversaries limited by both funding and motivation, it is highly unlikely that any nation will possess, or even attempt to develop, a cyber weapon sufficient to undermine the credibility of nuclear weapons. In both psychological and physical terms, the threat of the megabyte will never possess the ability to overshadow the destructive force of the megaton. Although the employment of cyberspace for military effect has brought new challenges to the international community, the role of nuclear weapons and their associated deterrence against open and unconstrained global aggression are as relevant now as they were in the Cold War.

# 2NC

## K ⁠— Capitalism

### AT: Util ⁠— 2NC

#### Their framing causes genocide AND links

Santos 3, Professor of Sociology at the University of Coimbra (Boaventura de Souza Santos, 2003, “Collective Suicide?”, Bad Subjects, Issue # 63, http://www.ces.fe.uc.pt/opiniao/bss/072en.php)

According to Franz Hinkelammert, the West has repeatedly been under the illusion that it should try to save humanity by destroying part of it. This is a salvific and sacrificial destruction, committed in the name of the need to radically materialize all the possibilities opened up by a given social and political reality over which it is supposed to have total power. This is how it was in colonialism, with the genocide of indigenous peoples, and the African slaves. This is how it was in the period of imperialist struggles, which caused millions of deaths in two world wars and many other colonial wars. This is how it was in Stalinism, with the Gulag and in Nazism, with the holocaust. And now today, this is how it is in neoliberalism, with the collective sacrifice of the periphery and even the semiperiphery of the world system. With the war against Iraq, it is fitting to ask whether what is in progress is a new genocidal and sacrificial illusion, and what its scope might be. It is above all appropriate to ask if the new illusion will not herald the radicalization and the ultimate perversion of the western illusion: destroying all of humanity in the illusion of saving it. Sacrificial genocide arises from a totalitarian illusion that is manifested in the belief that there are no alternatives to the present-day reality and that the problems and difficulties confronting it arise from failing to take its logic of development to its ultimate consequences. If there is unemployment, hunger and death in the Third World, this is not the result of market failures; instead, it is the outcome of the market laws not having been fully applied. If there is terrorism, this is not due to the violence of the conditions that generate it; it is due, rather, to the fact that total violence has not been employed to physically eradicate all terrorists and potential terrorists. This political logic is based on the supposition of total power and knowledge, and on the radical rejection of alternatives; it is ultra-conservative in that it aims to infinitely reproduce the status quo. Inherent to it is the notion of the end of history. During the last hundred years, the West has experienced three versions of this logic, and, therefore, seen three versions of the end of history: Stalinism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the plan; Nazism, with its logic of racial superiority; and neoliberalism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the market. The first two periods involved the destruction of democracy. The last one trivializes democracy, disarming it in the face of social actors sufficiently powerful to be able to privatize the State and international institutions in their favour. I have described this situation as a combination of political democracy and social fascism. One current manifestation of this combination resides in the fact that intensely strong public opinion, worldwide, against the war is found to be incapable of halting the war machine set in motion by supposedly democratic rulers. At all these moments, a death drive, a catastrophic heroism, predominates, the idea of a looming collective suicide, only preventable by the massive destruction of the other. Paradoxically, the broader the definition of the other and the efficacy of its destruction, the more likely collective suicide becomes. In its sacrificial genocide version, neoliberalism is a mixture of market radicalization, neoconservatism and Christian fundamentalism. Its death drive takes a number of forms, from the idea of "discardable populations", referring to citizens of the Third World not capable of being exploited as workers and consumers, to the concept of "collateral damage" , to refer to the deaths, as a result of war, of thousands of innocent civilians. The last, catastrophic heroism, is quite clear on two facts: according to reliable calculations by the Non-Governmental Organization MEDACT, in London, between 48 and 260 thousand civilians will die during the war and in the three months after (this is without there being civil war or a nuclear attack); the war will cost 100 billion dollars, enough to pay the health costs of the world's poorest countries for four years. Is it possible to fight this death drive? We must bear in mind that, historically, sacrificial destruction has always been linked to the economic pillage of natural resources and the labor force, to the imperial design of radically changing the terms of economic, social, political and cultural exchanges in the face of falling efficiency rates postulated by the maximalist logic of the totalitarian illusion in operation. It is as though hegemonic powers, both when they are on the rise and when they are in decline, repeatedly go through times of primitive accumulation, legitimizing the most shameful violence in the name of futures where, by definition, there is no room for what must be destroyed. In today's version, the period of primitive accumulation consists of combining neoliberal economic globalization with the globalization of war. The machine of democracy and liberty turns into a machine of horror and destruction.

they alter the nature of ownership, managerial decision making, contracts, intellectual-property licenses

#### Anti-trust makes tech more unethical — small companies expand surveillance capitalism and divide privacy along classist lines.

Kwet 20, PhD in Sociology from Rhodes University and is a Visiting Fellow of the Information Society Project at Yale Law School (Michael, Fixing Social Media: Toward a Democratic Digital Commons, *Markets, Globalization & Development Review*, Vol. 5, No. 1, Article 4. DOI: 10.23860/MGDR-2020-05-01-04)

The Neo-Brandeisian Solution

In the past few years, a new group of antitrust scholars channeled the philosophy of Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis (associate justice from 1916 to 1939) to challenge how antitrust should work in the internet era. As they note, in the 1970s, the Chicago School of legal scholars narrowed the scope of antitrust from concerns about centralized private power and the well-being of society to concerns about the price paid by consumers as a measure of consumer welfare (for an overview, see Kahn 2017). Such a narrow view is especially inadequate for the digital economy, where many Big Tech products and services are anticompetitive and harmful, despite the ‘zero price’ (at least in terms of subscriptions) paid by consumers for access.

For social media, most of the neo-Brandeisians hold that Facebook is harmful because it can use monopolistic power to erode our privacy, restrict consumer choice and innovation, undermine traditional media, and manipulate the behavior of users (Lynn and Stoller 2018, Patel 2018). The solution, they argue, is twofold: First, break up companies into component parts as a part of structural separation, and then force social networks to interoperate. Facebook, for example, concentrated its market power by acquiring Instagram and WhatsApp. Why not break it up into three separate companies? Most recognize that this in and of itself has its limitations, as there would still only be a few additional companies on the market performing the same functions. A second solution, neo-Brandeisians argue, is to force social networks to interoperate.

A Skeptical View of the Neo-Brandeisian Perspective

Creating multiple, competing social media platforms sounds nice until one starts thinking about how digital capitalism works. For starters, in order to turn profits, a corporation needs to generate revenue. One way to do this is to spy on users and monetize their data for marketing such as through personalized ads. People generally do not like surveillance or ads, so the corporations owning the platform have to force it on them. Ads can only be imposed on people because social media networks own and control the infrastructure, which they run as centralized networks on their corporate clouds. Even with more competitors, each company would still own and control the infrastructure, so they can all impose an ad-based revenue model on their users.

In fact, we already see this in the app marketplace. Seventy percent of the apps in the two most popular app stores, Google Play and Apple iOS, have hidden app trackers that spy on users (Vallina-Rodriguez et al. 2016, O’Brien and Kwet 2018). There are millions of apps, yet “competition” does not stop apps from spying on users. In fact, apps compete to spy on users, and users cannot do anything about it except stop using their beloved apps, because these are proprietary software applications that cannot be controlled by the users. There is no reason to assume competition among profit-seeking social networks will end differently.

A second possibility within the neo-Brandeisian framework is to charge users to access their services. Paid networks would then offer people a service that pledges to protect their privacy such as no data monetization. The “pay-for-privacy” option, however, is ethically flawed. Most of the world’s people have little or no disposable income (Hickel 2019). Poor people would be forced to use “free” surveillance-based networks, while the wealthy would pay to preserve their privacy. To fix this problem, one might advocate serving users ads without exploiting their data for personalization. This, too, is problematic. Most ads are involuntary corporate propaganda designed to manipulate people into buying more stuff. Bombarding people with ads all day pushes an environmentally destructive consumerist lifestyle on the world precisely at the time when we need to scale back overconsumption in rich countries and produce things that are needed in poorer countries, in order to transition to a sustainable and egalitarian global economy.

The real problem is we want a free and equitable social networking experience that respects privacy, provides the desired experience of users, and supports democracy; but we cannot deliver it in a capitalist system. A capitalist social network is enticed to profit and grow, which cannot be achieved without user exploitation or the generation of inequality. Indeed, business strategy scholars as well as political analysts understand it all too well – the prevailing conditions favor winner-take-all models (Hill 1997).

#### Turns methodology — Economic predictions about anti-trust are worse than a guess — empirics prove capitalist ideology produces inaccurate assessments and serial policy failure.

1AC Author Rozga 20, J.D. @ BU and former FTC merger review and litigation expert (Kai, August 31st, “How tech forces a reckoning with prediction-based antitrust enforcement,” *Tech Law Decoded*, <https://techlawdecoded.com/how-tech-forces-a-reckoning-with-prediction-based-antitrust-enforcement/>, Accessed 09-12-2021)

The Economism guessing game

The Economism—as some call it—of antitrust has sought to make the analysis in competition cases more rational by requiring that, before intervening in markets, enforcers must make a strong showing of the expected actual effects on competition of a given merger or a monopolist’s conduct. (To be sure, it was not just an intellectual disagreement with the status quo that inspired this movement. It was an ideological one, too, guided by the belief that it was more often than not better to wait for free markets to correct themselves rather than have the government meddle in them.)

On its face, it may seem sensible that the enforcement of laws which serve to protect competition should turn on an assessment of actual competitive effects. But this shift has meant that governments (and also private plaintiffs) bringing an antitrust case are required to present more evidence to explain the competitive dynamics of a market and how the conduct of its actors impacts competition in it. This exacts a heavy toll on everyone involved. Any antitrust litigator can attest to how antitrust cases stand out from others in terms of length, complexity, and scale. They are fact-heavy and data-intensive. And in the end, it is a burden borne by everyone involved in the case—prosecutor, defendant, and judge alike.

But the burden of analyzing actual competitive effects is more than just a hassle. It is responsible for turning antitrust into a guessing game. In merger cases, this is largely a forward-looking exercise: predicting how a combination of two companies will impact competition by comparing the market’s expected competitive state if the merger goes through to its expected competitive state if it does not. In monopolization cases, a similar analysis of the impact on competition of a monopolist’s abusive conduct can either be forward-looking (for preventing future harms) or backward-looking (for righting past wrongs).

And it is through the competitive effects guessing game that Economism was thrust into the forefront of antitrust. That is because a predictive approach to enforcement would not have been possible without the belief that economic theories and models provided the scientific (hard “s”) rigor for understanding how a market operates and how the conduct of its actors impacts competition in it. Depending on how you look at it, making predictions with economic models in antitrust was either the root cause or a necessary by-product of shifting the focus to actual competitive effects. Either way, Economism became the beating heart of antitrust at the same time that the law’s enforcement became premised on making predictions about actual competitive effects.

The unproven and perhaps unprovable premise of Economism

Despite forming its foundational underpinning, the bedrock assumption in modern antitrust that lawyers supported by economic experts are capable of understanding and predicting complex markets remains unproven—if it is even provable. To the contrary, there is good reason for reserving doubt.

In Antifragile, uncertainty expert Nassim Taleb writes: “Man-made complex systems tend to develop cascades and runaway chains of reactions that decrease, even eliminate, predictability … the modern world may be increasing in technological knowledge, but, paradoxically, it is making things a lot more unpredictable.” Taleb is skeptical of what he calls “superfragile” predictions guided by economic theory and models which are inherently “unreliable for decision-making.” To him, “economics is like a fable—a fable writer is there to stimulate ideas, indirectly inspire practice perhaps, but certainly not to direct or determine practice.”

According to Taleb, policymaking that uses economic models to manage complex systems in a top-down fashion is bound to fragilize things—no matter how well-intentioned the intervention might be. His most poignant examples of the dangers of expert-guided prediction-making come from looking at economic policy which, in an attempt to minimize short-term gyrations in the economy and financial markets, instead sets them up for larger blow-ups with systemic consequences. He concludes that “even when an economic theory makes sense, its application cannot be imposed from a model, in a top-down manner.”

In Thinking, Fast and Slow, behavioral economist and decision-making researcher Daniel Kahnemann endorses a similar skepticism about relying on expert judgments to evaluate and make predictions about complex environments. Kahnemann summarizes research in various domains (medical, economic, etc.) finding that, due to limits and biases innate to human cognition, expert judgments amidst uncertainty and unpredictability—what he calls “low-validity” environments—are a dependably ineffective way to predict the future.

Antitrust operates in precisely the sort of environment that the works of Taleb and Kahnemann would suggest is poorly suited for subjective, predictive decision-making. The lawfulness of a merger is determined by predicting whether it will cause prices to go up, a monopolist’s abusive conduct by conjecturing whether prices were inflated over a surmised competitive level—everything heavily reliant on economic theories and models. And the fact-specific inquiry of every antitrust case—especially when any case involving dynamic tech markets—means that its practitioners never get exposed to the sort of “regularity” and “prolonged practice” that Kahnemann concludes is necessary for subjective expert judgments to acquire predictive validity. If anything, low validity is supercharged in digital markets operating in vast ecosystems of constantly-evolving and interrelated markets with complicated relationships among its players.

The works of Taleb and Kahnemann suggest that antitrust technocrats are on a fool’s errand that will result in inaccurate evaluations of market conditions and poor predictions about competitive effects. Bad competition policy will result, if for no other reason than the limits of human cognition and the complexities of the market environments being observed.

Pulling back the curtain on Economism in practice

Practitioners can also draw on their own experiences to find ample support for the skepticism that flows from the works of Taleb and Kahnemann about expert-based, predictive decision-making.

The pitfalls of Economism in antitrust can be seen in everyday practice. In merger cases, economic models are presented to predict future price increases by the merged companies. And parties looking to dodge enforcement actions in close-call cases hire economists to predict how a merger will lower costs, increase output, and improve innovation.

In private antitrust litigation, plaintiffs and defendants alike rely on armies of economists to make out the elements of a case or defend against it. Too often, the result is a series of warring expert reports submitted by uber-qualified economists with stellar reputations who—based on the exact same factual record—reach diametrically opposing positions about a market’s dynamics or likely competitive effects. Equally troubling is how the uncertainty of the expert opinions can be seen fading away by the time the court chooses a winner, as the prevailing view achieves a supreme prescience when cited by the judge in support of its decision.

Alarm bells should be going off. An academic field’s reputation would seem to be put in doubt, and with it the foundation of an influential body of law that shapes our economy and society. Instead, academics and policymakers are more likely to be heard describing the rigor and rationality that they believe neoliberal economic thinking has brought to antitrust enforcement. And while some reforms proposed by the mainstream antitrust community might seem dramatic within the existing paradigm, they are trivial when considering how none tackle the fundamental flaws of the status quo.

And so, paradoxically, as antitrust turns its focus on increasingly difficult-to-predict markets, it does so increasingly with Economism-driven prediction as its lodestar—like a captain that insists on navigating a ship with the stars even when it is obvious that clouds cover the night sky.

#### Sanctions deny the necessities of life

Addis 3 (Adeno Addis is William Ray Forrester Professor of Public and Constitutional Law at Tulane University Law School. He received his B.A. and LL.B. (Honours) from Macquarie University (Australia), and an LL.M. and a J.S.D from Yale. He has published extensively in the areas of American constitutional law, communications law, human rights, and jurisprudence. Human Rights Quarterly 25.3 (2003) 573-623)

Other critics may concede that more often than not such measures would lead to the desired behavior modification, but at a cost that is often unacceptably high. Economic sanctions deprive citizens of the target state many of the basic necessities of life, leading to massive disruption and even destruction of life. The often high cost in life, liberty, and property that economic sanctions exact on innocent citizens and sectors of the target state are, to these critics, simply unacceptable even if at the end there was to be a change in the action and behavior of the regime of the target state. The moral and material costs that sanctions entail are, to these critics, simply too high to bear. Actually, there are two versions of the moral argument. The weak version is utilitarian in nature. It claims that often the cost in innocent human life and infrastructural damage is far greater than the benefit that is gained by imposing these sanctions. 13 The strong version of the moral argument is Kantian in its outlook. It objects to economic sanctions on the ground that often, if not always, sanctions target innocent civilians for suffering as a means to achieving a foreign policy objective, contrary to Kant's categorical imperative that we treat "humanity, whether in [our] person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end." 14 The argument here is that it is morally [End Page 576] unacceptable to impose suffering on innocent sectors of the target state, as economic sanctions do, for an objective that does not involve the prevention of the deaths of other innocent persons. 15

### AT: Central Planning

#### There’s no one-size-fix-all alternative---our task is shaping the best proposals into a unified alternative to capitalism.

Monbiot '19 [George; 4/25/19; columnist for The Guardian, has held visiting fellowships or professorships at the universities of Oxford (environmental policy), Bristol (philosophy), Keele (politics), Oxford Brookes (planning), and East London (environmental science); "Dare to declare capitalism dead – before it takes us all down with it," https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/apr/25/capitalism-economic-system-survival-earth/]

So what does a better system look like? I don’t have a complete answer, and I don’t believe any one person does. But I think I see a rough framework emerging. Part of it is provided by the ecological civilisation proposed by Jeremy Lent, one of the greatest thinkers of our age. Other elements come from Kate Raworth’s doughnut economics and the environmental thinking of Naomi Klein, Amitav Ghosh, Angaangaq Angakkorsuaq, Raj Patel and Bill McKibben. Part of the answer lies in the notion of “private sufficiency, public luxury”. Another part arises from the creation of a new conception of justice based on this simple principle: every generation, everywhere, shall have an equal right to the enjoyment of natural wealth.

I believe our task is to identify the best proposals from many different thinkers and shape them into a coherent alternative. Because no economic system is only an economic system but intrudes into every aspect of our lives, we need many minds from various disciplines – economic, environmental, political, cultural, social and logistical – working collaboratively to create a better way of organising ourselves that meets our needs without destroying our home.

### AT: Links to SQ ⁠— 2NC

### AT: Democracy

#### Fear of Chinese tech dominance is the “China virus” trope applied to technology---the US is even worse; their discourse is motivated by yellow peril and spikes Asian hate crimes.

Siu & Chun 20, Lok Siu: Cultural anthropologist and associate professor of Ethnic Studies at UC Berkeley. Claire Chun: PhD student in the Department of Ethnic Studies at the University of California, Berkeley (Yellow Peril and Techno-orientalism in the Time of Covid-19, *Journal of Asian American Studies*, Volume 23, Number 3, October 2020 Johns Hopkins University Press)

Technological Behemoth: The Racial Capitalist Frontier of Techno-Economic Warfare

The American media coverage of Wuhan's shutdown and the Chinese state's deployment of surveillance technology to contain the virus through [End Page 433] contact tracing and quarantine enforcement measures offered the American public a preview of the PRC government at work. Enfolded in these stories are both the underlying admiration and fear around the Chinese state's efficiency and efficacy in using technology for population control. Similarly, the same kind of admiration and fear are evident in American perceptions of China's explosive economic development and global reach since the 1990s. And arguably, these same sentiments re-emerge when we read about the seemingly rapid success of Huawei Technologies, which has become the world's largest telecommunications technology company, overtaking Western companies that were once household names, like Eriksson, Nokia, and Motorola.

The exemplary case of Huawei brings our discussion of yellow peril into the explicit terrain of techno-Orientalism where the idea of the Chinese techno-virus—emerging at the nexus of technology, international trade, and cyber-security—is articulated through the racialized fear of Chinese technological domination achieved purportedly by stealing trade secrets, engaging unfair trade practices, and enabling Chinese state surveillance. What the case of Huawei illustrates is the extension of the "Chinese virus" trope that already exists in the domains of public health (as biological pathogen) and research institutions (scientist-spy) into the realm of everyday consumer technologies. Our point in discussing Huawei is not to defend it or to judge its activities. Rather, we want to call attention to the increasing significance of media/communications technologies as sites of interstate techno-economic-security struggles (in addition to already existing corporate surveillance). Toward that end, the Huawei example clearly shows the entwined issues and discourses of technology, international trade, and cybersecurity, all of which are filtered through and constitutive of the racializing techniques of the "Chinese virus."

Between January 2019 and February 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice filed three indictments against Huawei and its subsidiaries. That Huawei is the first foreign company of recent memory that is singled out by the United States for charges related to sanctions violations, conspiracy to steal trade secrets from American companies (including source code and wireless technology manuals), and federal racketeering (including fraud, obstruction of justice, money laundering) is noteworthy in itself. This last charge of racketeering is used historically to address organized crime (i.e. mafias) and points to the U.S. government's intended juridical delegitimization of Huawei as an irrational institution mired in secrecy and an unlawful global corporation that cannot be trusted. In response to these allegations, Huawei accused the Department of Justice of exercising a form of political persecution and asserted that "[the charges] are based [End Page 434] largely on resolved civil disputes from the last twenty years that have been previously settled, litigated, and in some cases, rejected by federal judges and juries."31 The case will likely take years to resolve, but its function will become apparent by the ensuing interstate trade and diplomatic negotiations between China and the United States.

Meanwhile, the White House and various U.S. state departments have begun to exert pressure on both domestic institutions and allied nation-states to end contracts and research collaborations with Huawei. For instance, the U.S. Department of Commerce in 2019 blacklisted the firm on charges of intellectual property theft and barred U.S. companies from selling products to Huawei without federal authorization.32 Also, as discussed in the above section, the FBI has placed pressure on universities to increase oversight of Chinese American researchers and to divest from research collaborations funded by Huawei and other Chinese firms. Multiple universities, including MIT, Stanford University, and the University of Illinois, have terminated research partnerships with Huawei.33

In addition to these domestic pressures, U.S. officials have asked allied nation-states to cancel any existing contracts with Huawei, especially ones that involve using the firm's equipment for developing 5G wireless networks. Cybersecurity serves as the stated rationale, conjuring the potential of the Chinese Communist Party through its ties to the firm to engage in cyber surveillance/espionage by intercepting individual, corporate, and government data flowing through the 5G wireless networks. According to this logic, the "Chinese/Asian contagion" manifest as "Chinese/Asian espionage" can now be hardwired into the infrastructural fabric of our telecommunications systems through which data will travel from our phones, computers, online accounts, and other kinds of technologies to Chinese companies and, potentially, the Chinese state. The assertion is that the use of Huawei's equipment will create massive security vulnerabilities not just to U.S. intelligence but also to American individuals whose personal information can be captured and used for endless possibilities of commoditization. It is also argued that Chinese technology integration into any Western cyber infrastructure project "would give China the upper hand in any potential cyber war."34

Recently, this racialized fear of Chinese technology has materialized with intensified urgency in the privacy debates surrounding the immensely popular video-sharing platform, TikTok, and its Chinese parent company, ByteDance. With over 100 million users in the United States alone, TikTok has ascended to social media ubiquity, exacerbating American anxieties around China's technological dominance.35 Rehearsing much of the same rhetoric used to condemn Huawei, U.S. lawmakers have argued that TikTok [End Page 435] poses a threat to the "national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States," citing concerns over TikTok's handling of user data and the company's alleged allegiance to the Chinese government.36 Indeed, in early August 2020, the Trump administration released an executive order that would effectively ban the social media app from the United States if ByteDance failed to address concerns regarding the app's surveillance mechanisms, including the Chinese Communist Party's "access to Americans' personal and proprietary information . . . "37 Worth noting is the fact that TikTok was the platform of choice used by K-pop fans to flood the Trump campaign with fake ticket reservations to the Tulsa, Oklahoma, rally. The spectacular embarrassment of a half-empty arena no doubt left an impression on the White House.

However, even as the U.S. government is accusing Chinese corporations like ByteDance and Huawei of colluding with the state, it too is expanding collaborations with U.S. technology companies. For instance, in 2019, Microsoft was awarded a $10 billion contract from the Department of Defense to update and transform the U.S. military's cloud computing infrastructure. The project, known as the Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI), is the Pentagon's largest technology contract to date38 and represents the growing relationship between the high-tech industry and the military. Ironically, these are the very same nationalistic ties that the U.S. government has accused TikTok of advancing.

The strategic framing of potential foreign violation of individual privacy is part and parcel of the racialized construction of the "Chinese/ Asian techno-virus" as a danger to both American liberal personhood and national capitalist democracy. Indeed, the potentiality for China to gain the upper hand in any possible cyber and technological war with the United States compounds the economic threat that conglomerates like Huawei and ByteDance pose to U.S. global capitalism. The perceived dual dangers of compromised national security and economic competition—as embodied by Chinese transnational tech firms—positions Chinese technology, its commoditization, and its capture of the global market as evidence of China's advance in "techno-economic warfare." In this way, the specter of the Chinese/Asian threat is central, if not necessary, to legitimizing the insistence of American hegemony.

Conclusion

The unprecedented havoc caused by the coronavirus offers us an opportunity to pause and take note of both the deepening fractions within the [End Page 436] U.S. and the shifting dynamics between the national and the global. At the time of writing, on July 29, 2020, the virus has infected more than 17 million and has killed upwards of 667,000 people globally.39 The disproportionate impact on U.S. communities of color—Black, Native American, Latinx, and Asian American—has revealed the deep historical and structural inequalities that have shaped the profoundly unjust outcomes. Meanwhile, the racialization of the coronavirus as a "Chinese virus" has given rise to anti-Asian aggression globally. While this pandemic moment compels us to critically interrogate the construction of the contagion, our goal is not to focus solely on the racialization of the pathogen but to situate this particular discourse of the Chinese/Asian viral threat within the broader context of the U.S.-China trade war.

#### Democracy doesn’t solve war---best models.

Campbell et al. 18, \*Doctoral Candidate in Political Science, Ohio State University. \*\*Carter Phillips and Sue Henry Associate Professor of Political Science at the Ohio State University. \*\*\*Associate Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University. (\*Benjamin W., \*\*Skyler J. Cranmer, \*\*\*Bruce A. Desmarais, September 13, 2018, “Triangulating War: Network Structure and the Democratic Peace”, *Cornell University*, Accessible at: <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1809.04141.pdf>)

Conclusion

The dyadic understanding of the democratic peace has become ubiquitous in International Relations. By looking beyond simple dyadic analysis, accounting for the embededness of states in a much more complex network, we found the democratic peace may not be as robust as previously thought. Our results demonstrate that after accounting for the tendency for like-regime states with common enemies not to fight one another, the effect of the democratic peace not only vanishes, but jointly democratic dyads seem to be *more* conflict prone than mixed dyads. These results are consistent across operationalizations of the outcome variable, our triadic closure predictor, measurements of joint democracy, and a variety of other factors. We believe this explanation for the democratic peace is not a mechanism for understanding the democratic peace, but instead, an alternative. What we have shown here is that conflict between democracies indeed exists and the peaceful relations occasionally found are not necessarily a function of the affinity of democratic states, or intrinsic attributes of democratic states, but instead, a function of the strategic inefficiencies of fighting a state with a shared enemy. While regime type may influence the interests of states, we find that it does not directly influence the probability that any two states fight one another. There are three major implications to our research. First, scholars should be hesitant to consider dyadic conflict in isolation, as there are network dependencies informing whether a state engages or joins a MID. Second, preferences operating in addition to network interdependencies and collaboration explain much of the democratic peace. Third, when studying conflict, scholars and practitioners should consider the cost structure of collaboration, and how these dynamics inform not only conflict initiation, but conflict escalation. Particularly interesting is that the theoretical mechanism at work here is dramatically simpler than any of the established justifications for the democratic peace. We do not rely on arguments about institutions or norms, but just the simple and intuitive proposition that it does not make much sense for two states fighting a third to also fight each other. What the existing literature seems to have missed, usually theoretically and almost always empirically, is that dyadic conflicts do not occur in isolation, but in the context of a complex network of relations.

#### DPT reps sanitize interventions---Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate democracies are expansionist authoritarians bent on converting non-democratic states into an ideal form of governance.

Litsas 12—Assistant Professor of International Relations Theory at the Department of International and European Studies, University of Macedonia; Ph.D in International Relations from the University of Durham (Spyridon N., 2012, "DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY AND MILITARISM: THE UNRELATED CONNECTIVITY," Civitas Gentium 2(1), http://cg.turkmas.uoa.gr/~tcgweb/ojs/index.php/cg/article/view/31/45)

Islam is not simply a world religion. It is primarily a collective ideology with a rather developed political and doctrinal theory concerning social organization. The indisputable dominance of Islam at the centre of the Muslim world eliminates any attempt at domestic ideological and political pluralism, or of harmonious co-existence with contrasting socio-political models such as liberal democracy. The entire process of democratizing the two aforementioned Islamic states goes beyond the utopian ideal of voluntarily acceptance of Western values, an idealistic point of view that vividly resembles the Catholic Church’s arguments at the time of the discovery of the New World. The unwillingness of these Islamic states to voluntarily accept democracy makes war the only realistic option for the U.S. to impose power. In reality, no one can really support the view that the NATO attack against the Taliban regime was an irrational action. The Taliban is one of the most totalitarian regimes that humanity has ever witnessed and had almost identical methods of imposing its political presence as the notorious Khmer Rouge. Nevertheless, the NATO invasion of Afghanistan was not a humanitarian venture, but was motivated by the Taliban’s alliance with Al Qaeda terrorists. In order for this radical regime to be defeated, an ordinary military invasion was not sufficient. The primary objective for NATO and, in particular, the United States was the complete reformation of Afghanistan’s socio-ideological and political foundations. The situation is similar in Iraq. The objective in Iraq was not solely the overthrow of the Baathic regime of Sadam Hussein, nor was it control of Iraq’s oil deposits by Western companies. The primary objective, rather, was to install basic western socio-political values in Iraq. This would lead Iraq in an entirely different direction in the sub-system of the Middle East. On both occasions, the United States chose to wage war. On a primary level, the goal was to eliminate the political risks to Western interests. However, on a secondary level, the main goal was transformed into an undisguised attempt at altering the domestic structure of the aforementioned states in accordance with U.S. preference. War, in the second case, abandons the self-restraining Clausewitzian logic as an alternative way of achieving political goals. The very essence of the aforementioned dimension of war eliminates any form of rational application and, as a result, leads directly to military action. Therefore, it can be clearly supported that the D.P.T, on one hand, and militarism, on the other, develop a close ideological and empirical connection since neither is addressed directly in American foreign policy [55]. From the above it can be said that the D.P.T is a political weapon used by a Great Power, to accomplish its hegemonic objectives. This qualitative course of action promoted by the U.S. since the Cold War ended has been the primary source of militarism in the 21st century, as the wars in the Balkans and the Middle East clearly show. Inevitably, Democratic Peace leads to Democratic War and constitutes the ultimate attempt at imposing radical changes in the domestic socio-political structure of a state. As Geis et al argue: ‘As long as democracy is promoted by peaceful means of cooperation and voluntary assistance, one might not object to such a foreign policy strategy. If regime change is to be achieved by force as in the Iraq war 2003, however, the “flip side” of the democratic peace, namely a “democratic war” becomes obvious. Unfortunately, the notion of a democratic peace lends itself to being employed as an ideological underpinning for liberal- expansionist policies. Under the guise of promoting a seemingly “universalist” idea of democracy and freedom, some of the powerful Western democracies arrogate to themselves the right to pursue a “liberal mission.’’ [56]

### AT: Cap Good---Space Colonization

#### 1---Private sector won’t invest, and governments won’t fund colonization.

Konrad Szocik 19. University of Information Technology and Management in Rzeszow, Department of Philosophy and Cognitive Science. 01/2019. “Should and Could Humans Go to Mars? Yes, but Not Now and Not in the near Future.” Futures, vol. 105, pp. 54–66.

6. Public opinion Public opinion is, at least in the near future, the main sponsor of space research and space exploration. Bertrand, Pirtle, and Tomblin, (2017) show that the public is interested in human mission to Mars. The most preferred space mission is a crew in orbit and a robot mission on Mars surface. In other words, public criteria is low risk and low cost. The German space agency follows public opinion and social interest because is focused on duty for society and oriented to social purposes as “climate change, mobility, communication and security” (Zypries, 2017). Politicians are prone to reduce space budgets or to not invest in long-term human settlement missions due to public opinion. Consequently, progress in space technology is still retarded. State of art in space transport means did not change qualitatively since the Space Race between the US and the Soviet Union. Impact of public opinion may differ in various countries. Max Grimard (2012), p. 6) shows how important is space program for public opinion in the US. Public sympathy for American presence in space is counterbalanced by the unpredictability of politician authorities, the tensions between presidents and the Congress (Grimard, 2012, p. 12), and the important role played by competition with Russia and China (Grimard, 2012, p. 6). Grimard adds that Russia is similar case but it is currently entire focused on stability of space programs, including renovation of old infrastructure than on new space exploration programs. According to Grimard (2012), p. 13), this fact excludes Russia from being the leader of international collaboration in space policy despite its historical advantages. China, according to Grimard, repeats space policies of the US and Soviet Union. By contrast, in Japan and Europe, prestige does not play role. Japan and Europe are focused on scientific and technological contexts. Space program is not a part of national policy. Due to its costs, politicians may decide to not risk negative approach of public opinion. But public opinion does not threaten private investors which can consider space as object of their investment. 7. Commercial exploration of space is not a workable alternative Risk of funding the wall might be avoided by commercial exploration of space (Crawford, 2016). According to Crawford, some space projects such as next generation of large telescopes or crewed mission to Mars are non-profitable. While they are a governmental duty, they could be funded partially by profits from commercial exploration of space (for instance, space mining). Hope for private exploration sounds reasonable but is counterbalanced by commercial focus on profits. Because mission to Mars has only scientific profits, only public sponsors will be invested in this project. James S. J. Schwartz (2014) adds that two of the possible reasons for human space mission, such as improving human welfare and progress in scientific exploration, are well beyond interests of private companies. Newman and Williamson (2018) quite similarly expect that private space exploration will be focused on financial profits more than on environmental sustainability. Private investors are not obliged to act altruistically and to sacrifice their business for uncertain idea. W. Henry Lambright (2017) adds that private companies at least at first stages of Mars space program will not be able to fund it. For this reason, Mars space program requires multi-generational effort and political stabilization. The challenge of safety works against private investors in space program. Public space agencies have achieved high standards of safety. They behave in careful and conservative ways. Commercial, private projects do not have the same advanced technology, the large number of scientists and support staff, and the generous budgets. Catastrophe would likely break a private space program. The lack of experience of private companies in space exploration is partially responsible for higher risk of technological failures even in relatively easy tasks as crash of Momo-2 rocket launched by Japanese start-up on 30 June 2018 several seconds after launch. This does not mean that private investors are not able to explore space, but they are able to do that only when they receive profits. In scenario of commercial exploration of space, we should wait for some point in the future when a human space base appears as byproduct of commercial activity. A human base on Mars might be a by-product of hotels on LEO or space mining. Some investors who want to build space hotels may try to settle space regions beyond LEO and build hotels on the Moon and/or Mars. From touristic point of view, staying in the Moon or Mars hotel may be more attractive than on LEO. Investors working in asteroid mining may extend their business to the Moon and/or Mars. Both enterprises even if focused on purely commercial purposes, will not be easy (perhaps impossible) to achieve by private companies alone. Elvis (2012), p. 549) argues that asteroid mining will be challenging due to, among others, difficulties in detection of appropriate asteroids. He shows that among about 1200 analyzed meteorites only 13 of them contain high level of platinum profitable for their exploitation. Elvis suggests that NASA should reorient its strategy from focus on exploration to support for commercial utilization of space. Exploration will appear as a consequence of commercial profitable activity (Elvis, 2012, p. 549). Estimated profits of asteroid mining10 are counterbalanced by high costs of exploitation and possible decreasing of price of currently rare resources (Genta, 2014).11

#### 2---Any colony would be dependent on earth for resources---human society is too complex to survive without support.

Adam Morton 18. Visiting Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of British Columbia. 10/15/2018. “Three: Problems with Colonies” Should We Colonize Other Planets?, John Wiley & Sons.

Worries about refuges To be refuges where humans can survive catastrophe on Earth, colonies on other planets must of course contain and sustain humans. That is the point. They must also be highly technological: surviving in an environment less hospitable than anywhere on Earth would need powerful resources. Mars does not have an atmosphere that we can breathe, does not support plants that we can eat, is very cold, has little usable water, and receives much less solar energy. It is hard to make an analogy with anywhere on Earth: combine the light levels of the deep ocean with the cold of the Antarctic, add radiation, and then exaggerate. (The pictures from the Martian Rovers are accurate as far as colour and illumination go, but we tend to project familiarity onto them, taking the atmosphere to be like air on Earth and reading the absence of snow and ice as warmth rather than the frozen desert that it really is. I know this is my own tendency until I catch myself.) The colony must from early on produce all its own food, water, and oxygen. This is not at all impossible, given sophisticated equipment, which has been tried out under desert and arctic conditions on Earth. But these conditions are not really that much like Mars, especially with respect to cold, dark, and radiation. The equipment must continue to function, indefinitely. So it must be possible to repair it without using supplies brought from Earth. So, until local manufacturing can take over, repair equipment and spare parts must be added to the list of things that must be sent with the colonists in the first place. And, easy to overlook, it adds to the number of people who must be sent. A modern technological society of a kind that can create and repair the kind of equipment we are talking about involves thousands of specialized skills. Some combinations of these can be compressed into a smaller number of people, but many are still needed. Robinson Crusoe would not last long on Mars. Questions about the number of people in a colony are crucial. Selfsufficiency requires a large number of people – say several hundred at the least. And long-term survival requires genetic diversity. If population sizes are too small, then inbreeding makes hereditary defects and infectious diseases more common. Moreover, with a small population size, random fluctuations can result in imbalanced numbers of males and females, leading to both a smaller number in the following generation and yet more reduced diversity. (A shortage of females is obviously more serious. A bias towards females would have obvious advantages. Perhaps in fact an ideal colony should be all female plus a genetically diverse sperm bank.) It has been estimated that in wild quadrupeds a population size of 500 to 1,000 is needed for long-term survival of a species, while the crews for the simulated Mars habitats on Earth have typically had six people! Humans already have a very low genetic diversity: pairs of chimpanzees in the same troops have on average more genetic diversity than pairs of humans on Earth. The crews would have to be carefully chosen. A very special psychological makeup is needed. Crew members must endure close quarters with a small number of others, a very basic life, the knowledge that one has left one's family and friends behind, and a high risk of death. They must also be chosen so that there is a range of technical knowledge, improvisational skills, and the emotional and cultural makeup needed for something like Earth civilization to continue. And this must reproduce itself for generations. It is unlikely that, even if an optimum mix of people were achieved in the initial crew, the same mix would be preserved in subsequent generations. This too argues for larger population sizes. But the more people there are, the greater the expense and resources needed to establish the colony in the first place. A disturbing fact about the production of food on Mars has recently emerged. The soil on Mars is rich in compounds called perchlorates. They react with ultraviolet light, to which the Martian atmosphere is largely transparent, in a way that is fatal to many cells. There is thus a lot of doubt whether plant crops, and the symbiotic bacteria that many of them need, can survive in Martian soil. This complicates ambitions for indoor farming considerably. Because of the effects on both living cells and human health, perchlorate contamination is regarded as pollution on Earth. Perchlorates also have a risk of explosion when they are heated, complicating plans to produce oxygen by heating the Martian soil. They are, however, a source of oxygen and of other basic chemicals; although dangerous they could have their uses. There are surely high-tech solutions to this problem, but equally surely they raise the stakes for transport and technology and increase the danger. The complexity of technological society There is a fundamental fact behind many of these problems: the large scale and interdependence of our society, with its complex web of manufacturing techniques and expertise held in the minds of many people. It is extremely hard to duplicate this in a small population with restricted resources, especially in a hostile and unfamiliar environment. So dependence on the mother culture is hard to avoid. (This was true in the past, also. The early European colonies in North America did not make their own muskets until they had grown quite large, and European agricultural styles took a lot of adapting. This may not seem advanced technology. But could you make a musket? For that matter, could you make a stone axe?) This means that the high-tech devices needed to survive in the Martian environment are not going to be designed there. The designs are going to come from home. And it is likely that at least a proportion of the devices themselves will also. 3D printing from transmitted designs may solve some problems, though, if the raw materials can be obtained and refined on Mars. (I would imagine that supplies of direct and indirect biological material, such as the petroleum and oil products that are used to make plastics, might pose a serious problem.) If imported equipment is unsuitable or does not work because of some unexpected quirk of the faraway environment, much of it will have to be redesigned and manufactured not where it is needed but where the techniques and expertise are to be found. The more advanced the apparatus (the higher the tech), the more will need to be transported to the colony, adding to the transport costs and creating a need for spares. For all these reasons I am extremely sceptical that a colony of the size that we could send to Mars in the next decades, perhaps in the next century, could sustain itself without frequent supplies and reinforcements from Earth. The obvious reply to this is to drop the requirement that the colony be able to survive without the supplies and reinforcements. But this would undercut one of the main purposes – that of providing a remnant of humanity on Mars with a reasonable chance of surviving an earthly catastrophe. The colony would then be a scientific expedition and the beginning of a preparatory project that might take centuries.

# 1NR

## K---Capitalism

### 1NR---Link

#### Sanctions deny the necessities of life

Addis 3 (Adeno Addis is William Ray Forrester Professor of Public and Constitutional Law at Tulane University Law School. He received his B.A. and LL.B. (Honours) from Macquarie University (Australia), and an LL.M. and a J.S.D from Yale. He has published extensively in the areas of American constitutional law, communications law, human rights, and jurisprudence. Human Rights Quarterly 25.3 (2003) 573-623)

Other critics may concede that more often than not such measures would lead to the desired behavior modification, but at a cost that is often unacceptably high. Economic sanctions deprive citizens of the target state many of the basic necessities of life, leading to massive disruption and even destruction of life. The often high cost in life, liberty, and property that economic sanctions exact on innocent citizens and sectors of the target state are, to these critics, simply unacceptable even if at the end there was to be a change in the action and behavior of the regime of the target state. The moral and material costs that sanctions entail are, to these critics, simply too high to bear. Actually, there are two versions of the moral argument. The weak version is utilitarian in nature. It claims that often the cost in innocent human life and infrastructural damage is far greater than the benefit that is gained by imposing these sanctions. 13 The strong version of the moral argument is Kantian in its outlook. It objects to economic sanctions on the ground that often, if not always, sanctions target innocent civilians for suffering as a means to achieving a foreign policy objective, contrary to Kant's categorical imperative that we treat "humanity, whether in [our] person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end." 14 The argument here is that it is morally [End Page 576] unacceptable to impose suffering on innocent sectors of the target state, as economic sanctions do, for an objective that does not involve the prevention of the deaths of other innocent persons. 15

## ADV---Platforms

### 1NR---Solvency

#### Delay is inevitable.

Jones 20, \*Alison Jones, Professor of Law @ King’s College London. \*\*William E. Kovacic, professor @ George Washington University Law School, where he serves as director of their Competition Law Center; former member of the Federal Trade Commission. (3-20-2020, "Antitrust’s Implementation ~~Blind~~ Side: Challenges to Major Expansion of U.S. Competition Policy", *The Antitrust Bulletin*, 65(2), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0003603X20912884)

The discussion below, and history, seems to indicate, however, that more courage and more people will not necessarily overcome the implementation obstacles that stand in the way of a program that requires the rapid prosecution of a large number of complex cases against well-resourced and powerful companies. Indeed, the criticisms levied at the current system, the proposals for more effective enforcement and reform, and the scale of the action being demanded bear some resemblance to those that led to a more re-invigorated and aggressive antitrust enforcement policy in the 1960s and early 1970s. For example, at that time complaints that the FTC was in decay, was obsessed with trivial cases and failing to address matters of economic importance, anticompetitive conduct, and rising concentration,77 led the FTC to embark on a new, bold, and astoundingly broad enforcement program.78 In an effort to meet criticisms of it as a shambolic and failing institution, the FTC sought to upgrade its processes for policy planning, made concerted efforts to improve its human capital in management and case handling, and sought to improve substantive processes and the quality of its competition and consumer protection analysis.

In the end, FTC’s efforts to improve capability proved insufficient to support the expanded enforcement agenda, partly because the Commission failed to formulate an adequate plan to overcome the full range of implementation obstacles. The FTC seriously overreached because it did not grasp, or devise strategies to deal with, the scale and intricacies of its expanded program of cases and trade regulation rules, the ferocious opposition that big cases with huge remedial stakes would provoke from large defendants seeking to avoid divestitures, compulsory licensing, or other measures striking at the heart of their business, and the resources required to deliver good results. The Commission lacked the capacity to run novel shared monopoly cases that sought the break-up of the country’s eight leading petroleum refiners and four leading breakfast cereal manufacturers79 and simultaneously pursue an abundance of other high stake, difficult matters involving monopolization, distribution practices, and horizontal collaboration. The FTC also overlooked swelling political opposition, stoked by the vigorous lobbying of Congress, that its aggressive litigation program provoked.80

New legislation envisaged by reform advocates could ease the path for current government agencies seeking to reduce excessive levels of industrial concentration by arresting anticompetitive behavior of dominant enterprises (through interim and permanent relief) and by blocking mergers that pose incipient threats to competition. It seems clear, however, that such dramatic legislative proposals are likely to be fiercely contested through the legislative process and so will take time, and be difficult, to enact. Further, even if armed with a more powerful mandate, the DOJ and the FTC will still have to bring what are likely to be challenging cases applying the new laws (see Section F). The adoption, setting up, and bedding in of new legislation or regulatory structures and bodies is therefore unlikely to happen very quickly and is, consequently, unlikely to meet the demands of those seeking urgent and immediate action now.

#### 2---consolidation---the plan triggers re-growth---empirics.

Karabell 20, WIRED contributor and president of River Twice Research. (Zachary, 1-23-2020, "Don't Break Up Big Tech", *Wired*, https://www.wired.com/story/dont-break-up-big-tech/)

The problems fueling “break them up” are valid; breaking them up is not the solution. To begin with, antitrust enforcement has been romanticized well in excess of its accomplishments. The breakup in 1984 of the monopolistic AT&T into eight companies unleashed competition for a time, lowering prices and improving services. Eventually, however, as landlines gave way to wireless, the industry reconsolidated and regulators relaxed. Today telecom is dominated by a reconstituted AT&T along with Verizon, with Sprint as a distant third (yet still immense) player. The court-mandated breakup of Standard Oil in 1911 was the culmination of the most significant antitrust action ever, but the company’s dozens of offshoots eventually recombined into massive oil companies that maintain tremendous power. (ExxonMobil and Chevron are the two most notable.) That breakup also made the wealthy Rockefeller family even wealthier, as their shares in one company became shares in many—almost all of which doubled quickly and then continued their upward trajectory from there.

It’s debatable whether antitrust enforcement has ever been particularly effective. Even a charitable reading of its legacy suggests that the first effect of disrupting Big Tech might be to enrich the oligopoly’s shareholders, which is certainly not what advocates would want. In fact, as I argued in that earlier WIRED column, industrial conglomerates often spin off businesses strategically. For instance, United Technologies is about to cut loose its multibillion-dollar divisions Otis Elevators and Carrier (one of the world’s largest HVAC companies) as a means of unlocking shareholder value. One wonders why Silicon Valley executives haven’t gone down this path; perhaps the mantras of integration and a hubristic belief that they will never actually be forced to break up has shut down consideration of those strategies.

Would a forced breakup at least be effective at dispersing power? Let’s say that Facebook were strong-armed into disassembling itself. Its logical components would be legacy Facebook (individual pages), Facebook for business, Instagram, WhatsApp, and Oculus. You might be able to slice it even thinner, but assume Facebook would become five companies. Facebook currently has a market capitalization of just over $600 billion. That total market cap wouldn’t be divided equally among the five new companies; WhatsApp might struggle given its lack of discernible income, while Instagram might soar. It’s likely, however, that the resulting businesses would have a combined valuation greater than $600 billion, assuming it follows past patterns and that the tech industry remains robust.

Now imagine each of the Big Tech giants gets disassembled in this way. We might end up with a landscape of 30 companies instead of half a dozen. A quintupling of industry players would, by definition, create a more competitive field. But competition in the antitrust framework, stretching back to the original Sherman Anti-Trust Bill in 1890 and then subsequent legislation such as the Clayton Bill in 1914, is not a virtue or need in and of itself. It is the means to a set of ends—namely, “economic liberty,” unfettered trade, lower prices, and better services for consumers. By itself, competition does not guarantee anything.

Meanwhile, it’s hard to see how going from six companies to 30 would give consumers any more choice of services or more control over their data, or how it would help to nurture small businesses and lower costs to consumers and society. Perhaps there would be openings for companies with different business models, ones that brand themselves as valuing privacy and empowering individual ownership of data. This can’t be ruled out, but the nature of data selling and data mining is so embedded in the current models of most IT companies that it is very hard to see how such businesses could thrive unless they charged more to consumers than consumers have so far been willing to pay. In the meantime, the 30 new megacompanies would still have immense competitive advantages over smaller startups.

Would the market frictions and disruptions caused by a breakup be worth the possibility that such privacy-focused companies might succeed? Would cracking the current megacompanies into a set of slightly smaller ones effectively balance consumer needs and economic liberty? You may need to break eggs to make an omelet, but breaking eggs alone doesn’t make one.

#### Especially true for Big Tech

Crandall 19, PhD, MS, Senior Fellow in the Economic Studies Program of the Brookings Institution and Chairman of Criterion Economics. (Robert W., 2019, “The Dubious Antitrust Argument for Breaking Up the Internet Giants”, *Review of Industrial Organization*, 54(4), doi:10.1007/s11151-019-09680-y)

As shown above, none of the notable Internet giants has sufficient market share in its primary revenue-generating market to be vulnerable to a Section 2 Sherman Act prosecution. The focus of any antitrust action would have to be on the other side of their platforms: the services they offer to their subscribers. But even if they were vulnerable on this side of their platforms, it is far from clear how a structural remedy could be designed to address their market dominance. Three of these companies— Google, Amazon, and Facebook—have arguably grown to their present size because of network effects in Internet search, online shopping, or social media. Even Netflix is possibly the beneficiary of such effects; but Apple is different because its primary markets are for equipment that consumers use to connect to a public communications network—which it clearly has not monopolized.

If network effects explain the dominance of Google, Facebook, and Amazon in search, social media, and online retailing, respectively, it is far from clear how breaking these companies into multiple companies would end their dominance. Network effects would likely reappear and lead to a result much like the status quo ante.

### 1NR---Heg K

#### Fintech reinforces gross exploitation and white supremacy

Friedline 21 Friedline, Terri. Banking on a Revolution: Why Financial Technology Won't Save a Broken System. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2021. ND.

Beyond unequal landscapes and cost burdens, marginalization also may be amplified based on the ways that fintech embeds society’s destructive systems. Fintech and its supporters often operate under the assumption that digital and financial technologies can be developed devoid of white supremacy and financialized racial neoliberal capitalism. For example, as the Co-Director of MIT’s Initiative on the Digital Economy, Andrew McAfee, said in 2018, “If you want the bias out, get the algorithms in.” 66 This sentiment is shared by IBM Fellows Aleksandra Mojsilovic and John Smith, who believe that algorithms can be trained to reduce or eliminate any racial biases built in by their designers. 67 Even Stephen Schwarzman, Chief Executive-Officer (CEO) of Blackstone (yes, the same monopoly-esque investment corporation that is a central figure in Chapter 4), has chimed in on this possibility. Penning an opinion–editorial for The Washington Post in 2019 in a somewhat satirical caricature given his perch atop global capitalism, Schwarzman espoused the importance of an “ethics driven approach” to fintech. 68 Schwarzman described a multidisciplinary approach as sufficient for preventing broadly conceptualized “biases” and ensuring that fintech’s “powerful capabilities are a net positive for people and workers.” In other words, fintech’s disadvantages can be overlooked so long as advantages accrue on average. This viewpoint actually means that any disadvantages can be overlooked because “on average” (or “net positive, ” in Schwarzman’s terms) is code for white. 69 Fintech is acceptable—even ethical—so long as advantages accrue to whites (preferably wealthy elites) while averages disguise vast underlying racial disparities. For example, reporting the median net worth of $78,000 for all households in 2016 would conceal the fact that the median value of white households’ net worth is 41 times greater than that of Black households. 70 In fact, coders, computer scientists, engineers, and other designers—many of whom are white 71—stitch fintech and other technological advancements onto the fabric of society’s systems, 72 developing it as a tool for hoarding capitalism’s wealth. Insidiously, fintech is also developing as tool for surveilling and preying on Black and Brown communities by requiring individuals to sacrifice their privacy in order to participate. 73 This requirement disproportionately subjects people of color to ubiquitous, targeted surveillance that they are already experiencing in other contexts such as law enforcement, 74 education, 75 public welfare, 76 and housing. 77 White fintech users who experience technologies’ benefits without racist exploitation or wealth extraction may actually be contributing to mass surveillance that disproportionately impacts Black and Brown people. Like a white property owner ignoring how their predatory contract agreement contributed to the pattern of mass wealth extraction from Black and Brown communities, white fintech designers and users may similarly discount how their willingness—even eagerness—to sacrifice their privacy in exchange for fintech’s benefits may come with the costs of mass surveillance in the context of the financial system. And, if there was ever a case for history repeating itself, Black and Brown communities will disproportionally accrue the disadvantages if fintech marches full steam ahead without the voices of marginalized communities at the helm. 78 Fintech’s ability to accelerate the concentration of wealth can be overlooked when overemphasizing fintech for individuals. However, the problems with fintech for individuals are a microcosm of what is being acted out on a larger scale. For instance, Pagaya Investments, a U.S.–Israeli fintech start-up that describes its technology as the next generation of asset management investing, 79 announced in 2019 its complete reliance on machine learning and big data analytics to manage its $100 million portfolio. 80 Without human intervention, Pagaya’s fintech automatically manages the company’s asset-backed securities (ABS)—including all trading, buying, and selling transactions—and quickly spots potentially lucrative investment opportunities. Pagaya eventually plans to apply its fintech to collateralized loan obligations (CLO) and mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Minimal oversight from Pagaya’s data scientists is led by a former managing director of BlackRock, another monopoly-esque investment corporation. Buzzwords such as “disrupt, ” “reshape, ” and “innovate” are commonly applied to descriptions of Pagaya’s fintech, similar to the ways these buzzwords are enthusiastically applied to solving inequalities in individuals’ financial access. Pagaya Investments’ CEO, Gal Krubiner, promotes the advantages of a fintech approach that “can access very unique datasets” for making “really important insights and understanding on the valuation of assets” by identifying “what is really the risk behind each individual borrower or loan.” 81 At a 2017 fintech conference held in Tel Aviv, Krubiner described how fintech could modernize the field of corporate asset management, saying, “Many institutional investors are interested in investing in online lending markets. There’s a need for new, technology-based investment tools.” 82 Pagaya’s investors include venture capitalists, hedge funds, and financial institutions such as Oak HC/FT, GF Investments, and Citi Group. 83 In an announcement that Pagaya had raised $75 million in debt finance from the financial institution Citi Group, Citi Group’s Vice President of Consumer Finance, Ari Rosenberg, stated, “This transaction is a great example of the continuing evolution of consumer credit as an asset class and growth opportunity.” 84 Any evolution introduced by Pagaya’s fintech stands to benefit monopoly-esque investment corporations and their shareholders. “Consumer credit as an asset class and growth opportunity” is the language of a financialized racial neoliberal capitalism that equates growth with progress and deploys fintech to scavenge for new, profitable income streams. Individual consumers—the people whose collateralized credit card and mortgage debts are commodified and securitized to form these asset classes—do not see the profits that fintech generates from these new income streams. People are exploited by these processes, where algorithms scrape as much information on an individual as possible to be employed in risk models for generating profits that the individual will never receive. 85 Quickly and quietly, fintech efficiently ensconces the profits into the accounts of already-wealthy corporations and their disproportionately white shareholders. Not only can fintech concentrate wealth, the computer algorithms on which fintech is built replicate and reinforce white supremacy. 86 Evidence from online advertisements provides several examples. A study of Google advertisements reveals that searching for a person with a Black-identifying name is more likely to produce advertisements that falsely suggest the person has a criminal record. 87 Algorithms that determine whether a person is exposed to certain housing advertisements discriminate against people of color and those from lower-income backgrounds. 88 The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a lawsuit against Facebook claiming that their algorithms targeting online job ads to demographic groups excluded women. 89 Netflix has come under scrutiny for its algorithms’ tailoring of promotional advertisements based on customers’ viewing histories, effectively misrepresenting movies’ mostly white casts by showing scenes with movies’ few Black actors to Black customers. 90 Just as these algorithms work to discriminate on social media platforms and streaming services, fintech algorithms calibrate the financial system to whiteness. “Our whole defining mission is to redefine this discussion of both race, gender, and the intersectionality of that as it outlays and plays with closing the digital divide and providing access to girls of color . . . having the divine skills and innate ability to create change in both their own lives and their communities.” —Kimberly Bryant, 2017 91 As it stands—and especially when controlled by white data scientists and the wealthy corporations of financialized racial neoliberal capitalism—fintech offers new and sophisticated means of exploitation and surveillance. In the era of big data and predictive algorithms, benefits do not extend to Black and Brown communities or to lower-income whites. 92 Even Google Fiber’s purportedly well-intentioned city-wide efforts reinforce rather than remedy inequalities. While reflecting on the scientific contributions of her famed father, Stephen Hawking, Lucy Hawking mused, “How good is the track record of the human race in using advances in technology for the good of ordinary people?” 93 We can’t just hope that fintech will offer a slightly better track record. Hope steeped in willful, ahistorical ignorance is insulting and dangerous. We all need and deserve dignified access to digital and financial services without having our information exploited, wealth extracted, and movements surveilled—marginalized communities especially deserve this. Let us make it so.

### 1NR---Covid Turn

#### A new wave would trigger a global war—the time frame is quick

Gopman 4/16/20 Gregory Gopman is the founder of AngelHack, VR Worldwide, and the Akash Network. He started the A Better San Francisco community organization, which brought ShelterTech and The Downtown Streets Team to San Francisco. Preparing for the Global Great Depression, <https://medium.com/@GregGopman/preparing-for-the-global-great-depression-d365fdc482cd>

When COVID-19 first struck America, I knew we were headed for a recession level event. However, I thought it would be a black swan event, allowing the economy to quickly recover. However, it is quite clear now that social distancing will last until months after a vaccine is out. Meaning the global economy won’t recover until at least 2022. And that’s assuming things don’t start to break, which they will. Even if the US economy opens back up again, consumers will not be spending like they used to. Bars/Restaurants sales will be down 50%, as well as business working in tourism, travel, and entertainment (down 80%). A growing lack of consumer confidence will affect all companies, even those in tech who will see double-digit drops in customers and revenue. No one will be shopping, so retail sales will drop more than 50% and discretionary spending will be cut out from most budgets. Companies will stop hiring, additional large layoffs will begin, and then people will start defaulting on rents and mortgages, causing residential and commercial real estate to plummet. And this is under the assumption is that we can open up the economy again in May, albeit with everyone wearing masks. Somehow, stock market investors haven’t thought this through and are expecting some form of an economic recovery. I expect by June it will be clear there is no going back to the normal we all knew and the true recession cycle will begin. Now, that’s an optimistic scenario. Under a worst-case scenario, the Wuhan Coronavirus has another big outbreak, and we have to completely shut the economy down again with another 2T+ stimulus to try and hold off the inevitable. This could happen in June/July/August or really anytime before a vaccine is found. The absolute worst-case scenario is that we create a vaccine, and the virus mutates again, causing this recession cycle to last even longer. The only glimmer of hope we have is that we find an effective treatment measure that will allow people to go back to consuming goods without fear again. Or something that would allow us to socialize in public again. That would help a lot! But it still won’t give people back the savings and confidence they used to have pre-coronavirus. Pretty much any way you look at it, the economy is completely fucked. What we had in 2019, we will never have again. And if you think it’s bad for America, things will almost certainly be worst for almost every other country in the world. In the coming years you can expect the Euro to fail, the CCP to self-destruct, and a new global war to come as countries struggle with limited resources, unimaginable unemployment, and economic hardships that will cripple most nations.

#### New wave kills 200 million

Harden & Ivers 3/29/20 R. David Harden is managing director of the Georgetown Strategy Group and former assistant administrator at USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, where he oversaw U.S. assistance to all global crises. Louise C. Ivers MD, MPH, DTM&H is the executive director of Massachusetts General Hospital Center for Global Health, associate professor of Global Health and Social Medicine at Harvard Medical School, Anticipating the next waves of COVID-19, <https://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/490028-anticipating-the-next-waves-of-covid-19>

Today politicians, public health officials, and economists debate whether to roll back social distancing and other containment measures by Easter in order to open the economy. Our nation faced similar challenges in 1918. The start of the influenza pandemic began in March 1918, with more than 100 reported cases at Camp Funston in Fort Riley, Kansas. That pandemic, the worst in modern history, occurred in three waves, infecting a third of the world’s population and killing 50 million people, including 675,000 in the United States alone. The movement of troops at the end of World War I contributed to the spread of influenza, with the second wave in the fall of 1918 being the most deadly. The third wave subsided in the summer of 1919, 15 months later. The lessons of the 1918 influenza pandemic remain relevant to a COVID-19 response today for three reasons. First, the costs of an unmitigated pandemic overwhelms. More people died of the 1918 pandemic in 15 months than from four years of conflict in World War I. To put that early 20th Century pandemic in perspective, a proportionally rough equivalent pandemic today would kill 200 million people, including 2 million in the United States. Second, pandemics may have multiple waves until a sufficient number of individuals become immune, either by surviving infection or through effective vaccination. How the global community’s current approach to slowing the novel coronavirus pandemic will result in future waves remains to be seen, but the risk is real. China, for example, has reported their caseload shift from sustained community transmission to ongoing imported cases, requiring continued high-level alertness to detect, contain and prevent a large second wave. Having initially been considered a model for containment efforts, Hong Kong recently reported an increase in cases, largely the result of imported cases from overseas. Waves of pandemic disease are typical in many infections. The seventh pandemic of cholera, for instance, began in 1961 and continues to cause outbreaks today, sometimes with devastating consequences as was the case in Haiti in 2010 and Yemen in 2017-2018. Third, a domestic approach to blunt pandemic disease must align with international containment and mitigation efforts more broadly; not only is this the right thing to do, but subsequent waves can be more deadly than the first, as America experienced in 1918. In other infectious diseases, this is often the case. Studies of the genomic lineage of cholera in Africa, for example, demonstrate that since the infection was introduced to the continent in 1969, it is not inherently entrenched there, but has been repeatedly re-introduced from Asia. As a result, public health interventions in Asia are essential to cholera control in Africa and, likely, globally. It is nearly impossible to contain a pandemic by addressing an outbreak in only one nation. There are significant structural deficits in global public health that will accelerate transmission of COVID-19 and put the U.S. at risk of future waves. First, like the 1918 influenza, war will continue to facilitate the transmission of today’s pandemic. The grinding conflicts in Syria, Yemen, Libya, Afghanistan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo represent potential unmitigated hot spots for innocents caught in the war zones. These countries do not have central governments or functional health systems. There is often damaged health infrastructure, a lack of laboratory capacity, and few skilled health workers serving populations with low literacy rates and pervasive food and water insecurity. Second, social distancing is not feasible for any prolonged period of time in many instances. As a result of war and insecurity, millions of people are forced to migrate to internal displacement camps or to cross borders as refugees. Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Bangladesh, and Ethiopia for example, all host large refugee populations. These refugees, living in dense, insecure camps and temporary shelters will find it materially impossible to self-quarantine or socially distance themselves to mitigate the spread of COVID-19. The undomiciled and incarcerated face similar challenges to self-quarantine and social distancing. Approximately 1.4 million Americans will spend some time in a shelter in a given year. Worse yet, given the economic collapse, there may well be a surge in homelessness in the months ahead. Third, health care systems and public health systems in most low- and middle-income countries will be unable to cope with the capacity demands of the pandemic because of chronic neglect of surveillance and outbreak response infrastructure, and a major deficit in both the built environment and the health workforce. While some progress has been made in creating platforms for diagnosing and treating HIV globally, other pandemic diseases like tuberculosis (TB) demonstrate the failures of public health delivery, despite longstanding diagnosis and treatment protocols. This failure has consequences: 1.5 million people die from TB each year – making it the world’s top infectious killer. India, China, Indonesia, Philippines, Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh and South Africa account for two thirds of these new tuberculosis cases, illustrating the limitations of existing global health systems. COVID-19 could devastate many countries in Africa and South Asia, creating massive and unmitigated hotspots across continents and much of humanity. Military not accepting new recruits who've recovered from COVID-19 Walla Walla County officials warn against COVID-19 parties to expose... Given the likelihood of emerging hotspots and the lack of aggressive containment measures, there is a real risk that multiple waves of COVID-19 could extend throughout this year and into 2021. The United States has become the current epicenter of the pandemic with the world’s highest caseload. The administration must better control the current spread, reduce the risk of subsequent waves, and help lead a global response not only to alleviate the suffering of the world’s most vulnerable but also to protect the homeland.

### 1NR---AT: Sanctions Inevitable

#### 1AC says “Tracking solves Iranian evasion – US lead key.”

**Robinson 21** --- Ph.D., Co-founder and Chief Scientist discusses cryptocurrency forensics, investigations, compliance, and sanctions.

#### 2ac said vaccine distribution inevitable, no evidence and not true, US hoards vaccines which is why Iran has to use bitcoin to buy them!

#### Sanctions interfere with ability to solve the virus in Iran

Mousavian 20, Middle East Security and Nuclear Policy Specialist at Princeton University, (Seyed, Sanctions make Iran’s coronavirus crisis more deadly, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/5/8/sanctions-make-irans-coronavirus-crisis-more-deadly)

Ever since Trump unilaterally withdrew the US from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and embarked on a maximum pressure strategy against Iran some two years ago, the Islamic Republic has been under strict economic sanctions that limit its ability to trade with other nations. These sanctions, which choked of Iran’s oil exports, crippled its economy and practically pushed it out of the international banking system, made it impossible for the country to swiftly take the necessary medical, economic and social measures to protect its citizens from the coronavirus. The role US sanctions have played, and continue to play, in the devastation caused by the coronavirus in Iran led to renewed discussions on the effectiveness, legality and legitimacy of sanctions not only in Iran and the US, but also across the world. Political leaders, diplomats, defence officials, experts, civic organisations and activists from Asia to Europe have urged the Trump administration to ease its sanctions against Iran to help the country’s fight against coronavirus and help save “hundreds of thousands of lives”. In Iran, the government admitted that the sanctions make it difficult to obtain vital medical supplies and equipment to treat COVID-19 patients and called for their immediate lifting. Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, for example, tweeted that the US has moved from “economic terrorism” to “medical terror” by declining to lift the sanctions after the beginning of the outbreak in Iran in mid-February, and urged the international community to stop aiding “war crimes” by obeying “illegal and immoral” sanctions. There have also been widespread calls for the lifting of sanctions in the US. Nine US politicians, including former Democratic presidential candidates Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders, for example, sent an open letter to the Trump administration asking for sanctions relief for Iran amid the COVID-19 crisis. The New York Times, meanwhile, published an editorial calling for the easing of sanctions. But there have also been calls within the US for the sanctions to not only remain in place, but also to be tightened during this time of crisis. A cluster of right-wing think tanks in Washington, led by The Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and American Enterprise (AEI), for example, have been aggressively lobbying the Trump administration to escalate militarily towards Iran and tighten sanctions amid the pandemic. The Wall Street Journal, meanwhile, published an editorial claiming it is “no time to end Iran sanctions”. We have seen similar think pieces published in other reputable American media organisations, such as Foreign Policy and Bloomberg.

### 1NR---AT: Israel Strike

### 1NR---!D---Iran Prolif

#### Iran can’t and won’t think about prolif.

Ditz 20, news editor at Antiwar.com, a nonprofit organization dedicated to the cause of non-interventionism. (Jason C., 9-9-2020, "Iran’s Uranium Stockpile Is Not a Nuclear Proliferation Risk", *American Conservative*, https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/irans-uranium-stockpile-is-not-a-nuclear-proliferation-risk/)

On top of that, Iran has never attempted to take such uranium to make a weapon, which is also non-trivial. Figuring out the exact process of turning uranium into an atomic bomb would take quite a bit of time, and converting that into a weapon small enough to deliver is a whole other challenge which would take a lot of time. And again, with the IAEA monitoring the centrifuges, Iran would be telling the whole world its intentions to even go down this path. They haven’t, and Iran has publicly, repeatedly vowed to never produce nuclear weapons.

More to the point, if Iran could snap its fingers and convert the whole stockpile, they would wind up with, optimistically, 80 kg of weapons-grade 90% uranium. How does this translate to a uranium-based arsenal?

Not great, it turns out. There are a lot of nuclear weapons designs, but let’s use America’s Little Boy design from WW2 as a model, because it is halfway well-documented, and a good example of a first-generation weapon. This contained 64 kg of weapons-grade uranium.

If Iran somehow went through all of this process, which again would take years, not three and a half months, the next step would be a successful detonation in a test to prove they’d entered the nuclear club. And beyond starting a huge war, a detonation of this type of bomb would cost them 64 kg of weapons-grade uranium, meaning they wouldn’t have enough to make a second bomb to do anything with.

While it would be conceivably possible to make smaller bombs to get more than one out of the stockpile, that is a far more complicated design problem and makes this whole process take even longer.

In conclusion, Iran has no easy path to a nuclear weapon, even if they tried to make one, which they aren’t doing anyhow. The stockpile’s size is irrelevant to making weapons, because it is far too low-enriched, and meant for energy production.

## ADV---Acquisition

### 1NR---!---Preemption

### 1NR---UQ

#### Only answer is that it’s inevitable, it’s not!

Woolf, 18 - Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy at Congressional Service (Amy, “Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues,” Congressional Research Service, 4-6-2018, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41464.pdf)

Conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) weapons would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere on Earth in as little as an hour. This capability may bolster U.S. efforts to deter and defeat adversaries by allowing the United States to attack high-value targets or “fleeting targets” at the start of or during a conflict. Congress has generally supported the PGS mission, but it has restricted funding and suggested some changes in funding for specific programs. CPGS weapons would not substitute for nuclear weapons, but would supplement U.S. conventional capabilities. They would provide a “niche” capability, with a small number of weapons directed against select, critical targets. Some analysts, however, have raised concerns about the possibility that U.S. adversaries might misinterpret the launch of a missile with conventional warheads and conclude that the missiles carry nuclear weapons. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) is considering a number of systems that might provide the United States with long-range strike capabilities.

The Air Force and Navy have both considered deploying conventional warheads on their long range ballistic missiles. The Air Force and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) sought to develop a hypersonic glide delivery vehicle that could deploy on a modified Peacekeeper land-based ballistic missile, but test failures led to the termination of this program. In the mid-2000s, the Navy sought to deploy conventional warheads on a small number of Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles, but Congress rejected the requested funding for this program in 2008. Since then, the Pentagon has continued to develop a hypersonic glide vehicle, now known as the Alternate Reentry System, which could be deployed on long-range missiles. At present, it seems likely that this vehicle could be deployed on intermediate-range missiles on Navy submarines, for what is now known as the Prompt Strike Mission. Congress may review other weapons options for the CPGS mission, including bombers, cruise missiles, and possibly scramjets or other advanced technologies.

The Pentagon’s budget request for FY2019 increases funding for the CPGS program from around $201 million in FY2018 to $278 million in FY2019; it also shows significant increases in funding over the next five years, with a total of $1.9 billion allocated to the program. This shows the growing priority placed on the program in the Pentagon and the growing interest in Congress in moving the program forward toward deployment.

When Congress reviews the budget requests for CPGS weapons, it may question DOD’s rationale for the mission, reviewing whether the United States might have to attack targets promptly at the start of or during a conflict, when it could not rely on forward-based land or naval forces. It might also review whether this capability would reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons or whether, as some critics have asserted, it might upset stability and possibly increase the risk of a nuclear response to a U.S. attack. This risk derives, in part, from the possibility that nations detecting the launch of a U.S. PGS weapon would not be able to determine whether the weapon carried a nuclear or conventional warhead. Congress has raised concerns about this possibility in the past.

#### Congress defunded it

Oğuzer 2017

Dr. Şafak Oğuzer PhD from Gazi University, Department of International Relations Jun 5, 2017 “The US Continues with Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS)” https://ankasam.org/en/us-continues-conventional-prompt-global-strike-cpgs/

The Navy started a project in 2006 to modify some existing Trident submarine-launched nuclear ballistic missiles to hold conventional warheads, called Conventional Trident Modification (CTM). On the other hand, the Air Force in cooperation with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)—the agency of the U.S. DoD responsible for research on new technologies for the military—began feasibility studies for the Force Application and Launch from the Continental US (FALCON) project. The FALCON project consisted of two main projects: a launch vehicle similar to the Ballistic Missile, and a hypersonic re-entry vehicle. The Air Force considered reconfiguring existing ICBMs as launch vehicles, announcing in 2004 their plans to modify Minuteman II and Peacekeeper (MX) missiles renaming the modified missiles “Minotaur IV” missiles.

The US Congress cancelled the Navy’s project in 2008 because of concerns over the possibility that launch of a conventionally armed ballistic missiles could be regarded as a nuclear attack and started a defense-wide program named Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS). The Minotaur IV missile will be the main launch vehicle to deliver a conventional payload, combining boost-glide technologies to fly on a flatter trajectory than ballistic missile trajectory and thus prevent misunderstanding and miscalculation.

#### Congress has defunded CTM – bipartisan opposition

Payne 2012

Study Director: Keith Payne Professor and Head of the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State, President and co-founder of the National Institute for Public Policy, previously Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy Authors: Thomas Scheber Mark Schneider David Trachtenberg Kurt Guthe “Conventional Prompt Global Strike: A Fresh Perspective” June 2012 National Institute for Public Policy http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/CPGS\_REPORT-for-web.pdf

Although the concept of CPGS has been actively pursued for more than a decade by both the Bush and Obama administrations, no CPGS capabilities have yet been fielded. Like any new military capability, significant research and development must occur before concepts can be translated into reality. This requires support and funding from Congress.

Congressional opposition to the Bush administration’s favored CPGS concept— Conventional Trident Modification (CTM)—was significant and impeded progress toward developing a CPGS capability. In large measure, concerns over the possibility that launch of a conventionally-armed Trident D-5 missile could be misconstrued as a nuclear attack resulted in Congress repeatedly denying funds for CTM development. Although the 2008 NAS study concluded that the issue of “nuclear ambiguity” is “one of the lesser risks—militarily and politically—associated with attacking another country, especially a nuclear-armed country,” key members of Congress in both political parties remained opposed to the plan.42

### 1NR---Link

#### They say no link---cross ex disproves, US would put AI on hypersonic missiles and precision targeting with the intention of upending deterrence. That causes conventional modernization and preemption---that’s Kelleher.

#### CTM becomes the only possible replacement for nuclear weapons

Oğuz 2017

Şafak Oğuz Dr., Uluslararası Strateji ve Güvenlik Araştırmaları Merkezi (USGAM) Güvenlik Uzmanı, December 2017 Aralık Vol. 1 No. 3 31-53 “Conventional Prompt Global Strike (Cpgs): A Conventional Or A Nuclear Weapon?” http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/391828

Conventional ballistic missiles, with shorter range, and Intercontinental Conventional Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) emerged as the main launch vehicle options at the beginning. The Navy started a project in 2006 to modify some existing Trident submarine-launched nuclear ballistic missiles to hold conventional warheads, in what was called Conventional Trident Modification (CTM). The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2006 Report stated that the DoD will convert a small number of Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles for use in PGS. 6

CTM sparked great interest at the beginning because of its feasibility and easy availability. In 2008 the Committee on CPGS Capability advised proceeding with CTM, calling CTM the only option in near term.7 However, in large measure, concerns over the possibility that launch of a conventionally armed Trident D-5 missile could be misconstrued as a nuclear attack led Congress to repeatedly deny funds for CTM development,8 and the project, which consisted of conventional ballistic missiles and conventional warheads, was cancelled in 2008.

### 1NR---AT: Cyber

#### Uncertainty alone checks.

Lewis 18, PhD, a senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). (James Andrew, 1-1-2018, “Rethinking Cybersecurity: Strategy, Mass Effect, and States”, pg. 29, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22408.8?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents>)

This upper bound on cyber attack is affected by the likelihood of attribution. If an attacker was confident that it could avoid having the attack attributed to it, the risk of retaliation would be reduced, making some attacks more attractive. Uncertainty about attribution capabilities, particularly American capabilities, combined with uncertainty about the effectiveness of cyber attack, creates caution. Public expressions of uncertainty about attribution are not shared by opponents, who know when they have been caught. Over the last decade, the United States has made a major effort to improve its attribution capabilities and has succeeded to the point where no opponent can be confident about anonymity and this, if linked to truly credible threats to impose consequences, may finally produce the cyber deterrence so long sought by the United States.

The implicit threshold governing cyber attack is the line between force and coercion. With very few exceptions, states have avoided cyber actions that could be judged as the use of force, based on international understandings on what actions qualify as the use of force or armed attack. Opponents have engaged in cyber actions below this implicit threshold with impunity, but they are reluctant to cross it for fear of creating a situation that they cannot control. In this, cyber incidents are more like border incursions or bandit raids than attacks.

Public sources suggest that at least seven countries have used cyber tools for coercive purposes. However, they have been careful to avoid anything that could be interpreted as the use of force, and they have avoided physical destruction or casualties. This suggests that countries prefer actions that advance their strategic goals without creating unmanageable risk of escalation into armed conflict. Opponents calculate the advantage they would gain from an attack against the potential cost. Miscalculation is possible, but if anything, opponents appear more likely to overestimate the risk of retaliation.

#### 3---no motivation.

Lewis 18, PhD, a senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). (James Andrew, 1-1-2018, “Rethinking Cybersecurity: Strategy, Mass Effect, and States”, pg. 7-9, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22408.5?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents>) \*language edited---brackets

The most dangerous and damaging attacks required resources and engineering knowledge that are beyond the capabilities of nonstate actors, and those who possess such capabilities consider their use in the context of some larger strategy to achieve national goals. Precision and predictability—always desirable in offensive operations in order to provide assured effect and economy of force—suggest that the risk of collateral damage is smaller than we assume, and with this, so is the risk of indiscriminate or mass effect.

State Use of Cyber Attack Is Consistent with Larger Strategic Aims

Based on a review of state actions to date, cyber operations give countries a new way to implement existing policies rather than leading them to adopt new policy or strategies. State opponents use cyber techniques in ways consistent with their national strategies and objectives. But for now, cyber may be best explained as an addition to the existing portfolio of tools available to nations.

Cyber operations are ideal for achieving the strategic effect our opponents seek in this new environment. How nations use cyber techniques will be determined by their larger needs and interests, by their strategies, experience, and institutions, and by their tolerance for risk. Cyber operations provide unparalleled access to targets, and the only constraint on attackers is the risk of retaliation—a risk they manage by avoiding actions that would provoke a damaging response. This is done by staying below an implicit threshold on what can be considered the use of force in cyberspace.

The reality of cyber attack differs greatly from our fears. Analysts place a range of hypothetical threats, often accompanied by extreme consequences, before the public without considering the probability of occurrence or the likelihood that opponents will choose a course of action that does not advance their strategic aims and creates grave risk of damaging escalation. Our opponents’ goals are not to carry out a cyber 9/11. While there have been many opponent probes of critical infrastructure facilities in numerous countries, the number of malicious cyber actions that caused physical damage can be counted on one hand. While opponents have probed critical infrastructure networks, there is no indication that they are for the purposes of the kind of [devastating] crippling strategic attacks against critical infrastructure that dominated planning in the Second World War or the Cold War.

Similarly, the popular idea that opponents use cyber techniques to inflict cumulative economic harm is not supported by evidence. Economic warfare has always been part of conflict, but there are no examples of a country seeking to imperceptibly harm the economy of an opponent. The United States engaged in economic warfare during the Cold War, and still uses sanctions as a tool of foreign power, but few if any other nations do the same. The intent of cyber espionage is to gain market or technological advantage. Coercive actions against government agencies or companies are intended to intimidate. Terrorists do not seek to inflict economic damage. The difficulty of wreaking real harm on large, interconnected economies is usually ignored.

Economic warfare in cyberspace is ascribed to China, but China’s cyber doctrine has three elements: control of cyberspace to preserve party rule and political stability, espionage (both commercial and military), and preparation for disruptive acts to damage an opponent’s weapons, military information systems, and command and control. “Strategic” uses, such as striking civilian infrastructure in the opponent’s homeland, appear to be a lower priority and are an adjunct to nuclear strikes as part of China’s strategic deterrence. Chinese officials seem more concerned about accelerating China’s growth rather than some long-term effort to undermine the American economy.6 The 2015 agreement with the United States served Chinese interests by centralizing tasking authority in Beijing and ending People’s Liberation Army (PLA) “freelancing” against commercial targets.

The Russians specialize in coercion, financial crime, and creating harmful cognitive effect—the ability to manipulate emotions and decisionmaking. Under their 2010 military doctrine on disruptive information operations (part of what they call “New Generation Warfare”). Russians want confusion, not physical damage. Iran and North Korea use cyber actions against American banks or entertainment companies like Sony or the Sands Casino, but their goal is political coercion, not destruction.

None of these countries talk about death by 1000 cuts or attacking critical infrastructure to produce a cyber Pearl Harbor or any of the other scenarios that dominate the media. The few disruptive attacks on critical infrastructure have focused almost exclusively on the energy sector. Major financial institutions face a high degree of risk but in most cases, the attackers’ intent is to extract money. There have been cases of service disruption and data erasure, but these have been limited in scope. Denial-of-service attacks against banks impede services and may be costly to the targeted bank, but do not have a major effect on the national economy. In all of these actions, there is a line that countries have been unwilling to cross.

When our opponents decided to challenge American “hegemony,” they developed strategies to circumvent the risks of retaliation or escalation by ensuring that their actions stayed below the use-of-force threshold—an imprecise threshold, roughly defined by international law, but usually considered to involve actions that produce destruction or casualties. Almost all cyber attacks fall below this threshold, including, crime, espionage, and politically coercive acts. This explains why the decades-long quest to rebuild Cold War deterrence in cyberspace has been fruitless.

It also explains why we have not seen the dreaded cyber Pearl Harbor or other predicted catastrophes. Opponents are keenly aware that launching catastrophe brings with it immense risk of receiving catastrophe in return. States are the only actors who can carry out catastrophic cyber attacks and they are very unlikely to do so in a strategic environment that seeks to gain advantage without engaging in armed conflict. Decisions on targets and attack make sense only when embedded in their larger strategic calculations regarding how best to fight with the United States.

There have been thousands of incidents of cybercrime and cyber espionage, but only a handful of true attacks, where the intent was not to extract information or money, but to disrupt and, in a few cases, destroy. From these incidents, we can extract a more accurate picture of risk. The salient incidents are the cyber operations against Iran’s nuclear weapons facility (Stuxnet), Iran’s actions against Aramco and leading American banks, North Korean interference with Sony and with South Korean banks and television stations, and Russian actions against Estonia, Ukrainian power facilities, Canal 5 (television network in France), and the 2016 U.S. presidential elections. Cyber attacks are not random. All of these incidents have been part of larger geopolitical conflicts involving Iran, Korea, and the Ukraine, or Russia’s contest with the United States and NATO.

There are commonalities in each attack. All were undertaken by state actors or proxy forces to achieve the attacking state’s policy objectives. Only two caused tangible damage; the rest created coercive effect, intended to create confusion and psychological pressure through fear, uncertainty, and embarrassment. In no instance were there deaths or casualties. In two decades of cyber attacks, there has never been a single casualty. This alone should give pause to the doomsayers. Nor has there been widespread collateral damage.

#### Their cyber-threat construction is self-fulfilling, this turns the case

**Valeriano, 15** - Senior Lecturer at the University of Glasgow in Politics and Global Security. (Brandon, Cyber War Versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System p. 2-4

Currently, the cyberspace arena is the main area of international conflict where we see the development of a fear-based process of threat construction becoming dominant. The fear associated with terrorism after September 11, 2001, has dissipated, and in many ways has been replaced with the fear of cyber conflict, cyber power, and even cyber war.' With the emergence of an Internet society and rising interconnectedness in an ever more globalized world, many argue that we must also fear the vulnerability that these connections bring about. Advances and new connections such as drones, satellites, and cyber operational controls can create conditions that interact to produce weaknesses in the security dynamics that are critical to state survival. Dipert (2010: 402) makes the analogy that surfing in cyberspace is like swimming in a dirty pool. The developments associated with Internet life also come with dangers that are frightening to many.

In order to provide an alternative to the fear-based discourse, we present empirical evidence about the dynamics of cyber conflict. Often realities will impose a cost on exaggerations and hyperbole. We view this process through the construction of cyber threats. The contention is that the cyber world is dangerous, and a domain where traditional security considerations will continue to play out. A recent Pew Survey indicates that 70 percent of Americans see cyber incidents from other countries as a major security threat to the United States, with this threat being second only to that from Islamic extremist groups.2

This fear is further deepened by hyperbolic statements from the American elite. US President Barack Obama has declared that the "cyber threat is one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a nation."3 Former US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has gone further, stating, "So, yes, we are living in that world. I believe that it is very possible the next Pearl Harbor could be a cyber attack ... [that] would have one hell of an impact on the United States of America. That is something we have to worry about and protect against."4 United States elites are not alone in constructing the cyber threat. Russian President Vladimir Putin, in response to the creation of a new battalion of cyber troops to defend Russian cyberspace, noted, "We need to be prepared to effectively combat threats in cyberspace to increase the level of protection in the appropriate infrastructure, particularly the information systems of strategic and critically important facilities."\* The social construction of the cyber threat is therefore real; the aim of this book is to find out if these elite and public constructions are backed with facts and evidence.

First, we should define some of our terms to prepare for further engagement of our topic. This book is focused on international cyber interactions. The prefix cyber simply means computer or digital interactions, which are directly related to cyberspace, a concept we define as the networked system of microprocessors, mainframes, and basic computers that interact at the digital level. Our focus in this volume is on what we call cyber conflict, the use of computational technologies for malevolent and destructive purposes in order to impact, change, or modify diplomatic and military interactions among states. Cyber war would be an escalation of cyber conflict to include physical destruction and death. Our focus, therefore, is on cyber conflict and the manifestation of digital animosity short of and including frames of war. These terms will be unpacked in greater detail in the chapters that follow.

The idea that conflict is the foundation for cyber interactions at the interstate level is troubling. Obviously many things are dangerous, but we find that the danger inherent in the cyber system could be countered by the general restraint that might limit the worst abuses in the human condition. By countering what we assert to be an unwarranted construction of fear with reality, data, and evidence, we hope to move beyond the simple pessimistic construction of how digital interactions take place, and go further to describe the true security context of inter- national cyber politics.

In this project we examine interactions among interstate rivals, the most contentious pairs of states in the international system. The animosity between rivals often builds for centuries, to the point where a rival state is willing to harm itself in order to harm its rival even more (Valeriano 2013). If the cyber world is truly dangerous, we would see evidence of these disruptions among rival states with devastating effect. Rivals fight the majority of wars, conflicts, and disputes (Diehl and Goertz 2000), yet the evidence presented here demonstrates that the cyber threat is restrained at this point.6 Overstating the threat is dangerous because the response could then end up being the actual cause of more conflict. Reactions to threats must be proportional to the nature of the threat in the first place. Otherwise the threat takes on a life of its own and becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy of all-out cyber warfare.

Furthermore, there is a danger in equivocating the threat that comes from non-state cyber individuals and the threats that come from state-affiliated cyber actors not directly employed by governments. If the discourse is correct, non-state entities such as terrorist organizations or political activist groups should be actively using these malicious tactics in cyberspace in order to pro- mote their goals of fear and awareness of their plight. If the goal is to spread fear and instability among the perceived enemies of this group, and cyber tactics are the most effective way to do this, we should see these tactics perpetrated—and perpetrated often—by these entities. This book examines how state-affiliated non-state actors use cyber power and finds that their actual capabilities to do physical harm via cyberspace are quite limited. This then leaves rogue actors as the dangerous foes in the cyber arena. While these individuals can be destructive, their power in no way compares to the resources, abilities, and capabilities of cyber power connected to traditional states.

The future is open, and thus the cyber world could become dangerous, yet the norms we see developing so far seem to limit the amount of harm in the system. If these norms hold, institutions will develop to manage the worst abuses in cyberspace, and states will focus on cyber resilience and basic defense rather than offensive technologies and digital walls. Cyberspace would therefore become a fruitful place for developments for our globalized society. This arena could be the place of digital collaboration, education, and exchanges, communicated at speeds that were never before possible. If states fall into the trap of buying into the fear-based cyber hype by developing offensive weapons under the mistaken belief that these actions will deter future incidents, cyberspace is doomed. We will then have a restricted technology that prevents the developments that are inherent in mankind's progressive nature.

### 1NC---AI Bad

#### A.I. causes nuclear catastrophe via *use-it* or *lose-it* pressures.

RAND, 18 – [Article published by a composition of A.I. professionals working for RAND, a non-profit think-tank based in Santa Monica that specializes in military related public policy changes. “How Artificial Intelligence Could Increase the Risk of Nuclear War”, (https://www.rand.org/blog/articles/2018/04/how-artificial-intelligence-could-increase-the-risk.html)]

The fear that computers, by mistake or malice, might lead humanity to the brink of nuclear annihilation has haunted imaginations since the earliest days of the Cold War. The danger might soon be more science than fiction. Stunning advances in AI have created machines that can learn and think, provoking a new arms race among the world's major nuclear powers. It's not the killer robots of Hollywood blockbusters that we need to worry about; it's how computers might challenge the basic rules of nuclear deterrence and lead humans into making devastating decisions. That's the premise behind a new paper from RAND Corporation, How Might Artificial Intelligence Affect the Risk of Nuclear War? It's part of a special project within RAND, known as Security 2040, to look over the horizon and anticipate coming threats. "This isn't just a movie scenario," said Andrew Lohn, an engineer at RAND who coauthored the paper and whose experience with AI includes using it to route drones, identify whale calls, and predict the outcomes of NBA games. "Things that are relatively simple can raise tensions and lead us to some dangerous places if we are not careful." Petrov would say later that his chair felt like a frying pan. He knew the computer system had glitches. The Soviets, worried that they were falling behind in the arms race with the United States, had rushed it into service only months earlier. Its screen now read “high reliability,” but Petrov's gut said otherwise. He picked up the phone to his duty officer. “False alarm,” he said. Suddenly, the system flashed with new warnings: another launch, and then another, and then another. The words on the screen glowed red: "Missile attack." To understand how intelligent computers could raise the risk of nuclear war, you have to understand a little about why the Cold War never went nuclear hot. There are many theories, but “assured retaliation” has always been one of the cornerstones. In the simplest terms, it means: If you punch me, I'll punch you back. With nuclear weapons in play, that counterpunch could wipe out whole cities, a loss neither side was ever willing to risk.​​​​​​​ Autonomous systems don't need to kill people to undermine stability and make catastrophic war more likely. That theory leads to some seemingly counterintuitive conclusions. If both sides have weapons that can survive a first strike and hit back, then the situation is stable. Neither side will risk throwing that first punch. The situation gets more dangerous and uncertain if one side loses its ability to strike back or even just thinks it might lose that ability. It might respond by creating new weapons to regain its edge. Or it might decide it needs to throw its punches early, before it gets hit first. That's where the real danger of AI might lie. Computers can already scan thousands of surveillance photos, looking for patterns that a human eye would never see. It doesn't take much imagination to envision a more advanced system taking in drone feeds, satellite data, and even social media posts to develop a complete picture of an adversary's weapons and defenses. A system that can be everywhere and see everything might convince an adversary that it is vulnerable to a disarming first strike—that it might lose its counterpunch. That adversary would scramble to find new ways to level the field again, by whatever means necessary. That road leads closer to nuclear war. "Autonomous systems don't need to kill people to undermine stability and make catastrophic war more likely," said Edward Geist, an associate policy researcher at RAND, a specialist in nuclear security, and co-author of the new paper. "New AI capabilities might make people think they're going to lose if they hesitate. That could give them itchier trigger fingers. At that point, AI will be making war more likely even though the humans are still quote-unquote in control." A Gut Feeling Petrov's computer screen now showed five missiles rocketing toward the Soviet Union. Sirens wailed. Petrov held the phone to the duty officer in one hand, an intercom to the computer room in the other. The technicians there were telling him they could not find the missiles on their radar screens or telescopes. It didn't make any sense. Why would the United States start a nuclear war with only five missiles? Petrov raised the phone and said again: False alarm. Computers can now teach themselves to walk—stumbling, falling, but learning until they get it right. Their neural networks mimic the architecture of the brain. A computer recently beat one of the world's best players at the ancient strategy game of Go with a move that was so alien, yet so effective, that the human player stood up, left the room, and then needed 15 minutes to make his next move. Russia recently announced plans for an underwater doomsday drone with a warhead powerful enough to vaporize a major city.​​​​​​​ The military potential of such superintelligence has not gone unnoticed by the world's major nuclear powers. The United States has experimented with autonomous boats that could track an enemy submarine for thousands of miles. China has demonstrated “swarm intelligence” algorithms that can enable drones to hunt in packs. And Russia recently announced plans for an underwater doomsday drone that could guide itself across oceans to deliver a nuclear warhead powerful enough to vaporize a major city. Whoever wins the race for AI superiority, Russian President Vladimir Putin has said, "will become the ruler of the world." Tesla founder Elon Musk had a different take: The race for AI superiority, he warned, is the most likely cause of World War III. For a few terrifying moments, Stanislav Petrov stood at the precipice of nuclear war. By mid-1983, the Soviet Union was convinced that the United States was preparing a nuclear attack. The computer system flashing red in front of him was its insurance policy, an effort to make sure that if the United States struck, the Soviet Union would have time to strike back. But on that night, it had misread sunlight glinting off cloud tops. "False alarm." The duty officer didn't ask for an explanation. He relayed Petrov's message up the chain of command. The next generation of AI will have "significant potential" to undermine the foundations of nuclear security, the researchers concluded. The time for international dialogue is now. Keeping the nuclear peace in a time of such technological advances will require the cooperation of every nuclear power. It will require new global institutions and agreements; new understandings among rival states; and new technological, diplomatic, and military safeguards. It's possible that a future AI system could prove so reliable, so coldly rational, that it winds back the hands of the nuclear doomsday clock. To err is human, after all. A machine that makes no mistakes, feels no pressure, and has no personal bias could provide a level of stability that the Atomic Age has never known. That moment is still far in the future, the researchers concluded, but the years between now and then will be especially dangerous. More nuclear-armed nations and an increased reliance on AI, especially before it is technologically mature, could lead to catastrophic miscalculations. And at that point, it might be too late for a lieutenant colonel working the night shift to stop the machinery of war.

### 1NC---AI Fails---Generic

#### A.I. algorithms are too nascent for effective targeting – they can be easily tricked.

Goodfellow and Papernot, 17 – [[Ian](http://www.iangoodfellow.com) is a research scientist at OpenAI, and [Nicolas](https://papernot.fr) a Google PhD Fellow in Security at Penn State. “Attacking Machine Learning with Adversarial Examples”, (https://blog.openai.com/adversarial-example-research/)]

Adversarial examples are inputs to machine learning models that an attacker has intentionally designed to cause the model to make a mistake; they’re like optical illusions for machines. In this post we’ll show how adversarial examples work across different mediums, and will discuss why securing systems against them can be difficult. At OpenAI, we think adversarial examples are a good aspect of security to work on because they represent a concrete problem in AI safety that can be addressed in the short term, and because fixing them is difficult enough that it requires a serious research effort.

‘(Though we’ll need to explore many aspects of machine learning security to achieve our goal of building safe, widely distributed AI.) To get an idea of what adversarial examples look like, consider this demonstration from Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples: starting with an image of a panda, the attacker adds a small perturbation that has been calculated to make the image be recognized as a gibbon with high confidence. An adversarial input, overlaid on a typical image, can cause a classifier to miscategorize a panda as a gibbon. The approach is quite robust; recent research has shown adversarial examples can be printed out on standard paper then photographed with a standard smartphone, and still fool systems. Adversarial examples can be printed out on normal paper and photographed with a standard resolution smartphone and still cause a classifier to, in this case, label a “washer” as a “safe”. Adversarial examples have the potential to be dangerous. For example, attackers could target autonomous vehicles by using stickers or paint to create an adversarial stop sign that the vehicle would interpret as a ‘yield’ or other sign, as discussed in Practical Black-Box Attacks against Deep Learning Systems using Adversarial Examples. Reinforcement learning agents can also be manipulated by adversarial examples, according to new research from UC Berkeley, OpenAI, and Pennsylvania State University, Adversarial Attacks on Neural Network Policies, and research from the University of Nevada at Reno, Vulnerability of Deep Reinforcement Learning to Policy Induction Attacks. The research shows that widely-used RL algorithms, such as DQN, TRPO, and A3C, are vulnerable to adversarial inputs. These can lead to degraded performance even in the presence of pertubations too subtle to be percieved by a human, causing an agent to move a pong paddle down when it should go up, or interfering with its ability to spot enemies in Seaquest. If you want to experiment with breaking your own models, you can use cleverhans, an open source library developed jointly by Ian Goodfellow and Nicolas Papernot to test your AI’s vulnerabilities to adversarial examples. Adversarial examples give us some traction on AI safety When we think about the study of AI safety, we usually think about some of the most difficult problems in that field — how can we ensure that sophisticated reinforcement learning agents that are significantly more intelligent than human beings behave in ways that their designers intended? Adversarial examples show us that even simple modern algorithms, for both supervised and reinforcement learning, can already behave in surprising ways that we do not intend. Attempted defenses against adversarial examples Traditional techniques for making machine learning models more robust, such as weight decay and dropout, generally do not provide a practical defense against adversarial examples. So far, only two methods have provided a significant defense. Adversarial training: This is a brute force solution where we simply generate a lot of adversarial examples and explicitly train the model not to be fooled by each of them. An open-source implementation of adversarial training is available in the cleverhans library and its use illustrated in the following tutorial. Defensive distillation: This is a strategy where we train the model to output probabilities of different classes, rather than hard decisions about which class to output. The probabilities are supplied by an earlier model, trained on the same task using hard class labels. This creates a model whose surface is smoothed in the directions an adversary will typically try to exploit, making it difficult for them to discover adversarial input tweaks that lead to incorrect categorization. (Distillation was originally introduced in Distilling the Knowledge in a Neural Network as a technique for model compression, where a small model is trained to imitate a large one, in order to obtain computational savings.) Yet even these specialized algorithms can easily be broken by giving more computational firepower to the attacker. A failed defense: “gradient masking” To give an example of how a simple defense can fail, let’s consider why a technique called “gradient masking” does not work. “Gradient masking” is a term introduced in Practical Black-Box Attacks against Deep Learning Systems using Adversarial Examples. to describe an entire category of failed defense methods that work by trying to deny the attacker access to a useful gradient. Most adversarial example construction techniques use the gradient of the model to make an attack. In other words, they look at a picture of an airplane, they test which direction in picture space makes the probability of the “cat” class increase, and then they give a little push (in other words, they perturb the input) in that direction. The new, modified image is mis-recognized as a cat. But what if there were no gradient — what if an infinitesimal modification to the image caused no change in the output of the model? This seems to provide some defense because the attacker does not know which way to “push” the image. We can easily imagine some very trivial ways to get rid of the gradient. For example, most image classification models can be run in two modes: one mode where they output just the identity of the most likely class, and one mode where they output probabilities. If the model’s output is “99.9% airplane, 0.1% cat”, then a little tiny change to the input gives a little tiny change to the output, and the gradient tells us which changes will increase the probability of the “cat” class. If we run the model in a mode where the output is just “airplane”, then a little tiny change to the input will not change the output at all, and the gradient does not tell us anything. Let’s run a thought experiment to see how well we could defend our model against adversarial examples by running it in “most likely class” mode instead of “probability mode.” The attacker no longer knows where to go to find inputs that will be classified as cats, so we might have some defense. Unfortunately, every image that was classified as a cat before is still classified as a cat now. If the attacker can guess which points are adversarial examples, those points will still be misclassified. We haven’t made the model more robust; we have just given the attacker fewer clues to figure out where the holes in the models defense are. Even more unfortunately, it turns out that the attacker has a very good strategy for guessing where the holes in the defense are. The attacker can train their own model, a smooth model that has a gradient, make adversarial examples for their model, and then deploy those adversarial examples against our non-smooth model. Very often, our model will misclassify these examples too. In the end, our thought experiment reveals that hiding the gradient didn’t get us anywhere. The defense strategies that perform gradient masking typically result in a model that is very smooth in specific directions and neighborhoods of training points, which makes it harder for the adversary to find gradients indicating good candidate directions to perturb the input in a damaging way for the model. However, the adversary can train a substitute model: a copy that imitates the defended model by observing the labels that the defended model assigns to inputs chosen carefully by the adversary. A procedure for performing such a model extraction attack was introduced in the black-box attacks paper. The adversary can then use the substitute model’s gradients to find adversarial examples that are misclassified by the defended model as well. In the figure above, reproduced from the discussion of gradient masking found in Towards the Science of Security and Privacy in Machine Learning, we illustrate this attack strategy with a one-dimensional ML problem. The gradient masking phenomenon would be exacerbated for higher dimensionality problems, but harder to depict. We find that both adversarial training and defensive distillation accidentally perform a kind of gradient masking. Neither algorithm was explicitly designed to perform gradient masking, but gradient masking is apparently a defense that machine learning algorithms can invent relatively easily when they are trained to defend themselves and not given specific instructions about how to do so. If we transfer adversarial examples from one model to a second model that was trained with either adversarial training or defensive distillation, the attack often succeeds, even when a direct attack on the second model would fail. This suggests that both training techniques do more to flatten out the model and remove the gradient than to make sure it classifies more points correctly. Why is it hard to defend against adversarial examples? Adversarial examples are hard to defend against because it is difficult to construct a theoretical model of the adversarial example crafting process. Adversarial examples are solutions to an optimization problem that is non-linear and non-convex for many ML models, including neural networks. Because we don’t have good theoretical tools for describing the solutions to these complicated optimization problems, it is very hard to make any kind of theoretical argument that a defense will rule out a set of adversarial examples. Adversarial examples are also hard to defend against because they require machine learning models to produce good outputs for every possible input. Most of the time, machine learning models work very well but only work on a very small amount of all the many possible inputs they might encounter. Every strategy we have tested so far fails because it is not adaptive: it may block one kind of attack, but it leaves another vulnerability open to an attacker who knows about the defense being used. Designing a defense that can protect against a powerful, adaptive attacker is an important research area. Conclusion Adversarial examples show that many modern machine learning algorithms can be broken in surprising ways. These failures of machine learning demonstrate that even simple algorithms can behave very differently from what their designers intend. We encourage machine learning researchers to get involved and design methods for preventing adversarial examples, in order to close this gap between what designers intend and how algorithms behave. If you’re interested in working on adversarial examples, consider joining OpenAI.